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On March 24th, 2005, after ten weeks of non-violent protests across the
country, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Askar Akayev, fled the country. The
protests in the Kyrgyz Republic followed closely after the events in Georgia and
Ukraine and policy analysts and the international media initially saw it as another
example of the new wave of democracy in the post-Soviet states. This dissertation
explores the reasons for the non-violent protests from January to March 2005 and
how they led to the government’s collapse. I use a combination of macro-level data,
household opinion surveys, and field interviews to show that common causal
explanations of protest behavior are poor predictors in the case of the Kyrgyz
Republic. Individual levels of well-being, dissatisfaction with the government, and
perception of conflict had little influence on where or when protests occurred. The
role of international funding, western government influence, and local civil society
were minor and relatively unimportant in determining the final outcome. The thesis
of this dissertation is that the protests started for local causes, were sustained by local
political entrepreneurs, increased because of political repression and succeeded
because of the failures of the government. I argue that the decisive factor that
determined the final outcome of the protests was the government’s repressive action
against the protesters. Understanding the causes, conditions, and process of the
protests in the Kyrgyz Republic is important for current U.S. policy towards other
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dynamics. The methodology is a within case study process tracing using survey data
taken immediately before the protests and event analysis based on in-depth field
interviews and media reports.
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Note on Sources and References
A large amount of this dissertation relies on interviews with primary witnesses. Many
of the interviewees for personal and professional reasons requested anonymity as a
condition to be interviewed. To protect all sources, I have referenced all interviews
that I conducted and direct personal correspondence as “author interview” followed
by a number for that reference. For those that agreed to be quoted on the record, I
include the name and date of the interview. I have maintained a master copy of all
interview notes and any future researcher may contact me directly for additional
verification of any source.
As discussed in detail in the methodology section, I used hundreds of news sources to
verify first-hand interviews. The majority of these were from wire services. I have
provided the wire service and the date and the time as listed in the release. I have
chosen not to list the title of the articles because often the news service would release
anywhere from 5 to 15 updates a day with the same headline and no byline as they
added more information as it became available; therefore, the date and the time are
the important distinguishing factors.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In January 2005 protests started in isolated communities throughout the
Kyrgyz Republic and gained momentum in both intensity and duration over the
following six weeks. These protests expanded after the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the first and second round of
parliamentary elections and local citizens viewed the results as fraudulent. The
protests included some physical destruction such as the storming of government
buildings and burning of security services offices. However, the protests remained
remarkably non-violent. After less than two months of sustained protests across the
country, President Askar Akayev’s abrupt abdication of his position was sudden and
unexpected for protest leaders, the general populace and international monitors.
From the 17th century peasant revolts through modern government
overthrows, scholars and political leaders have asked “when will ordinary people
pour into the streets, risking life and limb to lay claim to their rights?”1 There is a
vast field of research on understanding the motivations for political protests, civil
conflict, and insurrection. The events in the Kyrgyz Republic appear to be another
case in a long line of popular protests overthrowing a despised regime. The protests
in the Kyrgyz Republic occurred shortly after the events in Georgia and Ukraine and
political analysts and international civil society leaders initially saw them as another
example of the new wave of democracy in the post-Soviet states. Yet, scholars soon
began to question this assumption and it is noticeable by its absence in McFaul’s July
1 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 71.
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2005 article on the characteristics of democratic change in Serbia, Georgia, and
Ukraine.2 The Kyrgyz Republic is an important case study both for understanding the
dynamics of protest and its contribution to the theoretical literature. It is also an
example of a potentially new unstable type of political protest process in the post-
Soviet space.
The Kyrgyz Republic Case
There are four important anomalies that distinguish the events in the Kyrgyz
Republic from other recent protest events and suggest the need for further scholarly
research and policy analysis. First, there was a lack of central leadership. There was
no clearly identifiable leader at any stage of the protests. The protests were local
events for primarily local reasons that increased because of the repressive response of
the regime. These were local protest events that only joined together on the last day
for the brief protest that ousted the government.
Second, the event did not occur for predicted macro causes. The literature on
conflict has identified a collection of variables that are generally agreed to be
instrumental in the existence of conflict or violence. For the past fifteen years,
regional specialists, civil violence experts and macro models have all predicted
violent civil conflict in the Kyrgyz Republic. With a history of civil violence and low
social and economic conditions, the Kyrgyz Republic met the initial conditions for
violent civil conflict according to several current macro economic models.3 When the
protests occurred, they were initially seen as validation of such expert’s predictions.
Yet, those predictive models anticipated ethnic strife and violence between citizens of
2 Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005).
3 Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy, A World Bank Policy
Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), 4.
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different communities and regions, none of which occurred.4 The initial protests do
not appear to have been initiated in response to the model’s key variables.
Third, the original goal of the protests remained unfulfilled. The first goal of
the protesters was to reinstate their local parliamentarians, not to overthrow the
government. The protests started in response to perceived illegitimate parliamentary
elections. The original statements of leaders focused on the abuses of the election
process. When the protesters arrived in the capital, few knew why they had come and
almost no one had anticipated the final outcome of the president leaving.5 The result
was a president forced from power, but the local parliamentarians were not
reinstated—the original intent of the protests.
Fourth, research indicates that the most aggrieved individuals did not protest.
It appears that those that protested were not systematically different from the general
population in terms of happiness and satisfaction with government. Extensive field
surveys of perceptions of conflict, happiness and satisfaction with government found
no systematic differences among regions and localities that had protests and those that
did not.
There may be clear explanations for each of the anomalies; however, it
appears that there is a tenuous link between the initial conditions, the cause of the
protests, and the final outcome.
4 Nancy Lubin et al., Calming the Ferghana Valley : Development and Dialogue in the Heart of
Central Asia : Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action,
Preventive Action Reports ; V. 4 (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999).
5 Interviewee #51 & #47 . Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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Thesis
This dissertation explores the reasons why non-violent protests occurred in
January 2005 and led to the government’s collapse. It uses a combination of macro-
level data, household opinion surveys, and field interviews to show that common
causal explanations of protest behavior are poor predictors in the case of the Kyrgyz
Republic. Individual levels of well-being, dissatisfaction with the government, and
perception of conflict had little influence on where or when protests occurred. The
role of international funding, western governments, and local civil society were minor
and unimportant in determining the final outcome. The thesis of this dissertation is
that the protests started for local causes, were sustained by local political
entrepreneurs, increased because of political repression and succeeded because of the
failures of the government. I argue that it is the repressive action of the government
toward the protesters—reactive dynamics—that was the most important component in
determining the final outcome of the political protests.
The dissertation presents three dependent variables or causal outcomes that
are examined in succession: 1) formation of protests, 2) increase of protests, and 3)
collapse of government. The independent variables are in categories, first the initial
conditions, second the government’s repressive actions, and third, the political
entrepreneur’s activities (see Figure 1). The initial conditions are comprised of both
the initial state of society—socio-economic conditions, history of conflict, ethnic
splits—and individual perceptions—personal happiness, government satisfaction, and
perception of conflict. The repressive government actions are the alienation of
opposition, the failure to communicate and direct physical pressure. The political
5
entrepreneurs both motivated their followers and provided resources to the protesters.
The first outcome state is the formation of the protests, the government repression
leads to the next state of an increase in the intensity of the protests and the final
outcome is the temporary unification of the opposition leading to the collapse of the
government.
Figure 1: Variables and Outcomes
The political protest and civil violence literature suggest two types of
motivations often apparent from initial conditions. Explanations based on individual
indicators include individual perceptions and grievances, inequality, ethnicity, and
identity issues. A second type of motivation involves societal or collective factors
and includes macro socio-economic indicators, institutions, civil organizations,
political leaders, and collective action. This dissertation argues that complete
explanations should include a third component of process which is the dynamic
interaction whereby individuals, groups, and institutions interact in ways that
dampen, stimulate or spread protest behavior.
The research is presented in two steps, 1) initial conditions and 2) dynamic
































micro initial conditions were motivators for the protests. The dynamic relationships
section argues that it is the reactive dynamics to the government repression that
determined the outcome of the protests.
Initial conditions
Why had the Kyrgyz Republic remained calm for so long in spite of a history
of local violence and high macro indicators for conflict? Why did protests start in
some cities and not others? I argue that initial conditions among regions did not
impact where protests occurred or whether they were destructive. I examine two
expected causes, the deterioration of macro-economic indicators and negative
individual perceptions of well-being and satisfaction with government and find no
difference in absolute indicators or in relative indicators among regions with protests
versus regions without. Contrary to traditional arguments, deteriorating macro
economic conditions were not a primary motivator of the protesters. In addition, my
research demonstrates that these were not local protests growing from citizens’
discontent with economic and social well being, the government’s legitimacy or lack
of democracy.
Dynamic
Why did the local protests increase in intensity? I argue that the protests were
about the ability of local leaders to motivate broad popular dissatisfaction with
President Askar Akayev and the ruling elite for their own purposes through local
networks and connections. Supporters were encouraged through payment, food,
family connections, or other means. There were only a few, very small popular
uprisings without some local leader. This does not imply that there were not real
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grievances by the local population, but they were motivated and encouraged by the
local parliamentarians.
Why was there a sudden non-violent sudden overthrow of the government? I argue
that the central government’s repressive actions led to their overthrow. The
government miscalculated the relative strength of the protests and their ability to
respond to repression. Initial conditions of the quality of the central government were
not the factors in determining the collapse; rather it was the manner and process of
the protests. The repressive dynamic from the government determined the outcome.
While the central government was weak and prone to collapse, if the government had
not responded aggressively to the protests, the president would not have left.
Approach to the problem
The approach of this paper is to provide a detailed, comprehensive analysis of
a single case study. Chapter 3 presents a detailed methodological review. The case
study approach provides the opportunity to examine the details and understand micro-
level motivations and interactions. A discrete case study approach can provide new
insights that a macro level cross-country statistical comparison often overlooks. For
example, Sambanis uses a case study approach to analyze the results of two popular
statistical models used to predict civil conflict.6 He goes through the data sets and
shows where the conclusions of the model significantly fail to match with the reality
in the countries. He demonstrates that understanding the real causes of civil war
demands combining macro quantitative models with an understanding of
micromotives which can only be discovered through a case study process.
6 Nicholas Sambanis, "Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies," (Yale
University, unpublished paper, 2003).
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The advantage of a single, in-depth case study is that it allows the research to
examine the causal linkages among initial indicators, process states and final
outcomes. A microscopic approach provides the ability to see relationships that may
be obscured by a lower level of magnification. The constraint on the research is in
generalizing from too specific of a case. This paper will demonstrate that the events
in the Kyrgyz Republic have many signatures of traditional protests and conflict and
the results of the research can provide useful policy contributions and
recommendations. Future research by this author and others will hopefully build on
the data and analysis in this paper to conduct cross-country comparisons. This paper
argues that while there are anomalies about the Kyrgyz case, the anomalies do not
prevent the generalization of an argument about the relationship of process to
outcome.
Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used in this case study. The
quantitative methods applied are survey data analysis and event analysis based on
field interviews and media reports. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, this is
the first and perhaps only existing database that has responses from a cross-country
randomized sampling of individual perceptions of well-being, propensity for conflict,
and other key issues taken five months prior to widespread protests across the
country. This is a unique opportunity to examine individual preferences for economic
and social well-being, satisfaction with government, perception of corruption, and
probability of conflict in the region and country. This is the first known instance of
applying data taken at this level immediately prior to a series of protests and conflicts.
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Event analysis provides a systematic, quantifiable process for interpreting and
comparing the protests based on local data. The data is based on field research from a
total of three field research trips to the Kyrgyz Republic and the collection of
information from hundreds of news articles from international and local press.
The qualitative method is process tracing also based on field interviews and
media reports. The process tracing approach uses micro level data to examine the
casual mechanisms that link suspected causes to measurable effects. This moves
beyond the direct quantifiable linkages towards understanding motivations for
response and engagement.
Significance and Contribution
After the 1991 social movements in Eastern Europe, Sidney Tarrow, a major
figure in the field of political protests and social movements, questioned why western
scholars had failed to predict the social movements that swept through Eastern
Europe.7 This same challenge applies to understanding the wave of movements that
spread through the former Soviet Union states from 2003 to 2005, starting with
Georgia in November 2003, Ukraine in December 2004 and the Kyrgyz Republic in
March 2005. Initially these were seen as representative of a wave of democracy
sweeping through the region motivated by external funds, yet this research questions
this theory.
There are three objectives of this research: first, to provide the first systematic,
detailed presentation of the timing and history of the protest events in the Kyrgyz
7 Sidney Tarrow, ""Aiming at a Moving Target": Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern
Europe," PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 1 (1991): 12.
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Republic based on media reports and personal interviews; second, to provide insight
into the field of happiness research and political protests by examining the
relationship between individual surveys and protest actions; and third, to analyze the
impact of repressive dynamics (government to protesters) on the process of political
protests.
The events in the Kyrgyz Republic are too recent to have been extensively
analyzed by academics. Understanding the causes, conditions, and process of the
protests in the Kyrgyz Republic is important for current U.S. policy towards the post-
Soviet countries and for these countries own internal political succession dynamic.
The Kyrgyz Republic case is an important puzzle for both academics and policy
makers. Is it similar to other post-Soviet protests and government overthrows, or is it
fundamentally different? Is it an example of a new type of political protests that is
emerging in these countries? It is possible that the Kyrgyz Republic is an outlier and
was a unique event. If it is an outlier, it is important to understand why and how. If it
is a symbol of a new and emerging pattern in the moderately authoritarian regimes, it
is vital for the policy maker to understand the process and the implications of these
protests. If we understand the reasons for the anomalous formation of protests in
these communities, it might point us towards a model for understanding the broader
questions of emerging conflicts in other countries.
Outline of dissertation
Chapter 2 provides a framework of the problem through a brief review of the
relevant literature from the civil conflict, political protest and happiness fields.
Chapter 3 presents the methods used in the research—case study, survey analysis, and
11
process tracing. Chapter 4 examines the initial conditions of the individual indicators.
Chapter 5 examines the initial conditions of the societal indicators and presents the
timeline of events. Chapter 6 presents analysis of the dynamic relationships that
influenced the protests, and finally Chapter 7 presents the key findings, contribution
and policy implications.
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Chapter 2: Framework of the problem—Literature
Review
Overview of the literature
This research starts with a singular event and attempts to explain the processes
that led to the outcome to develop a useful policy response and prediction of similar
events. This requires a broad approach to the literature. There is unfortunately not a
single literature that addresses the details of this case study. The literature review
will by design be broad rather than deep. It seeks to raise the key questions and
unresolved issues in the overlapping literatures that are applicable to this case. As the
contribution of this research will be cross-cutting across several disciplines, so the
literature will engage a broad selection of fields.
For purposes of this dissertation I divide the field of political protests into two
major camps of analysis, predictors based on individual perceptions and on social or
collective actions. This research seeks to place itself in the intersection of individual
and collective theories of protests and incorporate insights from both fields. This
chapter will provide a brief overview of the literature related to the theme of political
protests and civil conflict, with specific attention on these two aspects of protests:
individual perceptions and collective indicators. The individual perceptions section
examines the literature related to relative deprivation, well-being indicators, identity,
and ethnicity as predictors of protests. The collective indicators section examines
general macro socio-economic, institutional, collective action and resource
mobilization models as predictors of conflict.
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Tarrow’s book, Contentious Politics and Social Movements, was a major step
forward in synthesizing a wide range of theories and presenting a coherent historical
account of political protests from contentious politics to social movement. I will use
Tarrow’s definition that “contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in
league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites,
authorities, and opponents.”8 In his topology when these forces are sustained and are
“backed by dense social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-
oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents.
The result is the social movement.”9
For purposes of this review, the events in the Kyrgyz Republic are defined as
contentious politics. I would argue that they were not unified or sustained long
enough to fit in the category of a social movement. I will use the term protests and
political protests interchangeably throughout the paper to refer to this initial stage of
political organization or what Tarrow calls the “political opportunity structure.”10
Individual perceptions
Relative deprivation
In Why Men Rebel, Gurr explores the reasons why an individual rebels or
commits acts of violence within the framework of society.11 Gurr and his colleagues
constructed various databases of revolutions, protests and wars concurrent with
economic and social data about the countries. Gurr is examining not only what
motivates the individual, but is beginning to look at if this same motivation is what
8 Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 20.
11 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.,: Published for the Center of International Studies,
Princeton University [by] Princeton University Press, 1970), 532.
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causes a society to act in a violent manner. Gurr concluded that the issue was relative
deprivation and its relationship to expectations. Relative deprivation is defined as
"actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value
capacities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people
believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions
they think they are capable of getting and keeping."12
Eisinger in his study of protests in inner city America notes that the urban
minorities are just as likely as the middle class to protest if their level of relative
deprivation is similar. It is not the class of people, but the relations within a group
that provide the opportunities for protest or conflict. It is “the perception of
deprivation, whether objective or subjective in relation to others in society [that] is
likely to result in aggressive political behavior.”13
A problem with the relative deprivation theories is that “outbreaks of
contention cannot be derived from the deprivation people suffer or the
disorganization of their societies, for these preconditions are far more enduring than
the movements they support.”14 Relative levels of inequality are seen by some as a
given and therefore have little impact on the potential for protests.
Happiness
Individual well-being and happiness indicators provide the measurement tools
necessary to interpret and predict the relative deprivation theories presented above.
There are several excellent reviews of the happiness literature in existence and this
12 Ibid., 17.
13 Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," The American Political
Science Review 67, no. 1 (1973): 25.
14 Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 71.
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paper makes no claim to improve on their work.15 For a working definition of
happiness, this paper uses Veenhoven’s definition: “the degree to which an individual
judges the overall quality of his life-as-a-whole favorably. In other words: how well
he likes the life he leads.”16 This definition allows for the broader concept of well-
being and measures more than just the single answer response, “how happy are you
with your life?”
Easterlin, one of the fathers of the happiness research, argues that both the
classical economist’s theory of increasing utility and psychologists’ setpoint theory
are wrong.17 The idea of setpoint theory is that everyone has a happiness position that
is generally unchanged by life’s circumstances. Therefore, if you are a generally
happy person before winning the lottery, you will be a happy person afterwards. If
you are an unhappy person before, winning the lottery will not make you happy. The
same applies to health, marriage, social status, etc.
Economists would argue that increasing one’s income should increase one’s
measure of happiness. To paraphrase the famous economist Pigou, if one’s economic
welfare increases, ones social welfare should also increase.18 Easterlin uses life cycle
data to show that circumstances such as health and marriage also have significant
long-term impacts on perceptions of happiness in addition to just income. Healthy,
married people are generally happier than the converse. In reference to the influence
of economic status, the issue is a bit muddier. Numerous studies have found “a
15 See Ruut Veenhoven, "Developments in Satisfaction-Research," Social Indicators Research 37, no.
1 (1996)., Richard A. Easterlin, "Building a Better Theory of Well-Being," (University of Southern
California and IZA Bonn, 2003).
16 Rutt Veenhoven, "National Wealth and Individual Happiness " in Understanding Economic
Behaviour ed. Klaus G. Grunert and Folke Ölander (Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1989), 1.
17 Easterlin, "Building a Better Theory of Well-Being."
18 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed. (London,: Macmillan and co., limited, 1932), 3.
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significant positive association between income and happiness” when using point-of-
time regressions.19 However, over a lifecycle, even as income increases, happiness
remains unchanged. Easterlin argues that the difference is material aspirations, every
time we get something new; we then want something bigger and better. Our
attainment and our aspirations are always competing. Above a minimum threshold,
more money doesn’t make us happier, but health, education, and social unions might.
In general, an individual’s perceived level of happiness is based first on
monetary well-being, followed by family and health. How someone perceives any
circumstances “depend partly on one’s history and partly on comparison with the
situation of others.”20 However, material improvements over a lifetime appear to
have little impact on overall satisfaction. This theory of relative improvements in
happiness is challenged by Veenhoven who argues that standards of happiness are
much more than simply comparisons to those around you. Rather there is a desire for
attaining more and increasing one’s material well-being, regardless of those around
you.21
Happiness and Income
A key economic variable that has a significant impact on happiness is level of
income, compared at both a country and an individual level. Do people in richer
countries report higher levels of happiness than those in poorer countries? As one’s
income increases over time, is there a corresponding increase in happiness? Do richer
individuals report higher levels of happiness than poorer individuals?
19 Easterlin, "Building a Better Theory of Well-Being."
20 Ibid., 26.
21 Veenhoven, "National Wealth and Individual Happiness ".
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There is clear evidence from numerous cross-country surveys that those living
in more developed countries consistently report higher levels of happiness than those
in poorer countries.22 However, these correlations between higher income countries
and happiness may be driven by other factors such as human rights, democracy,
distribution of income, stability, etc.23 From numerous studies it does appear that
there is a minimum threshold of income necessary to reach higher levels of well-
being. Once above this minimum income threshold, there is no significant difference
among countries reported levels of happiness.
A curious phenomenon noted by many authors is that while there is a positive
correlation between levels of income and happiness between countries, within a
country over time there is no such correlation. For example, in the U.S., income per
capita grew by more than 150% from 1946-1991, yet there was a slight decrease in
the level of reported well-being from 2.4 in 1946 to 2.2 in 1991.24 There are many
different interpretations of this finding; for our purposes, it is enough to present the
finding and highlight the point that in developed countries there is much more to
“subjective well-being than just income.”25
A third issue is do richer individuals report higher levels of happiness than
poorer individuals in the same country at the same time? Again numerous studies
indicate that there is a positive correlation between income and happiness, yet the
correlation is often quite low and points towards other factors as explaining the
differences. Many studies find a similarity to the country comparisons, below a
22 Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions





minimum threshold (e.g. $15,000 in a 1981-1984 U.S. study) a rise in income has a
strong effect on happiness levels, however above the minimum standard there is a
much weaker effect on happiness.
An important outcome from these studies is to highlight the subjective nature
of perceived well-being. Individuals compare themselves within their cohort much
more than across all individuals, making perception of well-being and happiness
relative to those that you identify with. As Easterlin notes, “people with higher
income, are, on average, happier, but raising everybody’s income does not increase
everybody’s happiness, because, in comparison to others, income has not
improved.”26
There has been a limited amount of work to understanding how individuals in
developing countries perceive happiness. Graham and Pettinato have done extensive
work on Russia and for 17 countries in Latin America find that “there is no obvious
relationship between income and happiness” in their sample of developing
countries.27 However, “average happiness levels are higher in the advanced
economies than they are in the developing ones.”28 As Graham highlights, happiness
surveys and indices should not be seen as replacements for measures of income or
consumption, but rather as additional tools to provide insight into the development
process. The survey data presented in Chapter 4 finds a much closer relationship
between income and happiness across countries than Graham and Pettinato found.
26 Ibid., 85.
27 Carol Graham, "Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness," World Bank Res Obs
20, no. 2 (2005): 2.
28 Ibid.
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In a recent study of happiness and well-being in Russia, the authors found an
unusual relationship between unemployment and levels of happiness. They found
that one’s level of personal satisfaction was greatly dependent on one’s local
community regardless of if they were unemployed. The finding suggests that
“comparison with other people becomes more important to subjective well-being in
times of economic turmoil.”29 This finding may have an impact on survey findings of
respondents in Central Asia, a similar country also in economic turmoil.
Happiness and Protest
In the first page of a book titled Happiness and Hardship, the authors pose the
important question of “why some societies seem to tolerate significant degrees of
economic hardship and yet retain political and social stability, whereas others break
into violent protest in response to much smaller economic declines or shocks.”30 The
author’s examine the question of individuals’ perceptions of economic well-being and
economic shifts but leave the salient point of the relationship between perceived
levels of happiness and conflict or protests unanswered.
There have been several different studies that examine the relationship
between protests and individual happiness. Some older studies seemed to imply that
happy people do not protest and the majority of protesters are dissatisfied.31 Yet it is
also clear that the level of discontent is no greater among those protesting than in the
29 Andrew Eggers, Clifford Gaddy, and Carol Graham, "Well-Being and Unemployment in Russia in
the 1990’s: Can Society’s Suffering Be Individuals’ Solace?," The Journal of Socio-Economics 5
(2006 ).
30 Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New
Market Economies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 1.
31 See Eric Hoffer, The True Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York:
Perennial Library, 1989). and William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free
Press, 1959).
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general population.32 So there may be less ‘happy’ people protesting, but not a
statistically significant more amount of discontented people protesting. Frey and
Stutzer in a study in Switzerland, find a correlation between levels of happiness and
civic engagement. Generally they find that those that participate more in local
politics are statistically happier than those that don’t.33 (As they note, this does not
imply knowing the direction of the casualty arrow). Could this imply that happier
people are more likely to be engaged in civic activity or actions which they view as
improving their society? This question is addressed in depth in Chapter 4.
In comparison directly to riots and protests, McPhail found “the deprivation-
frustration-aggression explanation receives scant empirical support when personal
attributes bearing on this argument are examined in relation to individual riot
participation.”34 The conclusion of the majority of more recent studies is that
“discontent does not appear to be a strong predictor of protest behavior.”35 But it is
generally accepted that those that are protesting are discontent. So levels of
dissatisfaction in society may not provide a predictor, but they are a necessary
component. An important unknown in the literature is if this level of dissatisfaction
is only relative to one’s immediate surroundings, as noted above in reference to the
income-happiness relationship, or if it is to a broader swath of society.
32 Veenhoven, "Developments in Satisfaction-Research."
33 Frey and Stutzer, Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being.
34 Clark McPhail, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research,"
American Sociological Review 36, no. 6 (1971): 1064.
35 Bert Klandermans, "Does Happiness Soothe Political Protest? The Complex Relation between
Discontent and Political Unrest " in How Harmful Is Happiness? : Consequences of Enjoying Life or
Not, ed. Ruut Veenhoven (Rotterdam: Universitaire Pers, 1989), 6.
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Recent work by Graham and others has focused on the relative levels of
perceived happiness.36 While Graham hasn’t explicitly developed the link between
her work and the protest literature, the underlying theories are the same. Most of the
research on happiness and protest has occurred at a macro scale across a country. The
current data provides the opportunity for a more refined analysis at a micro level by
allowing comparison among local communities. Because of the decrease in
popularity of the relative deprivation arguments as discussed above, there has been
very little work done to link the new, more rigorous happiness research with protest
or civil conflict analysis. This research hopes to make an insightful contribution to
these questions.
In addition to levels of personal happiness or well-being and conflict, there is
an additional issue regarding perception of the government or general social
conditions. Are those that are more upset about the government more likely to
protest? One direction has been to examine what Klanderman calls the “causal
attribution”. Studies have looked at if it is the individual or society that is to blame
for the deprivation.37 However this is a different question from asking about the level
of satisfaction with the government or services. There has been very little research
specifically using country specific data to compare participation in protests with
satisfaction with government across a wide range of topics from general services to
corruption to quality and fairness. Chapter 4 provides these questions in detail.
36 Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New
Market Economies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
37 Nathan Caplan, "The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies," (1970).
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Ethnicity and Identity
The academic and empirical support for ethnicity and identity motivations in
protests and civil conflict has waned in the past few years, but ethnicity is still a
relevant part of the history in the Kyrgyz Republic. For example, in these events, the
role of ethnicity appears to have no significant bearing on the events. But this is
important and relevant in its absence. Why was ethnicity not a fundamental issue?
As will be discussed below, there has been a history of bloody ethnic conflicts in the
region. What is the balance between individual identity and one’s rational calculation
of costs of protesting?
One sociological approach is to see conflict as motivated by clashes of
identity between individuals. Rothman sees the issue of identity as a “motivating
factor” in all conflicts.38 The study of identity-based conflict has its roots in
ethnographic studies of cultural, ethnic, racial and even sexual identities. There is
little consensus of what is more important or even when identity matters most. In
addition, there is a lack of linkages between identity-based conflict and the other
types of conflict.
A second body of literature looks at conflict between groups below the state
level. Most of this analysis focuses on ethnic, religious, racial, or other similar
divisions. This approach has been called primordialism and seeks to “explain conflict
in terms of psychological and cultural forces that frame the ways in which individuals
within groups understand themselves and others.”39 Ethnic causes are a direct
38 Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities, 1st
ed., The Jossey-Bass Conflict Resolution Series (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1997).
39 Patrick Barron, Claire Q. Smith, and Michael Woolcock, "Understanding Local Level Conflict in
Developing Countries," in Social Development Papers (Washington, DC: The World Bank).
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challenge to the early Malthusian arguments for conflict and the more modern day
environmental disaster theories put forth by Homer-Dixon and others. This body of
literature accepts that each individual is a composite of different identities, e.g.
mother, wife, lawyer, black, ethnic minority, religion, etc., but that we form groups
based on which identity is either under attack or which one we most need affirmation
for at that time. If others are attacking “our” group, then often our solidarity and
attachment to that group will increase and the divide between “them” and “us” will
significantly widen.40 These theorists argue that while identity is rooted in the
individual it is only “manifested” and challenged within the social interactions of
groups and society.
Ross in his study of conflict within pre-industrial tribes draws the conclusion
that one of the primary causes for the wide variance in degree and type of conflict is
significant difference found in primitive tribe’s degree of social cohesion or social
interaction. His theory is based in the theory of societies or groups interdependence.
He argues that the more interdependent different groups are on each other, the less
likely they are to engage in conflict.41
An important issue with the sociological motivations is determining causality.
Do identities sort people into groups and then they engage in conflict, or does the
issue around which there is conflict force them to assume certain identities? Who
determines what identity someone will assume at a certain time? It is almost
impossible to disentangle the directions of influence within the interpersonal
sociological issues such as ethnicity, identity, equity, etc.
40 Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities.
41 Marc Howard Ross, The Culture of Conflict : Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
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Collective indicators
The focus of early social analysis of revolutions and protests saw individuals
as the primary players in social movements; however, collective action and social
movement theorists argue “that it is life within groups that transforms the potential
for action into social movements.”42 The new theories took from Olson’s work on
collective action, microeconomic theories, and rational choice structure and moved
toward examining the creation of the social movement organization.
The organization replaced the individual; the new framework was to examine
contentious collective action. The new concept was the social movement
organization defined by Tilly as “an organized, sustained, self-conscious challenge to
existing authorities.”43
Macro socio-economic predictors
Macro socio-economic indicators impact both the individual and the
collective’s perception and potential for conflict or protest. For organizational
structure, the macro indicators are discussed in the collective indicators section.
Civil conflict has been predicted in Central Asia and specifically the Kyrgyz
Republic for the past ten years. While the events in March 2005 were not civil
conflict, it is important to provide a very brief review of the key macro-indicators for
civil conflict. This paper will provide only a brief highlight of the key agreements
and disagreements and problems with the existing models civil conflict models.44 The
two most important papers using statistical analysis of predictors for civil conflict are
42 Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 22.
43 Tarrow, ""Aiming at a Moving Target": Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern
Europe," 18.
44 Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," (Washington, DC:
World Bank Report, 2002).
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by Collier and Hoeffler (CH)45 and Fearon and Laitin (FL)46 both using a pooled logit
analysis of panel data.47
CH argues, “If a country is in economic decline, is dependent on primary
commodity exports, and has a low per capita income and that income is unequally
distributed, it is at high risk of civil war.”48 Other studies point at the previous history
of armed conflicts and show that the more recent the conflict the greater potential for
war.49 In addition, high infant mortality, a mountainous environment, and the ratio of
poverty in the capital to poverty in the region all influence the potential for conflict.50
The key theme in these studies is that economic development in a country is
much more important than democratic development for predicting civil conflict. All
of the traditional “soft” issues in development, such as level of democracy,
development aid and legitimacy of the government all fail to be statistically
significant variables in the models.51 The other surprising result is that neither model
finds ethnic grievances or ethnic disparity as a key indicator of violence. While there
are other models that question this result, ethnicity seems to carry less statistical
weight than traditionally supposed.52
For purposes of this paper the important point is that the Kyrgyz Republic met
all of the basic indicators for civil conflict in the most established macro models. It
45 P. Collier and A. E. Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," in Centre for the Study of African
Economies (2002).
46 James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," American Political
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 6.
47 Sambanis, "Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies."
48 Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy.
49 Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 26.
50 Ibid. and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil
Conflict " in Defence & Peace Economics (Carfax Publishing Company, 2002).
51 Collier and Hoeffler, "Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict ".
52 Sambanis, "Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies."
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was a country that by any macro-analysis was on the verge of open civil or ethnic war
and only needed an initiating event to provide the spark
Institutional predictors
The 2003 Center for International Development and Conflict Management
(CIDCM) report notes that the number of democracies doubled between 1985 and
2002 at the same time the amount of global warfare has decreased by more than fifty-
percent since the mid-1980s.53 Development and democracy theorists argue that the
process of democracy, including individual’s participation and their acceptance of the
legitimacy of reform are keys to preventing conflict and reducing poverty.54
The problem is in the process of movement from an autocracy towards a fully-
functioning democracy. This is similar to de Tocqueville’s theory that it is when a
bad government is moving towards political openness that it is most likely to
experience unrest.55 The interaction between the government and the social
movements or individuals can have an important impact on the potential and
sustainability of protests.
This was explored by Eisinger in his analysis of protest in American cities,
“The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is
not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots,
barriers, and resources of the political systems themselves.” 56 His research
examined the responsiveness of a government to its citizen’s demands and the
53 Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2003 : A Global Survey of Armed
Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy (College Park, MD: Center for International
Development and Conflict Management, 2003), 12,17.
54 Amartya Kumar Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press,
2001).
55 Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 74.
56 Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," 12.
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incidents of protest. He suggested two important hypotheses; the first is that “protest
occurs most frequently in unresponsive and unrepresentative political systems.” He
defines this as a linear relationship.
The second hypothesis is that “protest occurs as a political system begins to
open up.” This suggests a curvilinear relationship. Eisinger’s conclusion is that
“protest occurs in a mixed system because the pace of change does not keep up with
expectations, even though change is occurring”[emphasis in original].57
In addition to the issue of the relative openness or closed nature of the system,
there is the important factor if the government is actively conducting repression to
prevent protests from occurring. The issue of the impact of repression on political
protests has been extensively examined from both the relative deprivation and the
resource mobilization schools of thought. Similar to Eisinger’s hypothesis,
Khawaja’s article on repression in the West Bank assumes either a curvilinear
relationship, based in the relative deprivation motivations or a linear relationship
based in the resource mobilization theories.58 Both of these approaches would agree
that at the highest levels of repression, the level of protest should decrease.
Resource mobilization theory assumes that coercion impacts the cost of
organization and therefore increased repression should lead to less social movements.
Relative deprivation assumes that repression would fuel frustration and therefore
would increase one’s potential to participate until some point when the repression
overwhelmed the individuals.
57 Ibid.: 15.
58 Marwan Khawaja, "Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank,"
Sociological Forum 8, no. 1 (1993).
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Khawaja’s study found that increased levels of repression increased collective
action, however it was not across all levels of interaction. The research distinguished
between collective and individual repression and did find uneven differences in levels
of action.
Collective action models
Collective action theories are important to protests and civil violence for their
insight to the incentives needed for individuals to engage in protests. Firmly
anchored in rational choice theory, Olson argues that without some incentives or
coercion “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interest.”59 This is directly relevant to civil conflict and protests in examining
the question of how rebel groups form.
Tarrow expresses it well when he says that Hirschman “complained that
Olson regarded collective action only as a cost—when to many it is a benefit. For
people whose lives are mired in drudgery and desperation, the offer of an exciting,
risky, and possibly beneficial campaign of collective action may be a gain.”60 The
collective action dilemma is equally relevant to peaceful groups and to protest and
rebellious groups. In direct contrast to the relative deprivation and grievance theories,
Lichbach points out, “Those with a reason to make a revolution do not always make
their revolution.”61 He specifically examines the issue of how rebel groups overcome
the collective action dilemma and presents several solutions including the use of
selective incentives.
59 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard
Economic Studies, V. 124 (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1965), 2.
60 Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 21.
61 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma, Economics, Cognition, and Society (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1995), 16.
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In his discussion of the Eastern European movements, referenced above,
Tarrow argues that we must adapt our concepts of collective action from one time to
another. “Forms of protest that would have revolutionary implications in one system
or time period may be treated as routine in another.” 62 Some of the early protests in
the Kyrgyz Republic, while engaging large crowds of people, were initially
considered routine as street protests and even road blockades were an accepted form
of protest. This is important in the discussion of action taken in Chapter 5, because
the protesters had to increase the level of their protests to gain the attention of the
government. Street protests had become routine and to make a point, it was necessary
to escalate the tactics and the level of violence.
Resource mobilization is a type of collective action model based on rational
choice with input from the fields of microeconomics and sociology as put forth by
McCarthy and Zald63 and expanded on by Tilly64 and others. In the concept of
resource mobilization, “movements form because of long-term changes in group
resources, organization and opportunities for collective action.”65 Resource
Mobilization “is the process by which a group secures collective control over the
resources needed for collective action.”66
The theory of resource mobilization is more about the mechanism of
managing, organizing and conducting the political protests than about the ideology,
individual preferences or personal attributes of the protesters. It was originally based
62 Tarrow, ""Aiming at a Moving Target": Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern
Europe," 17.
63 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory," The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977).
64 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978).
65 J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," Annual
Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 530.
66 Ibid.: 532.
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on analysis of social movements in the US in the 60’s and 70’s and the finding that it
was the acquisition and distribution of resources that allowed groups to form and
sustain political activity.
Conclusion
The two major distinctions in the political protest literature are motivations
based in individual perceptions and those based in social or collective actions.
Relative deprivation theory and the happiness literature provide an initial framework
to examine individuals’ perceptions of well-being. But a significant problem is that
real or relative levels of welfare are an insufficient explanation for the development
of political protests. Relative levels of inequality have existed at much greater rates
than levels of protest and appear to be a necessary, but not sufficient component. The
happiness literature provides an alternative method to evaluate inherent differences
among individuals, but the empirical links to formation of protests are tenuous and
not well documented. Individual ethnicity and identity characteristics are important
factors in predicting some political protests, but are not universally applicable.
Macro econometric models are useful to provide a crude measure to identify
countries with a potential for conflict, but have a demonstrated weakness in providing
causal mechanisms. An important historic shift in the political protest literature was
from a focus on the individual to the collective or society. Resource mobilization and
collective action models suggests the importance of examining specific incentives
offered by political leaders on both sides of the protests and resources used by leaders
to advance the protests.
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The current trend in academic research and analysis is in favor of collective
action models that demonstrate the relationship of the individual within a group
interacting with the greater society. Protests are seen as a melding of different social
movements and protest groups with overlapping and often competing agendas.
Institutions and changes in political systems are viewed as either enablers or
detractors from the protest process, but always as engaged. Protests are not simply
isolated events led by disgruntled individuals operating outside the pressures,
incentives, and benefits of a collective group.
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Chapter 3: Presentation of methods
Overview of case study methodology
The approach of this paper is to provide a detailed, comprehensive analysis of
a single case study. I use Bennett and George’s definition of a case study as, “the
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical
explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”67 An intrinsic benefit of a
case study approach is that it “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its
real-life context.”68
Large n statistical analysis are useful at suggesting correlation between policy
variables, but case study methods work best to provide information on the
“underlying causal mechanisms.” 69 One of the main advantages of the case study in
application to the events in the Kyrgyz Republic is the case study’s “value as a useful
means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context
of individual cases.”70
There is usefulness to cross-country comparisons and analysis across multiple
cases. However, as George and Bennett note, “improved historical explanations of
individual cases are the foundation for drawing wider implications from case
studies.”71 For a new and emerging event such as the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic,
the first step for the researcher is to establish the initial conditions and possible causal
mechanisms within the case before moving to cross-country comparison.
67 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 5.
68 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research : Design and Methods, 3rd ed., Applied Social Research
Methods Series (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003), 12.




Case studies can take a variety of different approaches and methodologies.
Because this is some of the first research done on this event, this research is first a
descriptive case study where the “aim is to get the story down for the possible benefit
of later policy makers, scholars and other citizens.”72 Second, it attempts to challenge
existing theories and test new hypothesis. Third, the case study research examines if
the Kyrgyz Republic is a “deviant case study” as defined by Odell, “where the main
causes were present but the expected effect did not occur.”73 I would expand this to
include cases where the main causes were present, the expected effect DID occur, but
NOT for the expected causes.
A methodological challenge is that the Kyrgyz case may be a deviant case or,
more likely an example of equifinality. Equifinality is the argument that “different
causal patterns can lead to similar outcomes.” 74[emphasis in original] Equifinality
may provide the methodological explanation why the events in Georgia, Ukraine and
the Kyrgyz Republic all had similar outcomes—crowds of protesters overthrowing a
former Soviet leader—yet had fundamentally different patterns that led to that result.
The use of a single case study that applies the method of process tracing is the first
step to test this hypothesis and identify the casual mechanisms.
Within this single case study, the paper applies two complementary
methodological approaches. First is the statistical analysis of survey data and event
analysis to allow the testing of several hypotheses regarding the influence of the
individual actor. Second, is the qualitative approach of process tracing based on field
72 John S. Odell, "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy," International Studies
Perspectives 2, no. 2 (2001): 162.
73 Ibid.: 166.
74 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 161.
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This is the first and perhaps only existing database that has responses from a
cross-country randomized sampling of individual’s perception of well-being,
propensity for conflict, and other key issues taken five months prior to widespread
protests across the country. This is a unique opportunity to examine individual
preferences for economic and social well-being, satisfaction with government,
perception of corruption, and probability of conflict in the region and country. This is
the first known instance of having data taken at this level immediately prior to a
series of protests and conflicts. This work builds on the work of Graham, Frey and
Stuzer in their recent application of well-being indicators. This section provides an
overview of the survey implementation process and the survey controls used in the
analysis, a discussion of the dependent and independent variables is presented in
Chapter 4.
In October and November of 2004, the World Bank funded a household
survey of 6,000 respondents in 4 countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The author was a member of the team that
wrote the questions and oversaw the survey implementation. Local firms in the
region were contracted to conduct the surveys in the local language. An international
consulting firm provided training assistance and methodological supervision to the
field survey team. The 100 question survey of 1500 households in each of the four
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countries asked questions about the respondent’s economic and social well-being,
their perception of the likelihood of local, regional and national level conflict, their
frustration at the government, and general demographic characteristics.75 Appendix 2
presents the full methodology report submitted by the firm that conducted the survey.
Proper survey design and analysis must address three issues: weighting,
stratification and clustering.76 Some of the problems of clustering and weights can be
correctly mitigated in the design stage and the implementation of the survey.77
The sampling procedure was a three-stage stratified clustered sampling. The
first stage used census data to
determine similar sized geographic
units and then label them as either
urban or rural. From this list of all
the geographic units in the country,
the team used primary probability sampling (PPS) to select a number of primary
sampling units (PSUs) representative of the urban and rural population of the Kyrgyz
Republic to generate 1,500 interviews. For purposes of the survey, rural was defined
as “villages – rural settlements that are subordinated to rural councils (“ailny
okmot”)” and urban units are “parts of large urban settlements – each city is divided
into parts with populations between 3,991 and 5,364 inhabitants.”78
75 See Appendix 5 for a copy of the survey questions in English.
76 C. J. Skinner, D. Holt, and T. M. F. Smith, Analysis of Complex Surveys, Wiley Series in Probability
and Mathematical Statistics (Chichester ; New York: Wiley, 1989), 2.
77 Ibid., 6.
78 Lawrence Robertson, "Regional Perception Survey of Conflict Prevention and Cooperation in
Central Asia: Methodology Report " (2005).
Stage 1: Random selection of urban/rural
geographic units (primary sampling units, PSU)
Stage 2: Sequential random sampling of
households (secondary sampling units, 2SUs)
Stage 3: Random selection of HH member with
Kish grid
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The second stage was sequential random sampling of households for
secondary sampling units (2SUs) in the selected PSUs. The household lists were
taken from available government data sets. The third stage was to use a Kish grid to
ensure random sampling of respondents within each household. A Kish grid is a table
constructed to insure random selection of individuals within a household based upon
number of people in the house, age of respondents and number of clusters in the PSU
or 2SU.
Because of field survey issues, some of the regions and districts were left out
of the household survey, as the methodology report states:
Kyrgyzstan has 14 cities, 431 rural districts and 1,815 villages. The population
of Kyrgyzstan was to [sic] 4,641,237 people, the urban population was
1,520,487 (33%), and the rural population 3,120,750 (67%) as of January, 1,
1998. Several remote or inaccessible districts are excluded from the sampling
frame. This category includes one district each in Naryn, Batken, Osh, Issyk-
Kul, and three in Djalal-Abad. One larger district, Uzgen in Osh oblast, was
excluded due to complicated interethnic and interreligious attitudes (147,183
inhabitants). In all, 14.99% of the rural population of the country was
unfortunately left out of the sample frame, (467,853 people). This is 10.08%
of the total population of Kyrgyzstan.79
There were a total of 58 PSUs selected, 37 (64%) were rural and 21 (36%)
were urban. Out of the 1500 observations, 1009 (67%) are rural and 491 (33%) were
urban. The observations per PSU range from 11 to 30 people, see Table 1.
The response rate for the survey was generally high at 84%. This broke down
to a 70% response rate for urban areas and a 93.3% response rate for rural areas. The




Table 1: Survey Methodology
Total Obs. Per PSU
#PSUs Obs min Mean max
Rural 37 1009 22 27.3 30
Urban 21 491 11 23.4 28
58 1500 11 25.9 30
There were several challenges in the survey implementation process which
may or may not impact the final analysis. The polling took place in Kyrgyz Republic
immediately after a series of local elections and there was a degree of polling fatigue.
Because the World Bank survey was taken close to regional elections there was much
greater scrutiny by the local government officials. There were a few cases of
surveyors detained by police for several hours. Especially in the rural areas,
comprehensive housing lists did not exist and the survey team had to create a
household list from available data. In a small number of locations, due to poor roads
or lack of transportation facilities, it was not possible to access the most remote
households.81
Survey Controls
Because of the nature of the complex survey, several different controls were
used in the survey design (as noted above) and in the statistical analysis. The World
Bank Central Asia (WB/CA) survey exhibits the characteristics of a complex social
survey. Complex surveys are defined as not meeting the assumptions of a simple
random sampling (SRS) with or without replacement and not meeting the
assumptions of independent and identically distributed (IID) observations. Variance
81Ibid.
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estimates that assume IID or SRS for complex survey data are biased down,
specifically standard errors are smaller and confidence intervals narrower.82
There are several controls that can be used for complex survey data. All of
the regressions were run both with the survey controls and without. The greatest
impact was in the Kyrgyz Republic, the smallest effect was in Uzbekistan. For the
key economic policy variables the controls had very little influence. The socio-
demographic variables had some minor changes with the Standard Errors increasing,
with variables that may have been significant at the .05 level now significant at the
.10 level. There were only one or two isolated instances across all four countries
where an important policy variable changed in level of significance with or without
controls. Appendix 4 presents a full complement of regression charts comparing the
results with and without controls.
A goal of the survey section is to compare survey results to data collected
from around the world in situations where all of the more advanced controls may not
have been applied, it is important for inter-country comparisons to maintain as similar
as possible methodological structure. For all results reported in comparing cross-
country, advanced survey controls were not used. I will indicate the very few
occurrences where I have found that that using the controls or not using the controls
is significant on the policy relevant impact of a variable. Standard proportional
weighting is used for all regressions. The weighting only impacts the coefficient
scores and not the SE’s.
The regressions were done using an ordered logit. Because ordered logits are
based on ordinal rather than cardinal variables it is not possible to compare between
82 Skinner, Holt, and Smith, Analysis of Complex Surveys, 6.
39
coefficient scores, only if the coefficient is positive or a negative and its relative
change when analyzed with the comparator. For some models an Ordinary Least
Squares model was used simply to see the differences among different policy relevant
independent variables. Previous research has shown OLS and ologit models yield
similar results and then it is possible to infer the relative weight of the coefficient.
Problems—DKNR
A final issue is the treatment of don’t know responses during the interviews.
Generally for most questions this was not an issue. For issues of happiness the level
of Don’t Know and No Responses (DKNR) was less than 1.3%. There were a
proportionally high percentage of DKNR answers for the perception of conflict
variables. In the Kyrgyz Republic it was the lowest of all four countries but still
ranged from 9% to 11.23% for key questions (see Table 2).
Table 2: DKNR for Four Countries
KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
War 18.6% 11.2% 31.8% 20%
Local 11.8% 7.6% 20.8% 10.5%
Country 12.6% 9% 30.4% 16.8%
N= 1,193 1,318 1,197 1,310
Appendix 3 has a full breakdown of the level of DKNR responses by region
and area. However, the results are less significant when the same model that is used
to interpret the three key DV variables of local, country, and war conflict is run with
DKNR as the DV. It appears that the DKNR responses are not consistently
representative of one sex, religious group, regional location or any other key variable.
The problem with DKNR is the analyst doesn’t know if the response means
that the respondent didn’t really know the answer to the question or if they do know
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the answer but is worried to give their real response because of the sensitivity of the
question. In countries with highly autocratic rulers, such as Uzbekistan this is of high
concern to the researcher. The main concern is if there is any systematic bias in the
answers. Was there a specific type of individual or region that was more likely to
say DKNR? To determine any bias, identical models were run with the DV as the
dichotomous variable local, coun and war. I collapsed all of the positive responses
into one variable, 1 = Highly likely, Fairly likely, and Somewhat likely and 0 = Not
likely at all, DKNR. A second model was run with 0 =Not likely at all, dropping the
DKNR responses for each DV. A third model was run with the DV as only the
DKNR variables, 1= DKNR, 0= all other responses.
There are two key results from the various models, one, there is not a
statistically significant difference between the models that have DKNR and where it
is dropped. The only two variables that show any differences are ethnic Russians and
males for the war question. Generally, it appears that males are less likely to say
DKNR when questioned about war. Ethnic Russians are more likely to say DKNR
when asked about war or country level conflict. Those that have been ethnically
discriminated against are less likely to say they don’t know when asked about local
conflict. It appears that those that are not as well educated are more likely to say
DKNR in response to questions about local and country level conflict. While there
doesn’t appear to be a clear reason why they are not also more likely to say DKNR on
the war question, it is logical that those with the least amount of education are the
ones most likely not to know the response. The most important result from these tests
is that there does not appear to be any bias in responses driven by region or any other
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general social-economic patterns. It does not appear that those from the south or in
more autocratic regions were any more likely than others to provide DKNR answers.
Based on the above analysis, for all reported results, the DV does not include
the DKNR responses. It is important to note that the discussion above is only
focused on the three policy relevant questions related to perception of conflict where
there appeared to be abnormally high levels of DK/NR responses. For all variables
used as both dependent and independent variables, DKNR responses were dropped
for the remainder of analysis.
Event Analysis
Olzak defines an event as “nonroutine, collective and public acts that involve
claims on behalf of a larger collective”83 Tilly updates this concept and defines
“contentious gathering”, which incorporates the concepts of protests, violence, strikes
or riots as “an occasion on which a number of people . . .outside of the government
gathered in a publicly-accessible place and made claims on at least on person outside
their own number, claims which if realized would affect the interests of their
objective.”84
There is some discussion about what the definition of an event is and if
organizations should be included or if it is only noninstitutional. For purposes of this
paper, I have defined any gathering both for and against the government as an event.
83 Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," Annual Review of Sociology 15
(1989): 124.
84 as quoted in Sidney Tarrow, "The People's Two Rhythms: Charles Tilly and the Study of




I based my methodology as a starting point on Eisinger’s classic event
analysis and then on Tilly’s refinements.85,86 I manually went through local and
international press and wire reports from January 1 through March 26, 2005. I
collected hundreds of clippings. In addition I referenced all reports by OSCE, ICG,
the US Embassy and other international organizations. Almost all events were
referenced by more than one source; however, single source events remained in the
database. The main reason for this was that this is the first attempt to catalog the
events and it is highly likely that others will come along to refine and add to this
research. I wanted to cast as wide a net as possible for this first research. I did not
use village level or local papers. I only used national papers or wire services that
were available online. One area of research that I considered, but did not complete
for lack of access and time, were the hundreds of blogs that were blogging literally
live with the events as they unfolded. This was encouraged by several colleagues, but
was not pursued. This still portends to be a rich data source for future researches of
this event or other breaking events.
I organized the data by date, city, oblast, number of participants (where there
were discrepancies between multiple sources, I took the average, my weighting
process largely corrects for this bias), and type of event. I created a scale of 1 to 4
for number of days of protests, 1pt = 1 day, 2 pt = 2 days, 3pt = 3 days, 4 pt = >4
days. The mean number of days of protests was 2.48, while the mode was 1 with 41
out of 65 events. This weighting, as suggested by Eisinger and Olzak controls for the
85 Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities."
86 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution.
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relative infrequency of long protests. I used Olzak’s definition of event days, by
counting an event as being the same as long as it was continual and unbroken by no
more than 24 hours.87 However, if an event shifted in both numbers and quality, I
counted them as separate events. For example, if an event had started as a small
protest in front of a building, but two days later, thousands of people came and
attacked a building, I counted them separately. This is a debatable methodology, but
I believe that there is a difference from the gradual shifting or growing of an event
and a sudden change with new people arriving or new leadership, I see this as a new
event, perhaps layered on top of the previous ones, but still fundamentally different.
I created a scale for the events based on my analysis of the most common
types of events as well as the language used in the news reports. 1pt =Protest <300,
2pts = Protest >300<1000, 3pts= Protest >1000, 4pts = Roads blocked or physical
violence, 5pts=Building seized or burned. The mean score was 3.23, the mode was 4.
An additional variable was included if the police dispersed the protests. This was to
provide some control for the issue of repression, although this a very blunt instrument
to capture this government repression as it was much more than just physical
intimidation.
For purposes of clarity, it is important to define the terms that will be used in
this research. For purposes of this paper there are two delineations that will be used,
one is protester and the other is opposition. A protester is a designation of tactics,
while opposition is one of position in reference to the government. Not all opposition
members are protesters, and not all protesters are opposition, although in this case
most were. In general, I will use the term protesters to reference those that acted
87 Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," 127.
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through marches, pickets, or gatherings against the government, when it is a different
motivation, I will carefully note that. I will use the term opposition to reference
political opposition to the sitting government. An opposition politician may disagree
with the direction of the government, but may not have used protests as a tactic to
achieve his objectives.
For purposes of this paper, external agencies is a reference to any group,
either diplomatic, developmental, human rights or other that is solely funded through
international funds and is registered first under international not local law. An
internal agency is defined as any fund, NGO, or civil society organization that is
registered locally and whose services are solely for the local population, even if they
receive a majority of their funding from external sources. An agency is separate and
distinct from the individual’s that comprise its membership as it implies the influence
of the organization not a single member. An internal agency is distinct from a protest
group that has rallied around a single spokesperson, they are individuals that have
chosen to self-organize, but do not represent the interests of an organization or legal
entity.
Independent field interviews
I conducted independent field research in Central Asia in the summer of 2003,
spring of 2005 and fall of 2005. In the summer of 2003, prior to the events, I met
with local conflict prevention non-governmental organizations and obtained their
reports and data on the incidences and causes of local level and regional level
conflicts. I also catalogued the conflict prevention programs of the local and
international donors throughout the country. Immediately after the March protests I
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conducted limited field research in the spring of 2005.88 I returned for several months
in the fall of 2005 for more extensive interviews.89 I have first hand data from
interviews with local participants, protest leaders, local officials, local citizens,
international observers, civil society leaders, and international diplomatic officials. In
2005, I personally interviewed more than a hundred different individuals.
The majority of these interviews were recorded; about half of the meetings
were in Russian and half in English, with a very few in Kyrgyz or Uzbek which were
transcribed by local translators in the country. The spring interviews were conducted
over less than 10 days in Chui and Osh in May 2005. The fall interviews were
conducted in Chui, Issyk-Kul, Osh and Jalal-Abad oblasts from October to December
2005. The majority of time was spent in Osh and Jalal-Abad. Because of time and
financial constraints it wasn’t feasible to travel to Naryn, Talas or Batkin.
At the time of the fall interviews several months had passed since the initial
events and other small scale protests had happened in the intervening time. There
was some loss of focus on the events. The spring interviews were less than two
months since the events and were still very fresh in people’s minds. I was able to
interview several people on both occasions and their information differed only with
minor exceptions.
The interviews were used primarily to fill in the background and motivations
for the protesters. They were very useful at corroborating news stories and especially
the main events in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Bishkek. If an interviewee mentioned an
event that I was not able to corroborate in the media or by another witness, then I
88 Field research funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Carnegie Corporation of New York
89 Field research funded by the State Department Title VIII IARO grant
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discarded that event. I only used events that were not in the media if they came from
at least three different sources who I did not interview together. A few of the
interviews were small group interviews, which incorporated much more bias into the
process, but these were used only for discussions of motivations.
Many of those interviewed only agreed on the condition of anonymity. I have
kept a database of all interviews and future researchers may contact me directly for
additional information on any quotations or sources. For purposes of source and
footnotes, I will reference all interviews that I conducted and direct personal
correspondence as “author interview” followed by a number for that reference. For




The method of process tracing uses micro level data to examine the casual
mechanisms that link suspected causes to measurable effects. “The process-tracing
method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and
causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome
of the dependent variable.”90 The difference with large n studies is between
observing a correlation and an underlying causal mechanism.91 Bennett and George
use the example of a barometer as a “non-explanatory prediction”.92 A barometer is a
reliable predictor of future weather patterns, but it tells us little about the mechanisms
90 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 206.
91 Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," ed. MacArthur
Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
(BCSIA), Harvard University, 1997).
92 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 3.
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that cause the weather change. The goal is not an exhaustive list of all possible causal
mechanisms but to apply relevant theories to the series of events and trace the various
permutations to identify a discrete number of independent variables that lead to the
final outcome, “knowledge of causal mechanisms can be of practical use even when
the entire causal process or path is not fully understood.” 93
The actual implementation of process tracing can take a variety of forms. For
purposes of this paper the two primary methods are a detailed narrative and an
analytic explanation. As a detailed narrative, this paper can provide a historical
explanation that is necessary to test and verify existing theories and form a basis for
future research and analysis. It will also provide an analytic explanation for the
process of events, for “process-tracing in single cases . . .has the capacity for
disproving claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient for an outcome.”94
The two analytical functions are process verification and process induction. Process
verification assumes a limited number of existing theories which are applied to the
case study to determine their validity. Process induction starts with the “purpose of
finding one or more potential causal paths which can then be rendered as more
general hypotheses for testing against other cases.” This induction type of approach is
best for new, unique, or unexplored cases.95
Conclusion
This research is a within case study approach that uses quantitative analysis of
survey and event data and qualitative process tracing methods. Chapter 4 is the





individuals in the Kyrgyz Republic. Chapter 5 presents the initial macro conditions
and introduces the event analysis data as well as the process tracing methodology
through the timeline of events. Finally, Chapter 6 uses the results from the event
analysis and the process tracing to examine the dynamic casual processes that led to
the final outcome of the government collapse.
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Chapter 4: Initial Conditions: Perceptions
Research Approach/Hypothesis
The goal of this chapter is to statistically examine individual initial conditions
that may influence one’s participation in local protests. This chapter examines
whether the Kyrgyz Republic and regions that participated in protests were
significantly different from other countries and areas within the country without
conflict. The events in the Kyrgyz Republic provide a unique opportunity to examine
individual perceptions of well-being, satisfaction with government and perception of
conflict immediately prior to cross-country protests. The timing of the survey and of
the protests provides an excellent example of a natural experiment. Data was
obtained throughout the country asking about the probability of an event and five
months later the event occurred.
The broad research question to be addressed in this section is: Are countries
and regions where protests occur significantly different in levels of personal well-
being, satisfaction with government and perception of conflict than their
comparators? Formally, this section will examine two hypotheses:
1. The Kyrgyz Republic is significantly different from the industrialized, the
developing world and other Central Asian countries in perception of
happiness.
2. Perception of individual well-being is correlated with protest events.
A problem in this research is that it is impossible to correlate an individual’s
perception of happiness, conflict and government with specific individuals who may
have engaged in protests. The analysis includes two methods to solve this problem.
The first is to use only the survey data and determine if the respondents in places
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where protests occurred are statistically significantly different from respondents in
other regions or countries. The second analysis is to create a profile of the protesters
based on field interviews and compare it to the survey responses. The first method
asks, given that you are happy, what are your general socio-economic characteristics?
The second method asks, given that you are a protester, what is your level of
happiness?
This chapter presents the results from the survey and will move through four
sections, first the general demographic information from the survey. Second is an
analysis of the happiness responses with comparisons to industrialized, developing,
and regional countries. Third is an examination of the correlation between happiness
and conflict and fourth are three conclusions and results from this chapter.
Cross-tab Country Results
As discussed in the methodology section, the sample is representative in terms
of age, gender, ethnicity, and geographic area. See Appendix 2 for a full comparison
of census data to survey sample. Table 3 provides a brief overview of some of the
socio-demographics of the respondents.
Table 3: General Socio-Demographics of Respondents
KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Male 44% 49% 48% 42%
Rural 41% 69% 72% 65%
Married 66% 68% 71% 75%
Employed 51% 46% 47% 46%
Muslim 57% 85% 95% 92%
Higher Ed in
House 72% 64% 61% 66%
Ethnic Minority 46% 34% 24% 21%




There are three independent variables used for the three main regression
models used in this chapter: individual satisfaction, satisfaction with government and
perception of conflict. Individual satisfaction and satisfaction with government were
based on a 1 to 4 scale with responses, Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Fairly
dissatisfied, Very dissatisfied, or DK/NR. The perception of conflict questions also
used a 1 to 4 scale from, Highly likely, Fairly likely, Somewhat likely, Not likely at
all, to DK/NR. The DK/NR responses were dropped from the analysis as discussed in
Chapter 3.
Individual satisfaction
The first questions in the survey asked about the individual’s level of satisfaction and
happiness. Questions about personal satisfaction are positioned early in the survey to
prevent their bias or corruption by specific attitudes toward other issues later in the
survey process.96 There were five questions about individual life satisfaction, these
identical questions have been used in research in Latin America and Russia, allowing
a high degree of cross-comparability between countries responses.
Satisfaction questions:
1. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life?
2. How do you estimate current economic situation of your household?
3. How would you rate the economic situation in your household a few years
ago in comparison with current situation?
4. Imagine a 10-step ladder where the poorest people are standing on the
first, or lowest, step, and the richest people are standing on the tenth, or
highest, step. On what step would you place yourself today?
96 Charles F. Turner, Elizabeth Martin, and National Research Council (U.S.). Panel on Survey
Measurement of Subjective Phenomena., Surveying Subjective Phenomena, 2 vols. (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1984).
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5. How long do you think it will take for you to reach a satisfactory standard
of living?
Table 4 provides cross tabs comparisons for some of the satisfaction with life
questions among four countries. Across all four countries almost two-thirds of those
interviewed stated that they were fairly or very satisfied with their life and a slightly
higher number said their current economic situation in the household was very or
somewhat good.
Table 4: Regional Satisfaction Results
Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life?
KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Very/Fairly Dissatisfied 37% 33% 43% 20%
Very/Fairly Satisfied 63% 67% 57% 80%
How do you estimate current economic situation of your
household?
KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Very/Somewhat Bad 27% 31% 26% 23%
Very/Somewhat Good 73% 69% 74% 77%
Satisfaction with government
There were two questions in the survey that addressed the issue of satisfaction
with the government.
1. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in (country)
today?
2. How would you describe the current economic situation in (country)?
There is a difference between the two levels of satisfaction, individual and country,
with a .23 pairwise correlation between the two variables across all four countries. In
a variety of different models when used simultaneously, both variables remain
statistically significant. The pair-wise correlation between personal happiness and
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satisfaction with country ranged from .29 for Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan to .44
for Tajikistan.
Table 5 presents the raw cross-tabulation results for these two questions. In
terms of raw percentages, respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are the most
dissatisfied with the situation in the country. The other three countries have positive
attitudes regarding the general satisfaction with the country.
Table 5: Satisfaction with Country
Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the
situation in (country) today?
KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Very/Fairly Dissatisfied 17% 55% 45% 22% 
Very/Fairly Satisfied 83% 45% 55% 78% 
How would you describe the current economic
situation in (country)?
Very/Fairly Dissatisfied 15% 67% 38% 27%
Very/Fairly Satisfied 85% 33% 62% 73%
Perception of conflict
There were three primary questions related to perception of conflict:
1. How likely is conflict on the local level, in your village/city, over the
next few years?
2. How likely is conflict within our country over the next few years?
3. How likely is conflict between (country) and other countries in Central
Asia?
These three questions will be referred to as local conflict, country conflict and
war respectively. below, Table 6 presents the perception of conflict for all four
countries both combined and separately. The majority of respondents in each country
think that conflict at any level is not likely. The Kyrgyz Republic has a much higher
percentage than any other country in each category that thinks conflict is likely. It is
interesting to note that the only country in the region that has experienced widespread
civil conflict is Tajikistan, yet by a wide margin the respondents do not think that
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conflict of any kind is likely. Compare the country category, where every other
country is over 20% and Tajikistan is at 7%. It raises an interesting question of the
relation between perceptions and actual potential for conflict. As noted in Chapter 2,
a history of conflict is a strong predictor of future conflict in traditional macro civil
conflict or war models.
The category that respondents think is most likely to have conflict is war
between two countries and the least likely is local level conflict, except for Tajikistan.
Few regional analysts think that country to country conflict is highly likely in the
region. As noted in the third chapter, most experts think that there may be some type
of internal conflict, with civil war or low level cross border aggressions in specific
locations. Yet, the type of conflict most anticipated within the country is at the
national level not at the local level. It appears that few think that conflict will occur
in their neighborhood or area, they anticipate it occurring somewhere else.
Table 6: Perception of Conflict
Local conflict
All
Four KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Not Likely 88% 87% 80% 96% 92%
Likely* 12% 13% 20% 4% 8%
Country conflict
Not Likely 76% 79% 65% 93% 71%
Likely 24% 21% 35% 7% 29%
War
Not Likely 79% 76% 60% 94% 91%
Likely 21% 24% 40% 6% 9%
*(Likely=Highly, Fairly, and Somewhat)
Dependent Variables
All of the models used the same standard demographic control variables. The
variables were age, ageSq, urban, male, married, education and country fixed effect
controls. Additional models also used variables for employment and religion
(muslim). Several subjective variables were also included.
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Trust: “Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be
trusted, or that you should be too careful in dealing with people?”
Ethnic Discrimination: “In the last several years, have you experienced
instances of discrimination because of your ethnicity in (country)?”
Protested: A series of questions were asked concerning respondents
previous participation in protest activities. The respondents were not a passive group,
40% of respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic had engaged in some level of protest in
the past three years compared to 50% in Tajikistan and 10% in Kazakhstan. In the
Kyrgyz Republic, the protest level ranged from writing a letter of complaint (14%), to
signing a collective petition (16%) to partaking in an authorized (4%) or unauthorized
protest (2%). 70% in both the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan said they would
definitely or maybe have grievances that they would like to discuss with the
authorities compared to only 47% in Uzbekistan.
Economic variables: There are several different economic variables. One is
a self-reported purchasing power statement that is used in many other countries. It
ranks ability to purchase basic necessities as a 1 up to purchasing luxury goods as a 5.
A usefulness of this question is that it measures consumption not income. In
developing countries consumption is generally much more reliable than income
which can be hard to accurately account. To control for the relative nature of the
scales, examples were provided:
1. Difficult to provide the family with basic food
2. Manage to provide basic food but find it difficult to pay utility bills
and buy clothes
3. Can afford required foods, clothes and pay utility bills, but cannot
afford such goods as TV, refrigerator, etc.
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4. We can afford to buy a TV or refrigerator, but cannot afford a car,
a new house or travel to another country.
5. Can buy a car, a new house or travel to another country, etc.
6. Don’t know/ No Response
This five point scale was collapsed into three categories for purposes of
analysis, hard to purchase (1 and 2), can purchase required (3) and can purchase high
quality goods (4 and 5). As an independent evaluation of the individual’s subjective
response of economic status, each interviewer rated the household on a five point
scale. The direct correlation between the two variables (self-evaluation and
interviewer measurement) was .53%, however when you compare answers that are
within one step of each other (i.e. a 3 to a 4 or a 2 to 3), there is a correlation of
greater than 90% across all four countries. This high number implies that while the
interviewer or the respondent might place themselves a step higher or lower than the
other, there were almost no situations of the two measures significantly differing from
one another. No one who perceived themselves as rich was actually seen as being
poor or visa-versus, this lends credibility to the respondent’s self-evaluation. Because
it is more commonly used in other studies and had very little difference from the
interviewer ranking, I use the self-reported purchasing power question as the base line
economic indicator.
Ethnicity: A key issue in some sections of the region is the fear of ethnic
tensions igniting into widespread ethnic infighting and civil war. In the Kyrgyz
Republic, 66% of those interviewed self-reported themselves as ethnically Kyrgyz,
17% ethnically Uzbek, 10% as ethnic Russians and 7% as other. In the southern
regions, the ratios are similar for the Kyrgyz but significantly different for the other
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ethnic groups. For the entire Uzbek group, 98% live in the south and the exact
opposite is true for the Russians with less than 1% in the southern regions. The
minorities are clearly segregated throughout the country; this issue is discussed in
more depth in the regression section.
Perceptions of Happiness
Is the Kyrgyz Republic significantly different from the industrialized, the
developing world and other regional countries in perception of happiness? This thesis
is answered in two stages, first by examining determinants of happiness from other
national surveys in the US, Europe, Latin America and Russia and second by
comparing survey results from within the region.
The Central Asian countries are very similar to other developing and
industrialized countries in their perception of happiness. Table 7 provides a
comparison among 16 countries in Latin America, Russia, the United States and the
four countries of Central Asia. The sign indicates the relationship of that variable
with the dependent variable of life satisfaction. If there is no sign then there was not a
statistically significant relationship with that variable. The most important result is
that the four Central Asian countries do not appear to be that significantly different
from the rest of the world.
In US and Europe “the following personal characteristics are positively and
significantly associated with happiness: being employed, female, young or old (not
middle age), educated, married, with few children, or belonging to a high-income
quartile.”97 In their extensive review of previous happiness studies Frey and Stutzer
97 Frey and Stutzer, Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being,
4.
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provide an overview of the key socio-demographic findings, age is clearly U-shaped,
the young and the old are the most satisfied while the middle-aged are the most
unhappy (approximately 40-43 in most developed countries). 98 Women appear to be
slightly happier than men in most countries, but by a very small percentage. In the
U.S., there is a clear difference between black and white, with blacks reporting lower
happiness scores. There does not appear to be as great a difference for other
ethnicities. Happiness and health are highly correlated; those that self-report higher
levels of health also report high levels of happiness. Marriage has a consistent
positive correlation with happiness. Intelligence appears to have no correlation,
however; education does have a slight positive correlation, but when income levels
are included significantly decreases. Finally, religion has a positive, but very small
correlation.99
When the Central Asian region as a group is compared to other regions, it is
very similar. The key variables of age, marital status, employment and a wealth
index are all similar to results in the U.S., Latin America, and Russia. For all the
regions, age has a negative impact and age squared has a positive curvilinear
relationship with happiness, those that are younger are happy and those that are older
are happy. Marriage has a positive impact on happiness. In the U.S., being male has
a negative impact, yet in Russia it has a positive impact, it appears to have no impact
in Central Asia. Those with higher levels of education are happier. Those that are









coun. Russia US KYR KAZ TAJ UZB
All-four
CAR
Age - - - - - - -
Age Sq + + + + + + +
Male + -
Married + + + + + +
Unemployed - - -





Muslim + + + + + +
It appears that the Kyrgyz Republic is very similar in general demographic
information to other developing and industrialized countries in their perception of
happiness although there are fewer statistically significant socio-demographic
variables correlated with happiness than in some other countries or regions. For
example, there is no difference between male or female respondents and one’s marital
status has no influence on the perception of happiness. However, the most important
result is that the respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic don’t have contradictory results
with other countries. In each country, economic factors tend to have the strongest
impact on levels of happiness. Unemployment has a negative impact. Wealth,
measured by either income or consumption, has a positive impact on happiness. For
all regions, education has a significant and positive impact when wealth levels are
100 Ibid., Graham and Pettinato, Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market
Economies. and WB/CA Survey Analysis
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excluded. 101 The Kyrgyz Republic appears to not be significantly different in
standard demographic determinants for happiness from other developing countries or
western industrialized countries.
The final component of the first hypothesis is the comparison of the Kyrgyz
Republic to other Central Asian countries. Because of the use of the same survey
methodology it implicitly takes into consideration the ethnic and language similarities
of the region and allows a broader exploration of the issues. For this section the
countries were compared using ordered logit models with the perception of happiness
as the dependent variable.
101 Graham and Pettinato, Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market
Economies, 76-77.
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Table 8: Individual Happiness--Regional Comparators
DV: Individual Happiness
(ordered logit) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All Four All Four KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Purchasing Hard -1.672 -1.658 -2.676 -1.871 -0.879 -1.165
[19.77]** [19.50]** [14.08]** [11.12]** [4.98]** [7.80]**
Purchasing Required -0.722 -0.727 -1.154 -1.075 -0.234 -0.503
[9.13]** [9.14]** [7.32]** [7.18]** [1.27] [3.27]**
Muslim 0.558 0.213 0.524 0.537 1.045
[6.46]** [1.36] [2.76]** [1.94] [4.85]**
Protest All -0.33 -0.573 0.061 -0.483 -0.47
[5.18]** [3.29]** [0.52] [4.21]** [4.00]**
Trust 0.062 0.353 -0.105 0.185 0.084
[1.00] [3.15]** [0.87] [1.47] [0.64]
Ethnic discrimination -0.702 -0.735 -0.011 -1.833 -1.354
[4.50]** [2.70]** [0.05] [3.74]** [3.34]**
Ethnic Minority -0.01 0.276 -0.913 -0.26







Demographic controls: YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5018 5018 1409 1318 1331 1463
AdjR2 0.0868 0.0954 0.1212 0.0802 0.0827 0.0844
Not significant (NS): Male, Urban, Ed. (Higher) NS: Male, Unemployed-KAZ,
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets Urban- TAJ
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
See Table 8 above for all of the results for regional perception comparisons.
Model one uses standard socio-demographic and economic control variables and
model two incorporates broader subjective control variables as presented earlier in
this chapter. The two important results are that first, there does not appear to be any
significant difference among Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and
second, the model indicates that respondents in Uzbekistan are statistically
significantly happier than those in the Kyrgyz Republic.
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Both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are positive compared to the Kyrgyz
Republic, but the results are not statistically significant. It appears that respondents in
the Kyrgyz Republic are not statistically less happy than their regional comparators.
The finding that respondents in Uzbekistan are on average significantly happier than
those in the Kyrgyz Republic is a bit surprising. Uzbekistan has the most repressed
government compared to the other countries surveyed and its general economic
situation is deteriorating. The issue of why Uzbek responses are so high has more to
do with intrinsic factors in Uzbekistan and less about the responses in the Kyrgyz
Republic. Since this dissertation is focused on the responses in the Kyrgyz Republic,
the issue of the Uzbekistan responses is not addressed in detail.102
The third model in Table 8 examines the key socio-demographic factors and
subjective indicators that impact perception of individual happiness by country.
Across all four countries, age, and ageSq have a negative impact on their perception
of personal level happiness, there is no statistical difference between men or women
respondents and those that say that purchasing basic necessitates is hard are less
happy than those that have the highest levels of purchasing power. In Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan, those that say they can purchase required goods
are statistically less happy than those that can easily afford luxury goods and there is
no significant difference between urban and rural respondents. Married respondents
are statistically happier in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
102 This is the first publication reporting regression results from this survey. In recent presentations of
the results, the reliability of the Uzbekistan responses has been severely challenged. The criticism is
that Uzbekistan is so repressed that no one will give you an honest answer; all of the responses must be
biased. This issue of positive biased responses will be addressed in detail in future publications that
examine all four countries.
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The impact of education on happiness is more varied throughout the region.
Uzbekistan is the only country where levels of education had no impact on happiness.
The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are similar in that generally, those with lower
levels of education are less happy than those with a higher education. While all of the
other countries indicate that those with incomplete higher education, but above a
secondary education level, are statistically happier than those that have completed
higher education, only in Kazakhstan is it statistically significant. Employment had
no statistical impact on level of happiness, except in Kazakhstan, where the
unemployed were less happy. While there are minor differences, what is important is
that across the region with its broad variations in geography, economic growth and
political freedom, there was much greater similarity in baseline socio-demographics
than differences in regards to perception of happiness.
When subjective issues or perceptions are added to the models, the countries
still look quite similar although key differences begin to emerge. There are two key
findings where the Kyrgyz Republic appears slightly different from its regional
comparators. First, the Kyrgyz Republic is the only country where those that had
already engaged in some level of protest had a positive impact on happiness, but it
was not statistically significant. In the other three countries it was both negative and
significant. Are those that protest in the Kyrgyz Republic happier than those that do
not? While this response is not statistically significant in this model, this idea is
examined in more depth in the last section.
The second finding is that minorities are statistically happier in the Kyrgyz
Republic than their comparators. In Tajikistan, those that were in the minority were
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statistically less happy than those in the majority ethnic group. What is interesting in
the Kyrgyz Republic is when the ethnic minority variable is compared across the
different groups; none of them are individually statistically significant, ethnic Uzbek
(z=1.59), ethnic Russian (z=0.50) and other ethnicity (z=1.88). Even though it is a
weak finding in the Kyrgyz Republic, it is intriguing, because in other cross-country
happiness research, minorities have statistically lower levels of happiness. In the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Uzbek minorities are generally wealthier than their Kyrgyz
counterparts. This may be driving some of the positive happiness response. While
there have been historic ethnic tensions as will be presented in the next chapter, the
region also has a history of ethnic and religious tolerance because of its historic role
as a cross-roads of trade and commerce. In the protests in March 2005, contrary to
expectations, ethnic minorities did not play a role in the protests. Was this driven by
the fact that they are happier or were there other stronger factors? The next chapter
addresses this issue in more depth.
Is the Kyrgyz Republic significantly different from other Central Asian
countries in perception of happiness? The Kyrgyz Republic does not appear to be
significantly different across a wide variety of demographic, economic and subjective
characteristics. There are differences among the countries, but there is no observable
pattern or type of respondent in the Kyrgyz Republic that is consistently statistically
different from the other three countries. While there appears to be a significant
difference in perception of happiness between Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, it
does not hold between the other two countries in the region.
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Perception of Happiness Correlated with Protests
The second hypothesis is that perception of individual well-being is correlated
with protest events. This hypothesis is examined first by comparing levels of
individual happiness across oblasts, second by controlling for intensity of protests in
regions and third by comparing the profile of protests by region.
In-Country Comparators
If happiness and protest are positively correlated than we would expect to see
that regions in the country that are less happy are where protests occurred. Are the
regions in the Kyrgyz Republic significantly different from each other in perception
of happiness? The hypothesis of most regional scholars is that there is a significant
difference in attitude between the northern regions of the country and the south. As
presented in the overview of the region, the south is depicted as a region fermenting
with anger and strife. This model examines that contention.
The first model in Table 9 compared all of the country to the Ferghana Valley
region; while this area did have a negative perception of happiness it was not
statistically significant. The second model compared all oblasts to the capital city
Bishkek. There are several oblasts that have a statistically significant negative
perception of happiness when compared to those in the capital. Batkin and Jalalabad
had negative perceptions of happiness and are both in the south, but the largest
southern region, Osh was not significant. This model also indicates that the negative
perceptions are spread across the country, with Naryn in the east and Chi in the north
both registering strong levels of dissatisfaction. It is interesting to note that Batkin
and Naryn both register the highest levels of personal dissatisfaction, yet while Naryn
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did have some early protests; Batkin had almost none and didn’t get involved until the
very end; Talas a region with widespread protests is not statistically significant.
Table 9: Individual Happiness—In-Country Comparators
DV: Individual Happiness (ordered logit)
Model





















Economic controls Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1318 1318 1318
AdjR2 0.081 0.0855 0.0811
Not significant: Urban, Male, Unemployed
The one consistent finding is that every region had a lower level of individual
happiness compared to the capital except for Talas, but they were not all statistically
significant. It does appear that regions in the Kyrgyz Republic are different from
each other in perception of happiness, but there is not a clear regional distribution, nor
does the pattern of individual personal satisfaction match with the pattern of where
protests occurred as will be discussed in Chapter 5 & 6.
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As noted above a difficulty in this methodology is that it is not possible to
identify who exactly went to the protests. One approach is to take the data on where
protests occurred and control for the relative level of intensity of the protests. The
significant methodological problem is that the survey responses are taken prior to the
protests occurring, so it is a temporal problem to use control data from when after the
survey was taken. However, if the data on protests is used as a predictor, i.e.
dependent variable, it is less of a concern. It uses the data taken at a specific time to
predict future events.
Alternative Hypotheses
Individual well-being or happiness was tested for a relationship to regions
where protests occurred based on an extensive literature both suggesting a
relationship and empirical evidence arguing against. I present two alternative
hypotheses concerning the relationship of protests and perceptions. I suggest that the
measure of one’s satisfaction with government may be a much stronger predictor of
protest than individual perceptions. Alternatively, individual perceptions of the
potential for conflict may be a useful predictors of where or if conflict will occur.
Satisfaction with Government
Regional Comparators
The majority of people were individually satisfied with their lives and
economic situation (Table 4), but the same does not hold for their satisfaction with
the country or economic situation. There is a clear separation of the standards and
satisfaction at the household level and the national level.
When the regions within the Kyrgyz Republic are compared, every region had
a majority dissatisfied with the situation in the country, except for Naryn oblast,
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which incidentally is the poorest oblast in the country. By oblast the region with the
most amount of dissatisfied responses was in Chui oblast and in Bishkek, the richest
and most prosperous sections of the country. Of all ethnic Uzbek respondents, a
small majority (54%) was satisfied, the only ethnic group satisfied with the situation
in the country. The Russians had the strongest dissatisfaction (74%). Table 10
presents the results from regression models with the ordered logit dependent variable
as level of satisfaction with the country. As expected from the cross-tabulations, all of
the countries had statistically significantly more positive responses than the Kyrgyz
Republic. When subjective variables are added to the model, the difference among
the countries remains; it appears that there is a significant difference between the
Kyrgyz Republic and the other three countries in satisfaction with the government.
When the countries are compared individually, there is a significant difference
among the demographic variables. The Kyrgyz Republic is the only country where if
one was male, employed or younger impacted one’s satisfaction with the government.
Muslims are more satisfied with the government both in the Kyrgyz Republic and
Uzbekistan and those that were ethnic minorities were less satisfied. Income levels
appear to matter less in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan for predicting satisfaction
with government. It appears that there is a significant difference between the
respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic and the other regional comparators in satisfaction
with government.
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Table 10: Satisfaction with Government
DV: Satisfaction
with Government
(ordered logit) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All Four All Four KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Purchasing Hard -0.79 -0.773 -1.543 -0.637 -0.181 -0.688
[9.60]** [9.36]** [7.79]** [4.19]** [1.06] [4.55]**
Purchasing
Required -0.232 -0.241 -0.604 -0.193 0.185 -0.356
[2.95]** [3.05]** [3.61]** [1.43] [1.03] [2.28]*
Muslim 0.347 0.144 0.828 0.311 0.982
[3.98]** [0.82] [4.49]** [1.15] [4.40]**
Protest All -0.304 -0.385 0.015 -0.429 -0.395
[4.71]** [1.98]* [0.13] [3.73]** [3.23]**
Trust 0.274 0.591 0.013 0.326 0.486
[4.30]** [4.70]** [0.11] [2.53]* [3.56]**
Ethnic
discrimination -0.803 0.397 0.469 -0.709 0.148
[5.12]** [2.24]* [3.63]** [5.22]** [0.98]
Ethnic Minority -0.711 -0.905 -0.997 -0.307








controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5018 5018 1381 1318 1283 1414
AdjR2 0.0771 0.0856
NS: Male, Married, Ed. NS: Age, Married, Ed., Unemployed
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets Significant only in KYR:
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Male, Age & Employment
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In-Country Comparators
Table 11: Satisfaction with Government—In-Country Comparators





















Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Econ Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1318 1318 1318
Not significant: Married, education
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
In Table 11, model 1, the Ferghana Valley is more positive towards the
government when compared to the all other regions in the Kyrgyz Republic. When
examined by region, it appears that the southern region is again more positive when
compared to the north. The oblast that appears to be driving the result is Osh, with a
highly significant strong positive satisfaction response. The other large southern area
Jalalabad is also positive, but not statistically significant. The interesting result is that
there does appear to be a geographical difference among the regions, but it is
respondents in the north that are the most dissatisfied with the government. This does
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not match with the reality of the protests. The protests started in the regions and
moved towards the capital, as noted above this contradicts the data on personal levels
of dissatisfaction being higher in the regions.
There are statistically significant differences among the different regions
within the country. However, these differences are not along the anticipated divide
between the north and the south. There does not appear to be a coherent story of why
some regions are less satisfied with the government. While there is a correlation
between economic variables and satisfaction, the economic indices appear to have
little influence in predicting which region would have higher levels of satisfaction
with government. There does not appear to be a correlation between satisfaction and
regions where protests occurred.
Perceptions of Conflict
This section examines the questions related to perception of conflict and
willingness to protest and act on grievances against the government. Regional
conflict indicator models often use responses from local citizens concerning the
potential for conflict in their region. Are individuals reliable predictors of the
potential for conflict in their region? If a respondent thought conflict was likely (a
minority for all three categories) they were asked several follow-up questions
concerning reasons for conflict, the form of conflict, and participants in the conflict.
See Table 12 for specific types and percentage of responses. In direct match with
what the majority of people had complaints about, most people thought that the
reasons for local or country conflict would be economic issues (poverty,
unemployment, taxes, etc.) followed by the failure of government (corruption, failed
72
elections) Most people think that any conflict in country will take the form of mass
riots, followed in ranking by swearing and insults.
The respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic were very accurate in their prediction
of the primary causes and pathway of protests. While the question specifically
referenced civil conflict, respondents focused on mass riots and personal insults as the
instrument for implementing the conflict. The respondent’s interpretation of conflict
is important. The respondents interpreted conflict as anything ranging from swearing
and insults to armed conflict. The word in Russian is a cognate and has a broad
interpretation; therefore it is important to see that the form of conflict referenced was
mass riots and protests.
Table 12: Reasons and Form of Conflict
What can be possible
reasons for such conflict?*
Country Local
Economic Issues 28% 30%
Failure of Government 17% 22%
Crime 11% 10%
Religion, ethnic or clan
issues 11% 7%
Land or water 9% 15%
General societal frustration 7% 4%
Other 16% 13%
In which form can the
conflict be over the next
few years?*
Mass riots 46% 41%
Swearing and insults 22% 36%
Armed conflict 16% 7%
Slight use of physical force 16% 14%
Other 1% 1%
*(Only those that gave a "likely response" in the Kyrgyz
Republic )
Regional Comparators
Standard control demographic variables such as employment, age, male or
female, and marriage appear to have no statistical impact on perception of conflict
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even without additional control variables. Urban respondents think that local and
country conflict is more likely than rural respondents. Economic levels has very little
statistical impact on perception of conflict at any level, with a minor impact on
country conflict with those at the mid-level of income thinking it is less likely than
those at higher income levels. Education has a mixed correlation with perception of
conflict, but generally, the more educated one is the more likely they think conflict is
going to occur at all levels.
In comparison to the region, respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are
statistically significantly more likely to think that conflict is going to occur at all three
levels of conflict. When subjective controls are added, those that have protested
before are more likely to think conflict will occur. Ethnic minorities in the Kyrgyz
Republic are less likely to think conflict will occur, but in contrast, those that have
been ethnically discriminated against think conflict will occur.
For space, the results are presented below only for local conflict for each
country. When the regression is run individually for each country, the Kyrgyz
Republic continues to appear very different. For local conflict, in all countries urban
respondents think conflict is likely. Economics has no statistical impact when
evaluated individually by country and almost no impact in the Kyrgyz Republic;
except for the better educated thinking local conflict is more likely. The Kyrgyz
Republic is closest to Kazakhstan in responses for local conflict and the most
different from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
For country conflict, urban residents again think it is more likely in the
Kyrgyz Republic; economics, education and all demographic controls don’t have any
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influence. Ethnic minorities think there is a low probability of local conflict, country
conflict or war. For the Kyrgyz Republic, war is very similar to country conflict—no
basic demographic or economic variables are significant.
Table 13: Regional Comparators—Conflict
DV: Local Country War
All Four All Four All Four KAZ KYR TAJ UZB
Urban 1.044 0.548 0.096 0.56 1.225 1.921 1.119
[0.113]** [0.084]** [0.093] [0.203]** [0.165]** [0.446]** [0.248]**
Purchasing Hard 0.108 -0.19 -0.138 0.239 0.253 -0.727 0.29
[0.139] [0.105] [0.116] [0.275] [0.208] [0.447] [0.315]
Purchasing Required -0.234 -0.222 -0.119 -0.241 0.016 -0.754 -0.124
[0.131] [0.099]* [0.107] [0.240] [0.187] [0.451] [0.357]
Muslim -0.058 -0.319 -0.266 0.024 -0.44 -0.863 -0.744
[0.185] [0.149]* [0.155] [0.256] [0.240] [0.540] [0.400]
Protest All 0.334 0.221 0.283 0.533 0.305 -0.287 0.661
[0.112]** [0.087]* [0.095]** [0.266]* [0.156]* [0.357] [0.230]**
Trust -0.274 -0.429 -0.137 -0.788 0.129 -0.295 -0.571
[0.115]* [0.089]** [0.091] [0.211]** [0.162] [0.456] [0.333]
Ethnic discrimination 1.445 1.173 1.171 1.13 1.928 -0.321 1.283
[0.181]** [0.162]** [0.171]** [0.342]** [0.241]** [1.257] [0.511]*
KAZ -0.493 -0.512 -0.575
[0.205]* [0.163]** [0.170]**
TAJ -1.113 -1.353 -2.438
[0.350]** [0.257]** [0.302]**
UZB -0.212 0.39 -1.414
[0.195] [0.138]** [0.157]**
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4390 4171 4005 1205 1218 1030 1293
PesudoR2 0.1304 0.0904 0.1149 0.076 0.1098 0.1806 0.1373
NS: Age, AgeSq, Male, Employed, Marriage NS: Age, AgeSq, Male, Marriage
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Local
The strongest predictor for attitude towards local conflict, country conflict or
war was if one has been ethnically discriminated against. At first this appears to be
intuitive, these individuals feel pushed aside from society and strongly feel
disenfranchised. However, it is a small minority that is driving this response; the vast
majority (94%) had not experienced any discrimination in the country because of
their ethnicity. Of the 6% who had been discriminated against, 45% were Kyrgyz,
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followed by 26% Russian, and only 19% Uzbek. This is the exact reverse of the
ethnic populations in the country. For some reason, the majority ethnicity in their
country is complaining of ethnic discrimination. Another similar question asked
respondents to rank the current relations among different ethnic groups; a strong
majority (86%) said that they were very or somewhat good. As will be examined
later, this may be driving the intense response related to conflict and protests. The
ethnic majority feels that they are entitled to certain rights and feel discriminated
against when individuals from a minority ethnicity have greater access to economic
opportunities or other advantages.
Based on the regression analysis presented above, the Kyrgyz Republic is
significantly different from other Central Asian countries in perception of potential
for conflict. Respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are more likely to think all levels of
conflict, local, country and war are going to occur than their comparators throughout
the region.
In-Country Comparators
When compared across regions in the Kyrgyz Republic, those that are in the
Ferghana Valley are less likely to think conflict at any level will occur compared to
everyone else in the country. As shown below in
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Table 14, Batkin, Jalalabad and Osh, the three southern oblasts, are all statistically
significant from Bishkek in their perception of the potential for conflict. Respondents
in each region think all types of conflict are less likely to occur, with Osh having one
of the strongest values.
When the regions are compared as a group, the southern region is statistically
less likely to think local and country conflict will occur. However there is no
statistical difference between the eastern region and the northern region. Similar to
the findings for the levels of government satisfaction, there is a significant difference
between the north and the south, but the north is more concerned about conflict than
the south. It appears that individuals may not be good predictors of whether conflict
will occur in their own region. Most people may assume that it can’t happen in their
neighborhood.
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Table 14: In-Country Comparators--Conflict
DV: Local Country War
Model 1
Ferghana Valley -0.59 -0.56 -0.122
[0.176]** [0.141]** [0.138]
Model 2
BAT (South) -0.828 -1.146 0.252
[0.382]* [0.341]** [0.313]
Jalal-Abad (South) -0.669 -0.667 -0.316
[0.293]* [0.259]* [0.267]
IK (North) -0.427 0.193 0.2
[0.330] [0.284] [0.300]
NAR (East) -1.29 -0.916 -0.507
[0.455]** [0.366]* [0.347]
OSH (South) -1.599 -0.605 -0.308
[0.337]** [0.265]* [0.268]
TALAS (North) -0.701 -0.625 -0.906
[0.445] [0.368] [0.393]*
CHUI (North) -0.208 0.1 0.225
[0.299] [0.258] [0.265]
Model 3
Region: South -0.751 -0.582 -0.123
[0.193]** [0.158]** [0.156]
Region: East -0.464 -0.062 -0.003
[0.240] [0.194] [0.197]
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Econ Controls Yes Yes Yes
Subjective controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1218 1200 1170
Absolute value of z statistics in
brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Conclusions
The general public in the Kyrgyz Republic in November 2004 were upset at
the government for failing to provide basic services and for extreme corruption. They
blamed the local and national government for not addressing any of their personal or
their community’s needs. The data suggests that the primary areas of dissatisfaction
were about economic and social concerns, not about the rights of political expression,
free speech or a free media.
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This section started by presenting two hypotheses. The results indicate that
the Kyrgyz Republic is not statistically significantly different from comparators
around the world, in the region and in-country in terms of perception of individual
happiness. Within the country, small differences were found among oblasts where
the southern respondents had slightly higher levels of individual satisfaction. Second
there is not a strong relationship between levels of individual happiness and regions
where protests occurred. The alternative hypothesis showed that the Kyrgyz Republic
is statistically different from other countries in the region in satisfaction with
government, but there is not a correlation between in-country levels of satisfaction
with government and protests.
The data from the survey in Table 15 suggests several important conclusions
and also presents several puzzles for the researcher, a few of which I have highlighted
throughout the previous sections. This final section presents three key results from
the survey; first, the lack of importance of personal levels of individual happiness,
second, the relative importance of dissatisfaction with government, and third,
perception of conflict as a poor predictor for regions, but strong between countries.
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Table 15: Characteristics of Respondents & Regions in the Kyrgyz Republic
Satisfied
Individually: Younger or older, married, Muslim, and ethnic minority
Government: Younger or older, employed, Muslim, and ethnic minority
Dissatisfied
Individually: Less education and less money.
Government:




Urban, higher education, protested, ethnically discriminated
against
Country: Urban and ethnically discriminated against
War: Ethnically discriminated against
Low Probability of Conflict
Local: Ethnic minorities
Country: Muslim, ethnic minority
War: Muslim, ethnic minority, trust
Regions in the Kyrgyz Republic*
Satisfied
Government: Ferghana Valley, Naryn, Osh
Dissatisfied
Individually: Batkin, Jalal-Abad, Naryn, Chui
Low Probability of Conflict (as compared to Bishkek)
Local: Ferghana Valley, Batkin, Jalal-Abad, Naryn and Osh
Country: Ferghana Valley, Batkin, Jalal-Abad, Naryn and Osh
War: Talas
*no dissatisfied with government or satisfied individually regions.
Individual satisfaction
The results suggest that individual perceptions of wellbeing are not reliable
indicators of potential for political protests. This does not suggest that the individual
happiness levels don’t provide some useful foundation, but independently they are
poor predictors. As discussed in Chapter 2, relative deprivation and conflict theories
based on individual levels of dissatisfaction have shown to lack empirical
substantiation. This research further supports the finding that an individual’s level of
personal happiness is a poor predictor of conflict. The concept of the “poor, unhappy
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protester” appears to not be a workable or useful theory in this case. It may be that
the converse is actually true.
In the Kyrgyz Republic those that had previously protested against the
government were on average happier, but not statistically significant at the .05 level,
but are at .10. As noted above this is a weak indicator that those that have protested
in the Kyrgyz Republic actually have higher levels of individual satisfaction. Frey
and Stuzer, discussed in Chapter 2, find a correlation between levels of happiness and
civic engagement. Those that participate more in local politics are statistically
happier than those that don’t.103 (As they note, this does not imply knowing the
direction of the casualty arrow). It may be that the protesters in the Kyrgyz Republic
were happier than those that didn’t protest because in emerging democracies, like the
Kyrgyz Republic, political protests have become a legitimate form of political
engagement. Street protests are not the product of deep grievances rather they are the
legitimate expression of basic discontent with the government. In a more developed
democratic process, institutions, civic organizations and town meetings would
provide forums for the public expression. Citizens in nascent democracies seek any
means available to express their political attitudes; when the voting box is viewed as
corrupt and institutions don’t exist, street protests become the legitimate form of
expression.
These participants are therefore not personally aggrieved with high levels of
personal dissatisfaction, but the exact inverse, they are relatively personally happy
and seek a mechanism to express their political attitudes.
103 Frey and Stutzer, Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being.
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This theory of ‘happy protesters’ has some validation based upon the
interviews with participants. But it only captures a certain type of protester during a
discrete period of time. As the timeline in Chapter 5 will show, there were significant
differences in the type and attitude of protesters as the protest shifted in time and
space. These happy protesters were part of the earliest protests and the final day
protests. They were the ones who initially came out into the squares to express
dissatisfaction with their candidate loosing. They were also included in the final
protest in Bishkek. It however doesn’t capture the radical and more vocal protesters
that joined later into the protests and increased the physical violence and strength of
the protests. These protesters appeared to have had a very different agenda.
One problem with interpretation is that these ‘happy protesters’ were
simultaneously dissatisfied with the government. A traditional model of linking
happiness to protest would assume: Y(protest) = b1(unhappy) + b2 (low economic
status) + b3 (vector of personal traits) + epsilon. This research suggests an alternative
construction: Y(protest) = b1(happy) + b2 (high dissatisfaction with gov’t) + b3 (low
economic status) + b4 (vector of personal traits) + epsilon. The dissatisfaction with
government may be the more important variable in determining the probability of
ones participation in protest. However while the correlation between the variables is
low, it’s not possible to completely disentangle the direction of influence between the
two variables.
The unanswered question is what type of protests do ‘happy protesters’
participate in? Is there a useful predictor based on economic satisfaction or potential
for political expression that would indicate when this type of protest would occur?
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The results here are suggestive and indicate the need for more research based on
happiness indicators and potential for protest.
Dissatisfaction with Government
Respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are significantly less satisfied with the
government than in any of the other countries. This finding suggests that these
protests were based on dissatisfaction with the government and a desire to change the
government. The survey indicates that it is possible to distinguish between countries
based on levels of dissatisfaction with government, but within a country, the
differences were more complicated. It is a puzzle why regions away from the capital
were more satisfied and why urban and better education respondents were the most
dissatisfied. It is not clear why southern regions are less dissatisfied with the
government when they receive the least amount of services and support. The
expectation was that southern regions would have greater dissatisfaction with the
government, the result was the opposite. Southern regions were actually more
satisfied with the government than other regions. This runs counter to the thesis that
the regional protests could be explained by differences among oblasts. It lends
credibility to the thesis that it was not the regional differences that sparked the
protests, but rather the specific actors and circumstances in each place which
encouraged the protests.
Perception of Conflict
The final category of questions suggested as a predictor were questions related
to perceptions of conflict. Similar to the satisfaction with government issues, there
appears to be a difference among countries with the Kyrgyz Republic respondents
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significantly more likely to perceive a greater probability of conflict than respondents
in the other countries. There is a difference among the local oblasts in their
perception of conflict, with the urban areas and specifically the capital having a
statistically significant greater perception that local conflict will occur, compared to
other regions.
This matches with the strong predictor results from the urban variable that was
observed across all of the countries. Those that are in the cities, specifically the
capital, and are slightly better educated are more likely to anticipate conflict at the
local level than any other group. Is this because they have better access to
information about what is really occurring in the country? Information flows up to
the capital but not back to the regions. These well informed urban representatives
may be reliable predictors of where conflict could occur in the future. Or they may
base their perception on an irrational, unsubstantiated attitude towards the regions as
being less stable and more probable for conflict and violence.
Why is the south, the one region with the greatest history of conflict, the one
region that does not anticipate conflict? Is it similar to Tajikistan, the only country
with a civil war, but no one predicts it occurring again? Why are regions where
violence has occurred less likely to predict violence, although empirically it is more
likely to occur? Unfortunately, these questions are beyond the scope of this research
and specifically the capabilities of this data. The question of perception of conflict
appears useful for distinguishing among countries, but not for identifying regions
within a country.
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This section has provided the parameters for where conflict may occur and
identified some of the key variables that influence one’s perception of satisfaction
with government and perception of conflict. But the survey data is inadequate in
providing a clear explanation for the process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic.
There are many contradictions in the data and it is impossible to clearly identify
motives to initiate and sustain the protests. The next section presents the initial
conditions of the country, the history of protests, and the timeline of the March
events.
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Chapter 5: Initial Conditions & Timeline
This section starts with an overview of the macro-economic and social
conditions in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005. It then presents a brief history of relevant
protests, conflicts, and significant events in The Kyrgyz Republic from 1990 till
2005: the conflict in Uzgen, land reform protests, the Ak Sai shooting, and the 2000
election protests. Finally it details a timeline of the events in 2005. The goal of this
section is to provide an important perspective and understanding of the road leading
to the March 2005 events. The election protests in March did not come out of a
vacuum and while the paper’s primary thesis is the priority of the process over initial
conditions, the initial conditions set the stage and provide determination for what
tactics and strategies were useable and useful. The details of the protests, timing and
events in March are explored in some detail with the objective of showing the
enormity and magnitude of the events, as well as the temporal and spatial patterns of
the protests.
Macro socio/economic environment
The Kyrgyz Republic is a country that is slowly creeping forward with
reforms but with few natural resources and almost no industrial base it is still one of
the poorest countries in the region. It had positive GDP growth from 1998 until 2002
when a pit fire at the Kumtor gold mine retarded GDP by .05%. 104 The impact of the
accident indicates the dependence of the country on its primary commodity export.
Since 2002, the GDP per captia grew from $290 USD in 2002 to $440 USD in 2005.
In comparison to the rest of the region, the Kyrgyz Republic’s GDP per capita is only
104 "The World Economic Outlook Database," (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003).
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slightly higher than Tajikistan. GDP growth again decreased from 2004 to 2005.
According to field research, the standard of living in rural areas has been getting
worse while the percent of severe poor increase each year.105 The infant mortality
rate is lower than any of the neighboring countries, but is still high compared to
developed countries; it ranked 110 out of 177 countries in the 2006 UNDP Human
Development Index.106 For indicators traditionally used in civil conflict predication,
more than 90% of the surface area of the country is considered mountainous.107
Using the CIDCM model, Kyrgyzstan’s political environment place it in the highest
risk area for civil conflict because it is a country caught between full democracy and
105 Interviewee #55 & #56, Interviewed by Author, Kyrgyz Republic, 2003.  
106UNDP, Human Development Report: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
107 UNDP, The Kyrgyz Republic: Millennium Development Goals Progress Report (Bishkek, The
Kyrgyz Republic: 2003).
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anocracy.108 Finally, there is a high degree of ethnic disparity; ethnic Kyrgyz




“In the summer of 1990, one of the most violent ethnic conflicts on the
territory of the former Soviet Union exploded in the southern Kyrgyz town of Uzgen
and spread to the neighboring villages which set astride the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border.
Lasting almost six days, 171 Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Russians were killed, and more
than 5,000 crimes perpetrated (murder, rape, and robbery).”110 The initial cause of the
conflict was over distribution of land, but it turned into a violent ethnic cleansing. A
Kyrgyz analyst writes that “the participants in the mass violence had no official
leadership. Rather, these were cases of uncontrolled mass paranoia, based mainly on
fear and conformity with mob values.”111 The inner-ethnic fighting was only stopped
by the intervention of Soviet troops. The killings and crimes were primarily
perpetrated by young men and the violence fueled by extreme ethnic prejudices and a
mob mentality.
Fifteen years later, these events have not been forgotten by the local
population and there is an open recognition of the delicate ethnic balance that exists,
108 Marshall and Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2003 : A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-
Determination Movements, and Democracy. (Anochracy is CIDCM’s term for a country between a
western democratic level and full autocracy.)
109 UNDP, The Kyrgyz Republic: Millennium Development Goals Progress Report.
110 Kevin Jones, "Land Privatization and Conflict: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model?," in In the Tracks of
Tamerlane : Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, ed. Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Center For Technology and National Security
Policy, 2004), 259.
111 Anara Tabyshalieva, "The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic
Conflict in the Ferghana Valley," in Peaceworks (United States Institute of Peace, 1999).
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specifically in the south of the country. The violence ultimately led to the downfall of
the Communist leaders who were seen as ineffective and unresponsive and to the
appointment and election of Askar Akayev as a new voice for economic and social
reform in the country.112
1991-2005
Since the early 1990’s, Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic and specifically the
southern area of the Ferghana Valley has been identified by national and international
observers as a potential zone of intense inter- and intra-ethnic fighting. Located in
the heart of Central Asia, the Ferghana Valley is bordered by three countries: The
Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The Valley encompasses more than
20% of the population living in Central Asia and “has a higher population density and
more economic distress then most other parts of Central Asia.”113 The living
standards for the majority of people in the region continue to deteriorate and
Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic represent the lowest indices for the region in the
UN Human Development Report Index.114
In 1997, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot issued a dire warning
about the potential for conflict, “religious and political extremism and . . . outright
war” in Central Asia.115 In 1999, a panel of regional experts in the landmark study,
Calming The Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central
112 Ibid., 22.
113 Lubin et al., Calming the Ferghana Valley : Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central
Asia : Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action, xv.
114 UNDP, Central Asia Human Development Report (Bratislava, Slovak Republic: UNDP Regional
Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2005).
115 Strobe Talbott, "A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," ed.
Central Asia-Cacusus Institute (Washington, D.C: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies, 1997).
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Asia predicted a high potential for strife within the next few years.116 The Peace and
Conflict, 2001 report by the Center for International Development and Conflict
Management, states “The Asian heartland is a . . . serious crisis zone.”117 A 2002
International Crisis Group report on Central Asia states, “there is the clear danger that
if relations between the states involved in border disputes deteriorate, the potential for
conflict will sharply rise.”118 In a Department for International Development (DFID)
2002 report, the impact of development aid in the Ferghana Valley was highlighted as
a potential cause of serious conflict.119
None of the dire predictions have occurred. Small protests erupted over land
reform and other specific local issues in the Kyrgyz Republic, but widespread protests
and conflict has not engulfed the region. Some regional pundits have pointed to the
topic of this paper, the political protests in 2005, as an example of the region out of
control. Yet a compelling feature of these events was how well controlled the
protests were, except for one or two isolated instances, it was not a wild, unruly mob
rampaging through the country.
Land reform is an example of a contentious issue that has a high potential for
violent conflict, but never erupted. However, it was a key underlying motivation for
some aspects of the March protests. In the southern part of the country, the
relationship to land is different from the north because of the scarcity of irrigated
land. In the southern regions the population is much denser than in the north and
116 Lubin et al., Calming the Ferghana Valley : Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central
Asia : Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action.
117 Ted Robert Gurr, Monty Marshall, and Deepa Khosla, Peace and Conflict Report (College Park,
MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2001), 2.
118 "Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential," (Brussels: International Conflict Group,
2002), 6.
119 Tony Vaux and Jonathan Goodhand, "Disturbing Connections: Aid and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,"
(Oxford: INTRAC, 2001).
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there is much greater competition for the scare resources of useable land.120 However,
in spite of these tensions, there have been remarkably few large-scale protests or
violent events over land. The key exception is the incident in Ak-Sai in 2002.
Aki-Sai
“In March, 2002, five people were killed and as many as 62 wounded when
police fired on a crowd protesting outside the southern city of Kerben,
Kyrgyzstan.”121 The crowd had gathered to protest the imprisonment of a popular
local politician, Beknazarov. A parliamentarian from the southern region of Jalal-
Abad, he had previously been a regional prosecutor and was accused of improper
conduct as a prosecutor. Political analysts and opposition leaders believed that the
real reason was his outspoken criticism of the President and several land deals that the
President had concluded with China. Almost immediately upon his arrest, crowds
formed in the town of Kara-Suu in the Jalal-Abad region to protest. Several hundred
supporters went on a hunger strike to demand his release. A few days after his trial
started, the crowd in Kara-Suu took eight regional government officials hostage and
seized the local government building.122
As the trial reached its end point, thousands of demonstrators gathered,
blocking roads and marching towards the courthouse. Police intervened to stop the
crowd and while reports differ, it appears that the police fired first into the crowd
killing 5 people and wounding many more.123
120 Interviewee #43, Interviewed by Author, Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
121 Jones, "Land Privatization and Conflict: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model?," 259.
122 RFE/RL, February 19, 2002
123 RFE/RL, March 18, 2002
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An important aspect of these protests is that Kurmanbek Bakiev, one of the
leaders of the March 2005 protests and the current President, was Prime Minster at
the time of the Ak-Sai shootings. In 2002 he “accused people of ‘provoking mass
disorder’ in the village of Kerben in the province of Jalal-Abad. He said law-
enforcement officials were forced to fire in self-defense when the protest turned
violent.”124
The immediate outcome of the shooting was that Beknazarov was released
from prison under the condition that he would try and stop the protests and Prime
Minister Bakiev and the leaders of the security apparatus were forced to resign.
There are four key long-term outcomes from the Ak-Sai event, the failure of
the security services, the power of a protest to collapse a government, the rise of
Beknazarov and finally, the tactical lessons learned in managing a protest. The actual
process of the shooting will never be completely understood, but it is clear that the
police fired on an unarmed crowd. The outcome for the public was an indictment of
the security services and an increase in distrust of the police. The outcome for the
police was the fear of using any force on a crowd. In interviews with security
members in 2005, they all pointed back to the events in 2002 as strongly influencing
their lack of interest in engaging the protesting crowds.
The second outcome of the events was the lesson that a crowd of popular
protesters could collapse a government. Weeks after the shooting, the Prime Minister
and the government were forced to resign. It was the first time that a government in
the former Soviet Union had been forced to resign because of popular protests. It is
an interesting irony that the Prime Minister forced to resign because of the political
124 RFE/RL, March 18, 2002
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protests was Kurmanbek Bakiev, the leader of the protests in March 2005 and the
new president elected in July 2005.
The third outcome was that it brought Beknazarov, the jailed political leader
to national attention and established him as a national opposition leader. It also
guaranteed support to him from his region in the south. Beknazarov would play an
important role behind the scenes in planning and implementing the protests in the
spring of 2005.
The final outcome is that the incidents in March of 2002, the blocking of
roads, seizing government buildings, taking hostages, large scale local protests, etc.
were all tactics that were used again in March 2005. In Tarrow’s language these had
become part of the “repertoire of contention”.125 It established what was possible for
the crowds to accomplish and the mechanisms how they should be implemented.
The events in Ak-Sai were an important event that interviewees regularly
referenced. It was an important emotional and practical reference point for the
protesters. As one local reporter commented, “Aksai was not financed. It started in
the fields and was only about ideology. In March, the Yurtas, food, buses, transport,
etc. were paid for by someone!”126 His comment raises a point discussed in the later
sections, the fundamental difference between the two protests; however, the key point
is that the Ak-Sai protests played an important role in framing and providing
motivation for both the protesters and the police in March 2005.
125Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 20.
126 Interviewee #24. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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2000 elections
The last parliamentary elections were in the spring of 2000 and at that time
there were also protests over the rigging of the elections. But the protests were
relatively small and for over a hundred days a small number of protesters camped out
in the capital city of Bishkek. There were not widespread protests across the country
and the protests in Bishkek were not led by any one opposition leader, but seemed to
be much more representative of a group of frustrated rural farmers who felt that
sitting in the capital was the only way to show their displeasure for the election.
After the Presidential elections in the fall of 2000, even though the elections
were not considered free and fair by the OSCE, there were very few protests across
the country and no wide spread protest movement.
Expectations for March 2005
There was an overwhelming expectation from the citizens that the 2005
Parliamentary elections would not be fair. Several individuals interviewed mentioned
that the politicians had votes to sell and there were plenty of people willing to
buy.127A group of local employees at a community health organization described how
the price for a vote goes up during Election Day, the price ranging from 100c. in the
morning to 500c in the evening ($2.5-12.5). As a local agriculture specialist
commented, “in the winter there is politics to make money, in the summer there is
farming.”128
Numerous local respondents stated that as the date for the elections
approached they all anticipated that the elections would be illegal and would be
127 Interviewee #48. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
128 Interviewee #48. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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stolen.129 There was a very strong perception throughout the country that the election
would not be clean. This bias, whether true or not, had an important role in guiding
people’s reactions after the election. The perception of illegal activity was so
strongly ingrained that it’s questionable if the regime could have done anything to
convince the populace that they conducted a fair election.
According to a Western diplomat, “There were not high expectations that
elections would be any different from before”, many of the campaigns were quite
dirty because so much money was involved.130
As an indication of what senior local political officials were saying, on
February 22nd only a few days prior to the election, the Ombudsmand for the country,
Tursunbai Bakir uulu stated that “in his view elections in 2005 would be the least fair
of all.”131 An opposition leader in the south said that he knew from the very
beginning that the election would not be real and was prepared to organize pickets if
needed in support of opposition candidate Bakiev.132
In an article a few days before the election, the Financial Times reported that
there was a potential for another Ukraine or Georgia style revolution, but
"nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan's elections are expected to pass peacefully. Voters are
apathetic. The opposition is divided. Television is government controlled."133 This
was a view echoed in numerous interviews locally. While people anticipated that the
elections would not be free and fair, they did not anticipate that it would lead to wide-
spread protests and revolt. Even when small protests started to occur across the
129 Interviewee #43. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
130Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
131 EurasiaDigest, 2-28, IRIN
132 Interviewee #53. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
133 Financial Times, 2-25, Gorst
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country, it wasn’t heavily reported on by the national TV and a lot of citizens were
unaware of what was happening. Many people regarded them as just paid supporters
coming out for their candidate and having no real impact on the wider issues.134
The general economic situation was slightly improving prior to the March
events, the banking situation improved, the financing was better, overall economic
growth was up. But according to numerous local businessmen interviewed,
everything else was as it had always been, tax, customs, corruption, etc hadn’t
changed at all. Medium-size businesses were tired of being controlled by the
government. They had lost any respect for Akayev and they were saying, “Anyone
but Akayev.”135
The general expectations prior to the Parliamentary elections by the local
citizens, civil society and international observers were that the elections would not be
fair and would be conducted illegally as they had been for many years. But there was
also not an expectation that wide scale protests would occur. There were a few
protest leaders who were planning to organize protests and encourage another colored
revolution, but they were a small minority.
As mentioned above, another important event that shaped the expectations
were the events in Georgia and Ukraine the year before. Akayev took the lesson from
these events that the only way to prevent the overthrow of his government was to
shut-down the opportunities for the opposition and to prevent them from protesting.
Akayev believed that the Rose and the Orange revolutions had been led and funded
by western organizations so he tried to shut down western funded media, NGOs and
134 Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
135 Interviewee #14. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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civil society. Akayev failed to understand the different dynamics that were at play in
both the Ukraine and Georgia process and failed to understand that pushing back on
the opposition would only create more pressure for them towards his regime.136
The President had already extended his term in office once and the
anticipation by the opposition was that Akayev was going to protect his interests by
remaining in office or appointing one of his children as President or Prime Minister.
When the President’s son and daughter announced they were running for the
Parliament this reinforced the conviction and apprehensions of the opposition.
Timeline of events March 2005
Overview
As early as mid-January, months ahead of the elections, protests started in
Bishkek and by February had spread to isolated communities throughout the Kyrgyz
Republic. The earliest protests started even before the actual elections as protests of
pre-election fraud and were initiated simultaneously without contact or information
between regions. After the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) criticized the parliamentary elections, the protests increased and significantly
expanded in intensity and duration after a second round of elections were also widely
viewed as fraudulent. The largest and most destructive protests were in the south of
the country. Large-scale protests did not spread to the north until near the end.
This timeline will start in early January 2005 since the previous section
already covered the years and months leading up to the end of 2004. There are five
major components to the timeline, the first period is the pre-election period, starting
136Fiona Hill and Kevin Jones, "Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon," The
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2006).
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from early in January until the first election on February 28th; second, from the first-
election until the run-off election on March 13th; third, from March 13th till March
20th; fourth March 20th till March 23rd, fifth, and finally the events of March 24th.
Pre-Election
The majority of serious infractions and restrictions on the democratic process
occurred prior to Election Day. As the OSCE/ODIHR final election report stated, in
the time period prior to the elections, there was “widespread vote-buying, de-
registration of candidates, interference with independent media, and a low level of
confidence in electoral and judicial institutions on the part of candidates and
voters.”137 For most of the local citizens, the problems weren’t the actions on the day
of the elections, but the process leading up to it. A former government official
commented that it sent a dangerous signal to the politicians running that anyone could
use dirty tactics.138
On January 7th, five former diplomats were excluded from running by a
regional court that declared that they had failed to live continuously in the country for
the mandated five years prior to running.139 One of the diplomats was Roza
Otunbaeva, the former Ambassador to the UK and the US and a leading candidate for
the presidential elections that fall. She would have been running against Bermet
Akayeva, the President’s oldest daughter. Supporters of Otunbaeva held small
protests in the capital from the the 8th of January until the 31st. Otunbaeva declared
an end to the protests when it became clear that she was not going to be allowed to
run.
137 OSCE, "The Kyrgyz Republic: Election Observation Mission Final Report " (2005), 1.
138 Interviewee #15. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
139 OSCE, "The Kyrgyz Republic: Election Observation Mission Final Report ", 10.
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The majority of candidates that wanted to run were allowed. More than 90%
of those that originally registered participated in the first round of elections; from 425
initial candidates, 23 withdrew, 12 were deregistered and one died.140 The problem
for the Akayev regime was that the deregistered candidates were very popular and
had strong local support they were able to immediately rally onto the streets.
All of the protests weren’t against the government. In the capital city of
Bishkek, on February 3rd there were groups collecting “signatures both for the
resignation of President Akayev and for extending his term.”141 In Bishkek, on
February 5th was an early protest led by the Coalition for NGOs where about 300
“meeting participants shouted ‘Down with Akayev’”.142 Almost a month prior to the
parliamentary election, this is one of the first recorded incidents where people were
specifically protesting about removing Akayev. In an interview after the events, the
director of the Coalition claimed that they were not there to protest against Akayev,
but only for “free and fair elections.”143
On the same day in the southern city of Osh, a group led by opposition
politician Otunbaeva and civil society leader Ismailova attempted to hold a forum on
free elections. They were prevented by the local government officials to gather at a
public building and went to a local restaurant. The local police made them leave the
restaurant and broke up the meeting on the grounds that they failed to have an official
permit for a gathering.144 The government had already prevented Otunbaeva from
140 Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
141 EurasiaDigest, 2-07, 16:18
142 EurasiaDigest, 2-07, 10:47EST from Interfax and AP
143 Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
144 EurasiaDigest, 2-07, 16:18EST
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running for office, but continued to harass and intimidate anyone remotely capable of
gathering supporters.
In mid-February several very popular local politicians were excluded from
running because of different minor infractions of the election code. On February 19th,
about a week prior to the elections, crowds in the eastern town of Kochkor started
blocking roads to protest their local candidate’s exclusion from standing for election.
A few days later in the far eastern town of Kara Kol, a crowd of about 750 protesters
picketed a local district court and another 300 blocked an important transit road to the
eastern region. At the same time, in the far west of the country in Talas, a former
Akayev supporter and government official was prevented from running and more
than 1,300 of his supporters protested at a district court.
A week from the elections, protesters had cut down trees and set up tents to
block three key roads in the country. At one site, protesters blocked off the access to
the main gold mine in the country, an important source of foreign currency and the
largest international investment.
In one of the largest protests, more than 3,000 supporters of two local
candidates blocked the road to the poorest region in the country, Naryn. On the 23rd
of February, K. Bakiev went to visit and speak to these protesters. This is the first
instance of links starting to form between different protesters and national opposition
leaders.145 On the Wednesday before the elections, protesters continued to block key
roads and in the late afternoon in the eastern city of Balykchy, protesters for the first
time seized a local administrative building.
145 EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Akipress
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As an indication that the protesters were only supporting their local candidate,
a group of protesters in the town of Typ dispersed after a local court reinstated the
local candidate. The next day, on the 24th, the Supreme Court upheld the cancellation
of five popular candidates and local protests in their regions increased immediately
including local supporters of A. Japarov who seized a government district building in
Kochkor.146
The next day, protesters supporting the deregistered candidates agreed to
disperse. They stated that they would “vote against all” in the election.147 This is an
interesting option on the ballot that allows voters to vote against everybody listed. If
enough people vote this way, it annuls the election and new candidates have to come
forward and a new election has to take place. Under Kyrgyz election law, in a first
round election, a candidate has to receive at least 50% of all the votes to win, if no
one does, the top two candidates have a runoff about two weeks later. The fact that
they were willing to use the ballot box for their specific candidate reinforces the
localized nature and dynamics of the protests.
1st Round
The elections were held on Sunday, February 27th with a turn out of about
60%. There were few major reports of problems during the day, although 11% of all
polling centers did report some type of problem, from minor issues to preventing
people from voting. 148 The OSCE officially stated that “while more competitive than
previous elections, [the elections] fell short of OSCE commitments and other
146 EurasiaDigest, 2-28, GazteaKG, AKIpress EurasiaDigest, 2-24, 10:06, RFE/RL
EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Kabar
147 EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Interfax
148 OSCE, "The Kyrgyz Republic: Election Observation Mission Final Report ", 2.
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international standards for democratic elections in a number of areas.”149 An
international political expert working in country, pointed out that while there were
numerous voting infractions, many members of the opposition still lost their districts
legitimately. They were outspent and often out organized because they hadn’t
expected to face formidable, well-organized and well-funded opponents.150
On the actual day of the election, the process appeared to be much better than
prior elections with the use of inking, transparent ballot boxes, and numerous local
and international observers. There was an interesting gulf between the international
community’s perspective on the elections and the local communities. As the OSCE
Ambassador stated, the “international community thought it was the best, locals
thought it was the worst.”151 As discussed in the previous section, part of the
difference is expectations; local observers were “ready for a real election.” The
international community focused on Election Day; the locals on all the time far ahead
of the elections. The election was perceived locally as very dirty with more money
involved then before, and several known criminals and corrupt businessmen running.
In addition, the court decisions were quite corrupt, deciding in reverse of what people
had just voted.152 Yet in spite of these very real limitations, the reality was that it
may have been the most transparent and competitive election in the history of the
country.
In the first round, the pro-government party Ala-Kyrgyzstan won the vast
majority of seats. For the opposition it was a huge setback, they had anticipated
149 Ibid., 1.
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winning at least 25 to 30 seats and won only a handful. An opposition NGO leader
commented that in Bishkek there was a feeling of resignation that the establishment
had shifted and they should start looking for ways to accept the new reality with
Akayev and his children in power.153
Immediately after the election results were announced, 600 supporters of A.
Tolonov blocked roads and key north-south traffic in the town of Kara Suu in Osh
oblast. 3,000 supporters of T. Alimov protested in the streets in Aravan, Osh, 10,000
supporters of Sadyrbaev marched on the mayor’s office in Nooken, Jalal-Abad and
finally a few hundred people gathered in Bishkek, “waving yellow and pink
banners.”154 As will be discussed in more detail in the later sections, the initial
protests were primarily in the northern regions, but the largest protests after the
elections were in the south. Part of this is because more candidates were deregistered
from running prior to the elections in the north and more candidates lost their seats
through the election process in the south.
The next day, more protesters came out to block roads and protest in
government centers. One group in Aravan, Osh agreed to unblock a road after the
local court agreed to hear the candidate’s complaints on March 2nd.155 On March 3rd,
a grenade was thrown onto the balcony of opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva’s
apartment. No one was living in the apartment at the time as it was being repaired.
Opposition leaders saw it is a clear provocation by the government, the government
153 Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
154 EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Burke AFP, 03-01, 2:05GMT
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official statements implied that it was planted by the opposition to engender sympathy
for the opposition position. The level of distrust and animosity between the
government and the opposition leaders increased significantly.156
On the same day, March 3rd, in Osh, hundreds of protesters for both the
elected parliamentarian, D. Sabirov and the opposition candidate, P. Tolonov
protested and came close to clashing in the center square, only prevented from
violence by police that stepped in and separated them.157 On the 4th, in Jalal-Abad, a
major city in the south, “over 300 people seized by storm” the Governor’s office.
This was the first time the opposition seized a Governor’s or Oblast Administration
building. The crowd was “demanding [the] resignation of President Askar Akayev,
the governor of Jalal-Abad region and his deputy, the mayor of the town of Jalal-
Abad and the heads of local law-enforcement agencies"158
Saturday March 5th was an important turning point for the opposition
protesters throughout the country because they solidified their control over the Jalal-
Abad Oblast Administration building that would become a focal point for the protests
over the next few weeks. According to news reports, in Jalal-Abad at 14:00 local
time, there was a “clash between protesters and personnel” over the regional
administration building that had been seized the previous day.159 However, the
struggle was short as by 19:00 the media reported that the “situation . . .is calm and
stable” with approximately 80 people inside the building and 100 on the street in
156 AFP, 03-03, 10:25GMT
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front.160 Protesters would remain in control of the government building in Jalal-Abad
from the 4th until the 24th, except for a short period early on the morning of the 20th.
As word of the protests in Jalal-Abad spread, supporters of Sadyrbaev, who
were continuing their protests in Nooken, a few hours away, threatened to march
down to Jalal-Abad in support of their fellow protesters.161 This is one of the earlier
references to protesters offering to link with other protesters from throughout the
region.
On the same day, 400 supporters of D. Chotonov continued to protest in Kara-
Kulja, in Osh oblast and hundreds of supporters of A. Kulbaev held protests in front
of the Lenin District Court in Bishkek and 500 supporters of N. Kasiev protested in
At-Bashy district in Naryn oblast.162 In the ongoing dispute over the government
building in Jalal-Abad, by Sunday the 6th about 150 occupied the building, while 100
soldiers prevented more from entering and another 700 "demonstrated in the square
outside chanting ‘Down with Akayev’”. Throughout the day, protesters began
arriving from other nearby cities.163 This is the first reference to protesters from one
region traveling to another area in support of a local protest. Jalal-Abad was to
become the focal point of protests over the next few weeks.
On Sunday the 6th, almost 2,500 supporters of Kadyrbekov blocked the
Bishkek-Torugart road. This road is the main access point for all trade between the
Kyrgyz Republic and China; as well as an important route to get trade into eastern
160 AFP, 03-04, 5:17pmGMT
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Uzbekistan and northern Tajikistan.164 Another group of protesters blocked the road
from the main cities up toward Naryn. When the Naryn Governor tried to return to
the oblast center he was detained at the roadblock by protesters for about six hours,
but was released after negations by a local leader of the civil society community.165
On Monday, the 7th, protests started for the first time in the farthest east region
of Issyk-Kul, about a hundred people protested and demanded the resignation of the
Governor.166 In Jalal-Abad, the government building continued to be occupied and
the crowds swelled to more than 1,500-2000 people outside with young people
marching through the square shouting "Akayev Resign".167 In one of the earliest
examples of opposition leaders joining forces and speaking to supporters from other
regions, national opposition leaders Otunbaeva, Sydykov, and Sadyrbaev spoke to the
crowds in Jalal-Abad on Tuesday the 8th.
In Uzgen, a small town in between Jalal-Abad and Osh, 500 protesters
organized by Jusupaliyev seized the mayor’s office and led chants against the
President.168 On Wednesday the 9th almost 200 supporters traveled to Osh from
Kara-Kulja District to protest in front of the government building.169 The protesters
specifically came to Osh as it is the regional center in the south and considered the
second capital of the country. There were few if any “local” protests held in Osh;
similar to Jalal-Abad it was used as a focal point for regional protests. In the southern
town of Kara Suu, supporters of A. Tolonov attempted to seize the government
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building. This was the third attempt to seize a government building in the past
week.170 In Bishkek, several students, most of them members of the youth
organization "Birge", held a thirty-minute protest at National University one of the
very few protests held in the capital city of Bishkek during this time.171
On the 10th, the opposition parties finally united together to form a
Coordination Council and elected K. Bakiev as the Council leader.172 This was a
significant step, as a key weakness of the Kyrgyz opposition was their lack of a
unifying front. One of the success factors in both Georgia and Ukraine was that they
were able to unite together against the government.173
In the northern town of Ivanovka, a few miles from Bishkek, 500 rallied in
support of Andashev and were dispersed by 150 police with some protesters
sustaining minor injuries.174 In the north of the country, the police were much more
willing to use force. In the south the police were either completely overwhelmed in
numbers or choose not to use force for fear of making the situation worse or because
of general lassitude. In the north there was less hesitation and more willingness to
initiate actively breaking up gatherings. Part of this was the influence of the Ak-Sai
events on the security services in the south. No one wanted to be responsible for
more attacks on civilians.
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2nd Round
On Monday, March 14th, the OSCE criticized the second round of the
elections for almost the same reasons as the first round. During the second round
there was voting in 39 of the 75 districts.175 After the second round of elections, only
six opposition figures won compared to twenty in the last parliament. Similar to the
first round, the day of the election was relatively quiet with protests starting back up
the next day.
Protesters in the south and in the west immediately responded with large scale
protests. 1,000 supporters of A. Madumarov took over the local government office in
the southern town of Uzgen, and in a village to the south of Osh, supporters of M.
Sultanov blocked the roads. 176,177 In Talas, 2,000 supporters of R. Dzheenbekov
gathered at the Oblast Administration and another 3,000 blocked the road between
Talas and Taraz, Kazakhstan.178 After protesting for several hours in front of the
Oblast Administration building, the protesters broke past police barricades and seized
the central government building in Talas.179 The Governor of Talas and the head of
Bakay-Ata district administration were both held hostage.180 Protesters now
controlled the Jalal-Abad and the Talas Governor’s offices.
The 15th in Jalal-Abad was an important day for the opposition as they
organized a “Kurultai”. A “Kurultai” is an ancient gathering dating back to the
selection of Khans and Emirs with the purpose to choose through an election process
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the next ruler. It has no legal authority, but was a very powerful revival of an ancient
custom. Reports differed, but somewhere from about 5,000 to 15,000 protesters and
representatives from throughout the region gathered that day. According to video
footage that I have seen, the number appears to be much closer to the 5,000. It was
shown as an orderly and well-managed process. The main opposition leaders
appeared and spoke, and K. Bakiev was selected as the representative leader of the
people.181 According to a New York Times reporter there, about 2,000 attended and
400 police looked on "while speaker after speaker denounced the election".182
As one participant commented, that day it was a celebration for the
opposition. Politically, it was an important development for at least symbolically, the
people were choosing their own new leaders. While it only represented a fraction of
the population and was in a small city in the south, it was an important moment. Two
parallel political structures were starting to emerge, the one managed by the White
House in Bishkek and the one managed by K. Bakiev in Jalal-Abad. Many observers
felt that the south was lost to the White House on the 15th.183
The same day in Osh, several hundred supporters from mountainous villages
continued their protests against the government.184 In Bazar-Kurgan, in the Jalalabad
region, the head of the regional administration and his deputy were taken hostage and
then released later in the day.185
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The next day in Osh, on the 16th, the crowd became more violent in their
attempt to break through the police cordon around the government building.186
Speaking publicly for one of the first times since the elections, President Akayev
denounced the opposition stating that they were trying to start a civil war.187
In another region in Jalal-Abad, supporters of T. Madiyarov seized the local
government building and blocked the road to Toktogul, a major water reservoir.188 In
addition, protesters blocked the southern road to Tadjikistan.189 At this point all but
one or two of the main roads into the country were blocked by protesters.
On the same day, 600 protesters seized the district building and held the
mayor hostage in Kochkor, Naryn.190 A new district leader was appointed by the
crowd of more than 3,000.191 On March 17th, 100 Supporters of Yusupov clashed
with about 200 supporters of Tolonov in the southern border town of Kara Suu, near
Osh. Tolonov’s supporters used horsemen to drive Yusupov's supporters away; the
police finally separated the two groups and prevented any physical violence.192 In
Toktogul, Jalal-Abad, supporters of Madiyarov occupied the state administration
building.193 In Osh, after weeks of growing protests, hundreds of demonstrators
finally seized the Governor’s office in the center of town, which "police barely
resisted".194
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As of March 18th, the governor’s offices were held in Jalalabad, Talas, and
Osh. The same day, Ar-Namys, a political party backing jailed politician F.Kulov
started a small rally in the center of Bishkek.195
March 20-23rd
The government believed that it had to retake control of the regional
government offices. Early on the morning of March 20th at approximately 5:30AM,
Ministry of the Interior Special Forces stormed the government buildings in Osh and
Jalal-Abad and physically removed all of the protesters.196
According to interviews with survivors, “each of the men had a police stick.
They didn’t differentiate [between] ladies or men, they beat up everybody, pulled
their hair. We tried to prevent them from beating up youngsters, but we got beaten
severely.”197 As the protesters were taken away in two Kamaz trucks, some of the
younger protesters jumped off the back of the trucks because they feared they were
being taken to be shot.
As one middle-aged woman stated, “I personally thought that I will die, but
when we came to Suzak and they told us to write explanatory letter I started thinking
that I will live further. They scared us so much that I thought I will be killed. And
then they drove us home, they thought that now we are scared and will not do
anything.”198 This same woman returned back to the square later in the day to attend
the growing protest. As will be analyzed further, the harsh reaction by the
government served as a spark to the opposition and to galvanize support from
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throughout the region. The attacking and beating of the women and children spread
quickly. There were many rumors, all untrue, that up to as many as ten protesters had
been killed.
Later in the day as news spread about the events, more than 10,000 protesters
marched on the government building in Jalalabad. About 2,000 were armed with
sticks and stones and used a bus to break down the police building. They burned the
Interior Services building and the prosecutor’s office. More than 700 protesters
moved into the Governor’s building, hanging banners out the window demanding
Akayev's resignation.199
From an eyewitness, who was in the bazaar in the center of Jalal-Abad, she
said that everyone at the bazaar was aware of the events and knew what was
happening. They were using their mobile phones and were in contact with others
coming into town. By around noon more and more people from the villages came
into town and most people left the bazaar to go towards the center of town. One
woman witnessed people gathering in the streets, some with rocks, sticks and a
Kamaz full of rocks. She said that it didn’t appear that anyone was really leading the
protests, it appeared that no one knew what was happening.200
Opposition leader Rosa Otunbayeva stated in an interview that day that
“’people took control over the city by midday.’ In her words, all police in Jalal-Abad
passed on the side of the people. 'One can easily say that these regions are under
popular control'".201 Later in the day the Jalal-Abad airport was seized and covered
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with rocks and burning tires were lit around the airport with the goal of preventing the
government from flying in special troops to quell the uprising.202
After the storming of the building in Jalal-Abad, numerous eye witnesses
stated that no one saw any policemen on the streets at all. They had all left and gone
home, with many of them refusing to wear their uniforms outside. People self-
organized into groups patrolling the streets wearing red armbands and calling
themselves, “Kirk Chovo” or 40 helpers, after the legendary helpers to Manas.203
People came from all different regions and areas now to support the protest.
Depending on the reports, there were at a minimum 10,000 and possibly as high as
20,000 people in and around the center square in Jalal-Abad on the 20th and 21st.
There were as many as seven large yurtas (local round felt houses) set up on the
square. Throughout the protest in Jalal-Abad, local people gathered money to support
the protesters. One local organization reported that they took up a donation of about
1000c (+/-$25) and some of them even took a few protesters into their homes. Most
of the people in the town were sympathetic with the demonstrators even if they didn’t
go out and protest themselves.204
The next day, March 21st was the celebration of the holiday Nooruz, the
Turkish celebration of the New Year, traditionally one of the largest celebrations in
the country. In Osh, the government thought that everything was over after they had
brought in the Special Forces to move people out as they had done in both Osh and
Jalal-Abad. In Osh, the local officials started organizing for the Nooruz celebration;
things appeared to be back to normal with kids on the square and musicians
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playing.205 According to eyewitnesses in Osh, on the morning of the 21st, around
11am they saw people in the wrestling center owned by E Bayaman preparing with
clubs and bottles. As these witnesses walked to the square they saw children and
parents dressed for Nooruz and the government preparing a parade.
There were about 200 police in riot gear in front of the government building in
Osh. A little after noon a crowd started to gather in the center of town in front of the
Lenin Statue and then a mass of more than 500 people, some armed with sticks and
bottles and some on horseback, started toward the government building.206 The
people stormed the building much more violently than they had the week before when
they had first seized the building. The protesters had a clear tactic of putting women
in front and using them as shields. The Special Forces had the building surrounded
and the people surrounded them. There was no response by the local militia. “No
one wanted to take responsibility to shoot or to respond.”207 According to members
of the security services interviewed later, the Special Forces and the local militia did
not get a specific green light from Bishkek to use force. When the women rushed in
like a wave against the police force the police just stood to the side and let them come
in. One witness stated that the police station and the Prosecutor’s office were both
attacked and partially burned and then the crowd stopped and left these buildings, “it
appeared to be very controlled and very targeted.”208
Similar to Jalal-Abad , the crowd seized the Osh airport and attempted to seize
a local TV station, but were talked out of it by the station manager who promised
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additional coverage of the local events.209 Reuters reported that the "city's police
chief later told the crowd he had ordered his men to cross over to the opposition."210
From an interview with a senior special security forces employee in Osh, on
the 21st he was at work and called and told to take off his uniform because people
were getting wild and that some people had started to beat policemen. His chief told
them to work only in groups, so “all three guards came in to work together at that
time.” He said that the senior authorities never gave the green light for shooting on
the 21st. He was told not to use guns or batons if people came toward them; they
were supposed to let them come.211
Again similar to Jalal-Abad, there were no policemen or local militia on the
streets, after the protests. One witness stated that the last time they could remember
seeing a police officer was on Sunday the 21st. There was a citizen’s militia brigade
walking the street keeping order, almost all witnesses reported that overall there was
very good discipline in Osh and Jalal-Abad.212
This was not an out of control wild crowd rampaging and destroying the city.
There was order and control. Some of the control was from the leaders of the
protests, but some of it was the self-organization of the local citizens. According to
witnesses and participants, the patrols were locally generated and self-organized.
On the 21st in the morning, after Jalal-Abad had been taken by force the night
before, the head of the President’s Administration, Jaspekarov, announced at a press
conference that everything in Jalal-Abad was under control of the government. This
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210 Reuters, 3-21, 5:04AM
211 Interviewee #45. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
212 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
115
triggered a great deal of anger in Jalal-Abad and was part of the impetus for moving
the protests to the north, so that they could show the country what was actually
happening.213
Symbolizing the radicalization of the opposition after the March 20 and 21st
events in Jalal-Abad and Osh, Rosa Otunbayeva stated on Monday the 21st, that "we
have one aim only: to oust this government . . .There is no need for talks anymore."214
The events in Jalal-Abad forced the President to react. On Monday the 21st,
Akayev indicated that he was willing to talk to protesters. In addition the AP reported
that on the 21st, "Akayev orders CEC [Central Election Commission] and Supreme
Court to investigate alleged violations".215 On Tuesday the 22nd, the President
addressed the country and Parliament stating that the "opposition is too fragmented
for talks." In addition he "condemned 'homegrown revolutionaries' as ' individuals
who are guided by foreign directives and inflict harm on their own people while
receiving funds from abroad.'"216
There were few, managed pro-government rallies during this time. On the 22nd
there was a pro-Akayev rally in Bishkek. The rectors of the Universities were asked
to support Akayev and students from the National Universities were forced to attend
to show support for the government.217 There was also a small pro-government rally
held in the far eastern town of Kara-Kol in the Issyk-Kul oblast with a few hundred
people protesting for order and stability.218
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On Wednesday, the 23rd, the President fired the Interior Minister and
Prosecutor General and replaced them with the much more defiant and stronger
Dushebaev and M. Sutalinov. Interior Minister Dushebaev stated, "police can use
'any legal means, including physical force, anti-riot gear, and authorized weapons' in
order to establish 'constitutional order.'"219 The same day, the Defense Minister
Topoev flew to Osh and met briefly with the "people's Gov, Aryykov” in order to
prepare for negotiation talks between the Prime Minister and the opposition on the
24th.220
On the afternoon of the 23rd, a group of NGOs held a rally with the stated
intention of providing information about what was actually happening in the south of
the country. There was very little if any information in the north of actual events in
the south of the country. Included in the gathering were students from Bergi, Kel-Kel,
and from American University.221 Most of the speakers were civil society leaders
who had not been involved in the protests until this point. The meeting on the 23rd
was broken up first by drunks sent into the crowd as agent provocateurs and then
police arrested the civil society leaders.222 Ironically, there were few if any political
opposition leaders either at the meeting or arrested, the vast majority were NGO
representatives who had played a very minor role up to that point in the events.
March 24th
The events of March 24th, the day that President Akayev fled the country
demand a rather lengthy treatment. These events will also be discussed in the
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analysis of the Reactive Dynamics section. On the 24th the opposition agreed to start
the demonstrations in three places in Bishkek: near Osh Bazzar (the Nazeraliev
center), Koch Jor and behind the Jorgo Kenesh. The idea was to have separate
protests so it would be more difficult for the police to break-up.223 According to
some organizational leaders the expectation was that they would spend more than a
week, possibly up to ten days in the square. They made plans to have yurts set up, to
have cooking locations, and to have water brought in. They had no anticipation that it
would all be over in a few hours.224
Civil society members said that they were informed about the gathering only a
few days in advance. From other interviews with opposition leaders it appears that
there had been a plan for some time to work from outside the capital towards the
center, but that the exact date and time was only fixed after the sudden reaction in
Jalal-Abad and Osh on the 20th and 21st. It was then that plans were set to have a
rally in Bishkek on the 24th and people began to travel from the south towards the
north. Representatives from the Western Embassies and international organizations
stated that they found out about the rally either the morning that it occurred or only
the evening before. It was quite clear in interviews that this was planned and
executed almost exclusively by the opposition politicians not by civil society or the
international community.
The White House had also received information about the rally and had
prepared by deploying military and police in riot gear as well as groups of young men
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that were given helmets and wooden shields as well as blue arm bands to show that
they were loyal to Akayev.
A former professional boxer and martial arts expert stated that he saw boxers,
karate experts and other sportsman hired by the White House involved in the protests
both on the 23rd and the 24th. These sportsmen who wore white caps to separate them
from the crowd were also used to break up the meeting on the 23rd in Bishkek. There
were approximately 500 “White Hats” who were needed because the militia was
unable to intervene.225
By 10am on the 24th, the crowd in front of Nazaraliev’s center was growing
larger. The location was near the Osh bazaar (the name of the largest bazaar in
Bishkek) and as traders called out to each other to go to the protest, almost the entire
bazaar shut down that day, similar to the process in Jalal-Abad. In the crowd there
were many different groups with placards representing their region and political
leader. It was well organized enough that they had time to arrive, organize and make
placards. Representatives from all over the country, Naryn, Koch Kor, Jalal-Abad,
Talas, Osh, were all represented. Those gathered at the center listened to speeches
before starting the few miles walk towards the White House. This crowd formed the
core which gathered more people as they went through the streets. There were
reports of people getting off buses, leaving from the sidewalk and coming out of
shops to join in the march down the street. All of the known opposition leaders were
gathered at the front and led the march.
Very few of the people that were there had any idea of what was going to
happen or what the plan was. The loudest chants were for Akayev to leave, but few
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believed that it might actually happen. The leaders were urging the crowd to be
prepared to stay on for many days. The opposition leaders repeated many times that,
“We’ve come to get a change in government”. They expected a long peaceful
demonstration and then perhaps an orderly transfer of power.226
Nothing happened to prevent the peaceful march as they walked down the
main boulevard taking up all four lanes of traffic and marched up towards the White
House and the central square. From photographs and eyewitnesses, it was difficult to
see from the beginning to the end of the crowd, it stretched for so many miles down
the road. As the crowd approached the White House (they were walking parallel to
the White House) soldiers at first attempted to stop them, but they must have received
orders to let them continue, because they quickly backed away. Video footage shows
a few soldiers moving to be in front of the crowd as well as young men many in
leather jackets with blue armbands gathering and then suddenly melting away back
towards the White House with one large man in plain clothes motioning for the others
to move away and follow them down the street.
The group moved past the White House and gathered in front of the new
liberty statue. A second smaller group representing the social democratic party had
also arrived at this point in the center of town from the other direction. Opposition
leaders passed around a bull horn and spoke to the crowd. The leaders were not
asking for Akayev to leave, but there were banners saying “Akayev Resign” and it
was a regular chant of the crowds. The leaders asked for Akayev to come and listen.
After a short time of speeches, from the side of the park between the White
House and the crowd, young men came running towards the crowd with shields,
226 Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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wearing helmets and blue ribbons and started throwing stones at the crowd. At first
the crowd started to disperse and moved towards the edge of the square. The
opposition leaders called out to the crowd to restrain themselves and to seek shelter
on the other side of the square, but after several minutes of this the “crowd was not
able to restrain themselves very long.”227There were lots of unemployed, poor and
young men in the protest crowd and they were not going to have a small group of
men throw stones at them. They picked up the stones thrown at them and started to
throw them back.
People ran away towards the buildings for safety, but when the crowd saw that
they had all the stones, they took them and started to throw them back.228 A
participant stated, “None of the people would have gone to the White House if rocks
had not been thrown.”229
A small group of soldiers came down Chui many of them on horses and
pushed the crowd back, but again the crowd surged back towards the police who
quickly scattered and ran away to the gates, some were caught and beaten by the
crowd. One young protester seized a police horse and galloped around waving a flag
and encouraging the protesters. By now some of the crowd had pushed up against the
gates of the White House. Between the first and second backlash, a crowd of about a
100 young men arrived from Osh wearing yellow ribbons. They were sportsman
trained in the south and served as an important catalyst and energy in responding to
the police.230 They marched to the gates of the White House and then helped to break
227 Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
228 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
229 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
230 Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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down or climb over the fence and break into the White House. By this time there was
no one left defending the building.
Akayev had left the White House about a half-hour before it was stormed. A
few of his senior government officials remained in the building and were beaten.
According to a Moscow radio interview with Akayev, the last order that he gave was
that force should not be used to prevent the taking of the White House.231
Immediately after the events there was a similar reaction in Bishkek to what
happened in the south, “the people did not support the police, so the police
disappeared that day.”232 The police would remain off the streets during the period of
looting for the next few days until former Mayor and security forces leader Felix
Kulov appealed to them to return to their jobs.
As an international observer commented, the day after the ‘revolution’ water
cannons were out cleaning the streets, the garbage was being collected and all of the
street cars and buses were running on schedule. In spite of the upheaval, the basic
requirements of a government continued to function.233
Conclusion
The deteriorating macro-economic conditions created an environment that was
conducive to political unrest and protests. The history of ethnic violence and
experience with political protests provided the necessary knowledge and repertoire of
tactics and contention that could be deployed as needed. These provided the
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the political protests to start. As the
detailed timeline demonstrated, the key factor in the growth of the protests was the
231 Ekho Moskvy (Moscow). March 29, 2005 1318 GMT, in Russian.
232 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
233 Interviewee #14. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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interaction between the government and the protesters. The next section takes the
details of the timeline as presented in this chapter and provides analysis on the
dynamic processes that drove the protests forward.
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Chapter 6: Dynamic Relationships
Overview
This paper’s research question is why did non-violent protests occur in
January 2005 and lead to the government’s collapse? Chapter 4 showed that personal
levels of well-being, dissatisfaction with the government, and perception of conflict
had little influence on where or when protests occurred. Chapter 5 argued that the
initial macro conditions were actually improving or had not significantly changed to
provide a causal motivation for the protests. Chapter 5 also discussed the history of
previous protests and suggested that while this was an important motivator and
facilitator once the protests started, they were not the initiating or even the most
important sustaining cause. The thesis of this dissertation is that the protests started
for local causes, were sustained by local political entrepreneurs, increased because of
political repression and succeeded because of the failures of the government. I argue
that it is the repressive action of the government toward the protesters that was the
most important component in determining the final outcome of the political protests.
As noted in Chapter 1, McFaul identifies seven characteristics in the other
protests in the former Soviet countries: a semiautocratic regime with a degree of
political competition, an unpopular incumbent, a united and organized opposition,
independent electoral-monitoring capabilities, a modicum of independent media, the
opposition’s capacity to mobilize large numbers of protestors, and splits among the
state’s military, police, and security forces. 234 The first section of this chapter
234 McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism."
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examines these seven points and discusses their relative degree of importance in the
Kyrgyz Republic. The process of events in the Kyrgyz Republic was significantly
different from the protests in Ukraine and Georgia, but the research suggests that
there is a greater similarity between the Kyrgyz Republic and other post-Soviet
countries facing political succession. I argue that the role of international funding,
western governments, and local civil society were minor and had limited impact on
the initiation or sustaining of the Kyrgyz events. The following three sections
examine the start of the protests for local reasons, the increase of the protests through
the actions of political entrepreneurs, the sustaining of the protests based on
repressive actions of the government and the success of the protests because of the
failures of the Kyrgyz government.
Protest themes
A semiautocratic regime with a degree of political competition
The Kyrgyz Republic was a semiautocratic regime that had previously
allowed a degree of political competition, but was in the process of restricting and
constraining all political opposition. As noted in Chapter 2, a government that moves
from highly restrictive towards a more open environment is undertaking a potentially
dangerous and explosive process. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, the country was
moving backwards toward a more repressive environment. I argue that it is even
more dangerous to move backwards than to slowly open to political competition. The
citizens are told that they are in a democracy, but their freedoms are slowly taken
away from them. The irony is that the Kyrgyz Republic was making some progress
forward in large-scale political reforms, but it was perceived by the population to be
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moving backward and attempting to consolidate power that it had previously
relinquished.
An unpopular incumbent
The Kyrgyz Republic had an unpopular incumbent, but he was not up for
election in the spring of 2005. In both Ukraine and Georgia the elections were for the
president, in this case, it was parliamentary elections that brought down the president,
but the new parliament remained. This is one of the fascinating ironies and
conundrums of the outcome of these political events—the catalyst for the original
protests, ousting the parliament, did not succeed, but the protests went away when the
president fled from power. The president was extremely unpopular and had become a
favorite ‘punching bag’ for every political, economic, or social problem in the
country. The weak and ineffective parliament received almost no criticism and all the
blame went towards the president. So while there was an unpopular president, he was
not up for election until the fall of that year. It was his actions towards the
parliamentary elections that led to his government’s collapse.
United and organized opposition
A key difference in the events in the Kyrgyz Republic was the lack of
coordination among the opposition. Eventually, some members of the opposition
formed a coalition and were able to select a public representative, K. Bakiev. But this
was not a representative coalition and did not include the leaders of two of the largest
protests in Osh and Talas. The meeting of the Kuralti on the 15th was another
example of a partial unification of the opposition, but it was primarily a restatement
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of the group that had formed a week before and was attempting to put a veneer of
legitimacy on the illegal taking of government buildings.
It was not until the last day, the 24th, when the different groups of protesters
and opposition leaders were able to organize to bring together almost all of the
different factions and protesters from across the country. It is interesting to note that
the one day that the opposition was able to organize together was the same day the
government collapsed. The unification of the opposition lasted no longer than the
time the protesters were on the square. By the next day, the coalition had collapsed
and as subsequent political activities have demonstrated, there was never any unified
or consistent message or theme of the opposition other than to remove Akayev.
Independent electoral-monitoring capabilities
Similar to the other countries, the Kyrgyz Republic did have independent
electoral-monitoring capabilities by both local and international monitors. The OSCE
led the international monitoring mission with 30 long-term and 175 short-term
observers. The Coalition of NGOs provided the largest local observation mission with
hundreds of local observers supported primarily with funds from the US Embassy.
The international reports appeared to have some impact, the levels of protest
increased significantly after both elections and the statements by the OSCE.
However, there is no way to distinguish if the motivation was the candidates loosing
the election or the OSCE statements.
I would strongly argue that the OSCE statements were at best tertiary and
most likely immaterial to the increase in protests. The OSCE statements were mainly
fodder for the local civil society, NGOs, and the international diplomatic missions.
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These organizations used the OSCE statements repeatedly in their interviews and
statements, but they were never mentioned in any of my field interviews and also are
not mentioned in the media interviews with protesters at the time. In contrast, in
Ukraine and Georgia there was a high awareness of the impact of the international
monitors and it was a much more sophisticated group of protesters who were aware of
the usefulness of the international pressure.235 Because these protests were about
local politicians for local reasons, the international observations had little impact on
the initial protests.
A modicum of independent media
The Kyrgyz Republic had almost no independent media. In Ukraine there was
a national level medium that was able to continue broadcasting throughout the
country during the crisis. In the Kyrgyz Republic there was only one radio station
with limited broadcast and a few newspapers that had a very limited readership.
There was no national level opposition media that systematically reported on the
events across the country. The newspaper MSN was an opposition newspaper that
was printed with the support of Freedom House with US Embassy funds. The US
government funded an independent printing house to provide the small independent
newspapers in the country an opportunity to continue printing after the Kyrgyz
government had forced the local companies not to print their papers. However, the
distribution of the newspaper was less than 150,000 and had a very limited
distribution outside the capital.236 It was a paper aimed at the intelligentsia and those
in the capital; its most significant influence was in informing the leaders in the north
235 Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange : The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough.
236 Greg Walters, "Kyrgyz Press Helped to Speed Akayev’s Fall," The Moscow Times, March 31 2005.
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of what was occurring in the south. The protests that started in these isolated
communities were not led or participated in by people who read the newspaper. In an
unscientific poll, I would ask people in the villages I interviewed what newspapers
they read and if they had ever heard of MSN, they almost all read one of the daily
government or moderate newspapers. Except for civil society leaders, most people
didn’t know about the paper, including some key protest leaders in the south.
The US funded printing plant lost their power for a day until the US Embassy
supplied back-up generators and the fight over the printing press became an important
issue for the international community and the local NGOs, but in spite of their
statements claiming large levels of influence, I argue that the opposition papers had a
minor impact on the spread of the protests.237
The one medium that appears to have had some influence was the radio
broadcasts of Radio Azattyk. This is a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty funded
program that broadcasts in the Kyrgyz language. It has a limited broadcast, but is
well known especially in the southern regions. The radio broadcasts were mentioned
by many people when I asked where they found out about the protests. Radio
Azattyk had reporters in the center of Jalal-Abad throughout the protests and provided
some of the most up-to-the minute accurate reporting in the Kyrgyz language.
The other medium was the internet. This was primarily used by those in the
capital to follow what was happening in the regions. There are hundreds of internet
cafes throughout the city of Bishkek (it has the highest per capita ratio of internet
237 Craig S. Smith, "U.S. Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan’s Uprising," The New York Times,
March 30 2005.
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users in the region!)238. These are relatively inexpensive and were heavily used by
students to follow the events. As I mentioned in the methodology section, there were
hundreds of blogs, message boards, and chat sites that were providing real time
information from across the country. Because they were updated in real time and
because several people would comment on the same event from having viewed it
from different perspectives it offeres a fascinating mosaic of information
collaboration. I anticipate that this will be a significant data mine for future research
of this and other regional protests.
The opposition’s capacity to mobilize large numbers of protestors
The opposition did have the capacity to mobilize large numbers of protestors,
as demonstrated in the protests in the capital on the last day, but what is important to
note is that they were not coordinated protests. The process of the protests and the
final result in the Kyrgyz Republic lacked leadership and central control for the
events. The protests were local events led by local leaders that only on the last day
came together for the brief protest that ousted the government. As discussed in
Chapter 5 with the timeline, large numbers of protests came out in Naryn, in Talas
and in Jalal-Abad at different times, but these were not coordinated events and in
some ways had less impact on the national government because of the lack of central
organization. The only time that the opposition coordinated was for one day.
Splits among the state’s military, police, and security forces.
The police and security apparatus were divided throughout the country and
not under any real central control. Local militia quickly sided with local political
leaders. The central government had very little widespread control. The government
238 Bank World, World Development Indicators (2006).
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was fundamentally very weak and out of touch with the reality of what was
happening in the rest of the county. Militia in the south of the country quickly
switched over to the opposition side and openly supported the opposition. In the
north, some of the militia simply did not get involved in events and stayed home —
this was more a tacit form of support than the open support in the south.
There were some splits among the state’s military, police, and security forces.
The most important was the split from the north to the south. The police in the south
did not react harshly to the protests and were often, as in Jalal-Abad, in support of the
protesters. As noted in the timeline, after March 20th there was no police presence in
either Osh or Jalal-Abad. The central operating organs of the country had no control
over these areas.
The Ministry of Interior was still in support of the President, but they were
also not willing to use excessive force on the protesters. It was Interior forces that
removed the protesters from the buildings in Jalal-Abad and Osh. While the tactics
were clearly aggressive and meant to send a harsh and powerful message, none of the
men used weapons and all of the protesters except for a few of the leaders were let go
immediately after signing a statement that they would not participate again in
protests. While these actions served to incite the crowds, in terms of levels of police
brutally, this was a quite mild affair.
It is unclear what the role of the Ministry of Defense played in any of this.
The Minister of Defense was acting as a go between with the leaders in the south in
attempting to secure negotiations with the government. The main forces used in front
of the White House were from the Ministry of Interior. There does not appear to have
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been a ‘palace coup’ by the military switching sides at the last minute. My
information indicates that they were waiting to see what would happen.
Lack of external influence
In Ukraine, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, foreign aid and interference
was seen by the local government, the international media and other countries as a
key cause and motivating factor. In reference to Ukraine and Georgia, McFaul
writes, “foreign aid played no independent role in any of these breakthroughs (and
rarely does), but contributed to the drama by increasing or decreasing the relative
value of each of the seven factors.”239The role in the Kyrgyz Republic of these
external actors was greatly exaggerated in both the international and the local press
during and immediately after the events. As Hill and Jones noted in an earlier article:
“The international and regional media coverage of the Kyrgyz events and the
Colored Revolutions glossed over Akayev’s failings as well as the domestic
crisis and misguided actions that hastened the government’s demise. Instead,
in the case of all three states—the Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine, and Georgia—
the role of the international community, the individual countries’ domestic
civil societies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the local media
was hyped and often misconstrued. A nefarious role was also assigned to the
United States. Because of the active presence of U.S.-supported NGOs in all
the “afflicted” countries working on democracy promotion and issues such as
political party development, voters’ rights, and electoral reform, media
observers portrayed a pattern of blatant U.S. intervention to install its allies in
key countries on Russia’s borders.240
There were several different spheres of organizations promoting democracy
that all played some role in the spring events. There are the international western
official organizations, including the U.S. Embassy, the German Embassy (the EU
representative Embassy), USAID, the OSCE, and the UN. There are the international
democracy assistance programs, primarily funded by USAID funds, these include, the
239 McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism."
240 Hill and Jones, "Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon," 8.
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National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI),
Internews, IFES, Freedom House and OSI which is funded through Soros Foundation.
The role of the international external actors was very limited during the
February to March period of 2005. Perhaps the most important role that the
international organizations had played was in education and training programs over
the past few years. While some members of the opposition had benefited from these
trips, unlike in Georgia and Ukraine, few of those that had studied in the west or
worked closely with the western embassies were included in the final government.
There is some irony to the statements by the Russian government and media that the
west, specifically the US and organizations such as Soros had directly financed and
caused the protests. If they had caused them, then they did a poor job at realizing
their goals. The new government was decidedly less favorable towards the west than
the Akayev government had been for most of its rule.
According to US government representatives, the USG probably spent about
1.5 million USD on the election. A third of this was a special one-time funding to
support the technical process of inking voter’s fingers, similar to efforts in
Afghanistan. Another third went through small grants to local organizations to
provide election information and another third went to train and fund international
and local observers as well as to train election commission members.241 USAID was
generally unsuccessful in getting people involved to lobby on specific issues. Most of
the organizations agreed to work only on providing general election information. As
Coalition director Edil Baisolov, said, there is a “myth of all the support from US and
241 Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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International organizations.”242 When asked the level of influence of US government
funding on the process, a US government diplomat stated that “Perhaps people were
more aware of what a fair election should be,” they continued, “I believe it had a very
indirect effect.”243 This presents an interesting situation, either international
organizations did a lot more and aren’t willing to admit it, of which no hard evidence
exists or they really did have no influence. One would assume that they would want
to take credit for the money they spent. The apparent reality is that the programs had
very little influence and only played a minor role in the events. The latter
interpretation is much more logical and additional interviews and contacts support
this argument.
There was an indirect influence of US government support, for example, the
Media Center which is in the center of Jalal-Abad and is run by IREX with funds
from the USG, played an important role in disseminating information about the
protests. It was the only place where journalists could get out information every few
minutes. The media center is less than a minute from the central square, so local
journalists could be on the square observing and then run up and provide continuous
updates. In local interviews, several journalists mentioned the importance of the
place.244 In addition, Radio Azattyk mentioned earlier was supported through US
funds.
Lack of internal organizations influence
Internal agencies include local NGOs and civil society organizations that
serve to monitor political, democratic and human rights events in the country. One of
242 Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
243 Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
244 Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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the largest of these is the Coalition of NGOs, founded in the early mid-1990’s
through the work of NDI and the direct financial support of NDI and USAID. Since
then, the Coalition has become one of the most outspoken organizations for
democracy in the country. Currently led by the youthful Edil Baisolov, the Coalition
is very popular with the international community. Partiality because of his fluency in
English and articulate manner, Edil is one of the most quoted and interviewed
government activists in the country. Another key local NGO is Counterpart, again
founded with USAID funds, Counterpart is primarily a clearing house for providing
small grants to local NGOs and civil society organizations on a wide range of issues,
from health and poverty alleviation to women’s rights and free and fair elections.
The local NGOs and civil society did play two important roles, one was to
help facilitate the spread of information about what was happening in the regions to
the international community. The Coalition of NGOs played a key role in getting this
information out to the international community, including western media as well as
other international organizations. The Coalition had a small army of close to a
hundred observers scattered throughout the country using cell phones to report back
to Bishkek about what was happening in the local villages. The Coalition provided
information to the elite in Bishkek as well as the rest of the world of what was
happening. They were an information pipeline, not the instigators or creators of the
event.245
It was only when all the information came together that one could see it as a
whole. The leaders had no plan or idea that the revolution would happen. Much of
the information being put out by the local press was coming from the Coalition
245 Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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observers who were actually on the ground throughout the country. As the director of
the organization acknowledged, the information dissemination “really was the most
important role of the Coalition.”246
Counterpart had received a grant from USAID to promote fair and unbiased
elections and to provide impartial observation. However, there were problems with
the implementation at a local level. Grantees were often refused permission for
trainings from local authorities and heads of Universities would prohibit trainings of
any kind at their facilities.247
The second role that the local NGOs and civil society played was in moving
information from the regions to the local population in the north. The youth
organization Kel-Kel played an important role in spreading this information. On
March 21st, during the Nooruz celebrations, they passed around printed sheets that
had pictures and a description of what had occurred the day before in the south when
the Regional Governor’s buildings had been stormed by the government and then
retaken violently by the protesters. According to Kel-Kel leaders, they gave these
sheets to policemen who were very interested in what was happening since they were
not receiving information from any other source. The information that Kel-Kel
shared was potentially destabilizing since the fact that the south was out of the control
of the government for the past few days was new information to most people.
Rumors had been circulating, but to have the facts that ‘the people’ were in control of
the south was very powerful. It’s impossible to measure the full impact of this
information flow, but it is hard not to imagine it to be quite demoralizing for a local
246 Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
247 Interviewee #40. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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policeman to realize that his colleagues in the south had been completely overrun and
were no longer patrolling the streets.
In comparison to Georgia and Ukraine, the youth organizations in the Kyrgyz
Republic were very underdeveloped and did not play a significant role in the protests.
As discussed above, the one youth organization that had a minor influence in the
March events is Kel-Kel (although they have played a more important role in
subsequent elections). Kel-Kel was started in mid January 2005 in response to
pressure on students who felt they were being forced to vote for Bermet Akayev (the
President’s daughter). Several students came together because they believed that there
was a need for open information to the students about their rights. A few of the
original founders had spent time in Ukraine as election monitors and had observed the
influence of the student-run organization “Pora”. At its inception, Kel-Kel’s actions
were limited to Bishkek and a very small number of young people were involved.
During the February elections some of the Kel-Kel members were election monitors.
As noted above, because of the lack of a formal news dissemination process, a key
role that they started to play was in providing information in the north about events in
the south.248 In interviews with current Kel-Kel members in the south of the country,
they said there was almost no involvement of Kel-Kel members or leaders in any of
the protests in the south. The organization did not formally establish regional
chapters until after the March events in preparation for the Presidential elections.
Even the leaders of the “opposition” did not believe that it was possible to
actually overcome the repression of the government. While small protests were held
in Bishkek prior to the elections, they were not large scale mass demonstrations,
248 Interviewee #01. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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because it didn’t look like anything positive could result from the protests. The head
of the Coalition of NGOs said that at the start of the protests after the elections, “you
could feel it in forums and discussions in Bishkek, the people in Jalal-Abad looked
like ‘bad sports’. It really looked like the protests were going nowhere; it was just
relatives of losers rocking the boat.”249 The ‘establishment’ in Bishkek didn’t suspect
that it would ever grow into a larger movement, few of the elites suspected early on
that the revolution would grow to the size that it eventually did. The local
organizations were taken by surprise by the power of the local protests. For example,
the Coalition didn’t find out about the rally in Bishkek until late on the 22nd. The
event was planned by the opposition candidates, not by the civil society or NGOs;
they were just additional members that joined in.
While there was some minor influence of the local independent press and of
the local NGOs and civil society, their influence was on the edges and had influence
only in the capital. According to a western aid employee who works directly with
local NGOs, the local civil society had very little influence and was “doing very little
planning, only reaction.” Fundamentally, “civil society was not really a part of the
process.”250 The public went around the institutions and the institutions missed the
opportunity. The March events were outside the influence of local organizations or
institutions because they were not involved at all in the process of the protests.
Lack of influence of Colored Revolutions
In spite of the press attention and speculation about the close connection
between Ukraine, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic, the reality is that there were very
249 Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
250 Interviewee #33. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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limited links. The most important impact of the Ukraine process was in two ways,
one was the conceptual notion of people in a former Soviet country huddled in the
cold standing up to the government and the result being a complete capitulation of the
government. A few members of the civil society had been in Ukraine and they
returned motivated to have the same result in the Kyrgyz Republic. Ironically, these
individuals played minor if insignificant roles in the subsequent events, they were
swept aside by the local protest dynamics. The second impact was on the
government. They took the lesson that the only way to prevent a Colored Revolution
was to prevent crowds from gathering and to prevent key candidates from even
running for office. This lesson learned had a significant impact on the local protests.
For it was the reaction by the government to the protesters that was the single most
important factor for motivating the protests.
Local Dynamics
There are four important phases to the protest cycle, the initial motivations,
the increase in the protests, the sustaining of the protests and finally the success of the
protests. Local dynamics were the most important factor for the initiation of the
protests. The protests in March 2005 were about the ability of local leaders to
motivate local popular dissatisfaction with Akayev and ruling elite for their own
purposes. The overwhelming response from numerous interviews was that at the start
the protests were only about the elections, not about removing Akayev. This is
reinforced by looking at the structure and slogans of the early protesters. Most of
them came out in support of a specific local politician and as in the case of some of
the largest early protests in Koch Kor and Naryn, the crowds went away when either
139
their local politician was reinstated on the ballot or when they decided that the best
option would be to use the power of the vote to “vote against all”.
After the second election, when candidates that had been deregistered in the
north lost or were not allowed to run, there were few if any large protests. In the
south, the main protests started later, but significantly increased after popular
candidates lost in the election. As the protests shifted from the north to the south,
they also shifted in theme, from local, to more regional and national issues.
There were limited protests prior to the first election where people chanted for
Akayev to leave, but these were definitely in the minority and appear to be just an
indication of the continual dissatisfaction with Akayev and not something new
specifically focused on the elections or even realistically expecting that anything
would change.
Chapter 3 presented the initial methodology for measuring the intensity of the
events. Figure 3 shows the distribution by region for both the event level and number
of days.251 The X axis is the duration of events and the Y axis is the sum of the
intensity of events by day in that region. The different colors of the bars represent the
number of events that day. For example in Naryn in the week of March 4th there was
a day with six separate events and the next day there were only three events.
251 An initial statistical examination of the intensity of the events suggests a power law distribution
with a rank/size exponent of -0.8. Power law distributions are often associated with phenomena which
emerge from local interactions including civil violence which unfolds according to local tactical rules
The data appear to reinforce the argument that the events emerged from uncoordinated local
dynamics. However, the small number of events (n=66) precludes a detailed examination or the
drawing of any clear statistical inference. (See Tim R. Gulden, "Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Civil
Violence," Politics and the Life Sciences vol. 21, no. 1 (2002).)
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Figure 4 is the same data shown in a slightly different way. Each region and the
specific cities where protests occurred are listed. The darkness of the square indicates
the intensity of the protests. For example, if you look at the week starting on March
4-11, there were protests of different intensity occurring in every oblast except for
Talas. The earliest protests were in Bishkek, then Issyk-Kul and Naryn and not until
several weeks later did protests suddenly start across the country. After the later
elections the number of protests significantly increased, but it was only in the final
week that the number of protests decreased and the intensity increased.
At the earliest stages there was very little flow from one protest to another, the
protests “were all about the local protests for local reasons that were unconnected.”252
The fact that a protest occurred in one region had little or no influence on a protest
occurring in any other region. The protests started independently and organically.
While there may have been linkages in terms of knowledge flow and personal
connections between protests, it was not an initiating cause.
252Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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The identification of who came to the protests and why they came provides
support to the theory that the protests started as local events for local reasons. The
majority of early protesters were direct supporters of candidates from their region and
area. In the south, the first protests had only a few hundred people, but in response
to actions by the government, more supporters arrived and then others came for very
different reasons. As a local leader commented, those that came were “first real
protesters, then criminal element, then the opposition layered on top and finally,
NGOs providing the final frosting of legitimacy.”253
There were clear differences in the composition of the protesters both by time
and by location. The first protests had large numbers of rural, poor, middle-aged
women. Over time the protests shifted and more young rural men became involved.
There were also significant differences by region.254
It is as important to see who did not come to the protests. The middle class
and the intelligentsia stayed at home and off the streets. Some observers are critical
of the protests because they failed to incorporate these classes. They point to it as an
example of why many of the long-term demands of the revolution failed. This is also
a reason why the events remained in the category of “contentious politics” and never
moved in the direction of a “social movement”. It was local people using the
methods of contentious politics while the leaders failed (or didn’t try) to create a
wider social movement.
253 Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
254 Interviewee #48. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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Matching the positive attitudes of Uzbek minorities from the survey in
Chapter 4 with the situation in the country, there were very few Uzbeks involved in
the protests, most of the Uzbeks lived in the towns and the Kyrgyz lived in the
villages. However, most probably the more important reason is that the few Uzbek
candidates that ran for office won. There was no reason to take to the streets to
support their candidates.
Most of the protesters and the parliamentarians who had lost their seats were
in rural Kyrgyz areas. The people involved in the protests were not from Jalal-Abad
or Osh city. It was people from the surrounding localities, not from the cities.255
While there were a reasonable amount of young people involved in the
protests, overall the role of students and student protest organizations in the south was
fairly marginal. They did not have a lead role and acted more as provocateurs when
needed to rally the crowd. In an interview with student leaders from the group Kel-
Kel, they suggested that there were few students from the cities involved at the start.
Just as there was a shift over time in the goals of the protests there was also a
shift in who participated. At the start in Jalal-Abad it was mainly older women and
men. After the events on the morning of the 20th, a large number of young people
took to the streets and the tenor of the crowd became much more violent. A Peace
Corps Volunteer who lived in the center of Jalal-Abad observed the crowd on the 20th
and said that “at first the crowd was friendly, but at the end of the crowd were young
men with riot sticks and shields.” These men were already a little drunk and were
much more agitated. They beat the volunteer and took away his camera.256
255 Interviewee #07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
256 Interviewee #11&12. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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When the profile of those that came to protest is compared to the survey of
attitudes, it turns out that almost none of the categories are statistically significant. It
is useful to reference the attitudes of these groups of protesters from the survey data
and specifically Table 15 in Chapter 4. The group that is most personally dissatisfied
is those with less education and less money from Jalal-Abad, Naryn or Chui oblast.
Some of this matches with the initial protesters, but in the survey, rural/urban or
male/female had no statistical difference, two very important factors in the
composition of the original protesters.







For example, while the variables for men and urban residents are both
statistically significant, the interaction variable, i.e. respondents that are both urban
and men is not statistically significant. The same is true for the category of rural
poor women, they are not statistically significant for either individual levels of
happiness or dissatisfaction with the government. This lends further reinforcement to
the argument that it was not just individual’s personal levels of grievances that
motivated them to protest, but it was the influence of their local political leaders.
It is very difficult to make generalized comments about the protesters across
the country, for example, even with two regions as close geographically and
culturally as Osh and Jalal-Abad there were important differences in the attitudes of
the protesters. In Jalal-Abad, according to participants and eye-witnesses, the people
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that went to the protests “came to really protest”. They were very committed to
supporting their candidate and eventually to ousting Akayev. The people that came
were the unemployed, the poor, the old people, and the rural/village people. In Osh
things were quite different; it lacked the prolonged protests both inside and outside
the central government building. Several observers commented that Osh was much
more artificial than Jalal-Abad. In Jalal-Abad it was primarily older women and men
and a small amount of younger men, in Osh the preponderance was younger men. It
was very clear that it was a different political group organizing the protests. In Osh it
was heavily controlled by one particular leader with strong ties to the regional
criminal network. It was people from his group that organized and seized the
government building; very little genuine public interests were represented in Osh.257
While local Jalal-Abad residents did not participate in the protests, they
generally seemed to be supportive of the process and would assist with payments for
food. In contrast, in Osh, the local residents interviewed were not at all interested in
the protests and saw the protests as a dangerous distraction and tried to stay as far
away from them as possible. There was a clear antipathy in Osh towards the protests;
they were seen as only involving criminal fighting.
The crowd that gathered on the morning of the 24th in Bishkek made up a
different dynamic than those that had gathered at other protests throughout the
country. It was the most cosmopolitan and integrated of any of the protests. There
was a diverse crowd with people from outside the city as well as many people who
were in the capital as a result of internal migration. These workers hadn’t been at
other protests, many were from the south but were working in the bazaar, driving
257 Interviewee #38. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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taxis, or doing other manual labor jobs, one political observer referred to them as the
“fifth column”.258 The crowd included people that had been protesting for weeks in
the south, people who joined off the streets that morning and student leaders from the
North. It also included for the first time, representatives of the civil society
community. In the protests throughout the country, civil society played a very minor
role and had rarely attended any protests. On the 24th, they were there marching in
the front, ready to give speeches and lend their support to the opposition. The wave
of protests from around the country had finally come crashing into the capital and it
swept along every type of anti-government, opposition, civil society, and democratic
reform organization in its wake.
Why come
What were the protesters motivations? Why did people come and protest?
Why did they sit in the square in the cold for weeks? Understanding why they came
out on the street and stormed the buildings is one of the fundamental questions in
analyzing protest dynamics. From extensive field interviews it appears that the
protesters came because of individual motivations based on economic dissatisfaction
and a perception of loss of economic opportunities combined with collective
encouragement from local political entrepreneurs.
The first aspect of the individual motivations was a growing economic
inequality between the rural and urban regions and a belief that the local leaders could
assist them. There was a general feeling that their economic problems were the fault
of the government. As noted in the earlier section, the general economics of the
258 Interviewee #03. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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country were improving in February 2005, but these benefits hadn’t reached the rural
population in the south. The protesters were fearful that they were getting poorer and
thought that they saw others doing better. There was a significant disconnect from
what they were seeing in the cities and their lives in the villages. Of course, poverty
is not the only reason that people came out on to the streets. Poverty had existed in
these regions for a long time and there had been much greater inequality. But it was
the combination of the growing economic inequality with the fear of being left out of
the economic growth that intersected with the perception that the elections were
stolen from them. If their local politicians had been elected, they still would have
been poor and probably no better off, but it would not have been another insult to
have the one sphere of their lives where they at least had a small measure of influence
taken away from them.
The second aspect of poverty was the opportunity cost. Many of the people
who came were poor people from the region. Poverty was not only a motivation, but
it also provided the opportunity. Those that had no work or were farmers waiting for
the season to start had nothing to lose by coming and no threat of recriminations at
their work place.259 For example, there were many supporters of the opposition living
in Jalal-Abad, but they were not willing to leave their jobs both for financial
considerations as well as the fear of reprisals. Some of the organizations and
individuals that worked in Jalal-Abad collected money to assist the protesters in
buying food, lodging, etc.
Did they come because they were paid? One of the statements that the
government regularly made and was repeated in the press and often even by
259 Interviewee #51. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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international observers was that all of the protesters were there because of money, yet
one international reporter admitted that he never saw any payments for protesters.260
There is strong anecdotal evidence that people were paid to vote and to show
up on Election Day. At a minimum, voters were provided food and the cost of their
transport on Election Day, not a lot different from any successful political machinery
world wide. The more contentious issue is if protesters were paid to come to the
square or to block the roads. One international representative in the south said that he
had heard that 200-300com was paid each day to protesters. I heard this statement
from numerous government and international sources, the price ranging from 100-
500com. However, there is almost no hard evidence of protesters before, during or
after the election being paid for their participation. From a logistical standpoint on
many days there were thousands of protesters, even if one takes an average of 500
people at 200c for up to 20 days it’s around $50,000. It’s not an unrealistic amount
of money and I’m sure much larger bribes have been paid for less important
outcomes, but that amount of money dispersed over hundreds and thousands of
people is difficult to do and people talk about it. The strongest argument against the
payments was simply that no one had any hard evidence of it occurring. In addition,
those that really had the finances to help fund the protest didn’t get involved until the
very end. There is clear evidence that these individuals helped with organizational
costs and transportation costs as the protests reached a peak in the last few days. But
paying large sums for organizational costs is very different from actually paying all of
the protesters that stood in the square.
260 Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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An important caveat and cultural note is that in the west, payment is routinely
thought of as limited to a financial transaction. Someone gives me money to perform
a specific service. In this region, payment for everything from a new house to wages
to taxes might be in-kind in the form of wheat, fruit, milk, gas, etc. or might even be
completely non-material in the sense of allowing my child into the better school,
getting a better job, or access to some other resource. Many of these local politicians
are strongly supported because they provide patronage in the old-fashioned Chicago
politics sense of the word. They make sure that those that supported them are well
rewarded through jobs, loans, opportunities, etc. The local parliamentarians were
seen as much more responsive to the needs of the people and often actually capable of
helping them. A large percentage of them were wealthy businessmen who would
often finance buildings, community work and gatherings out of their personal
finances, well aware that this increased their local support. So when these local
parliamentarians were blocked from getting into office in a rather nefarious manner,
the people were protesting to prevent the future loss of patronage and in thanks for
what they had already received. Were they paid a daily wage for standing in the
square? Extensive interviews indicate that this was extremely rare. Did they
anticipate some positive future outcome to themselves directly or to their community,
most assuredly, but there is a huge gulf between anticipated payment and actual
payment.
While the protesters did not receive payment for attendance, they usually did
receive food while they camped out. For many of the poor farmers who have nothing
else to do during the late winter months, this may have provided some secondary
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incentive to stay. I would argue that it would not have been enough incentive to
gather, in addition there was no guarantee that food would appear, but as one started
to stay for a few days; it may have been a factor in preventing people from leaving, in
keeping a core group of dedicated protesters amassed.
A field leader of the opposition stated emphatically that “no one was paid,
how could we have paid thousands of people to come, how could we pay them?” He
continued in a defiant tone, “not for money would people sleep in the streets and in
cold buildings for 20 days.” He did acknowledge that they helped pay for food and
transport, but that was all.261 There is some truth to his argument; this was an organic
protest that grew in ways that no one expected. After the ‘gentle’ take over of the
Jalal-Abad government building, the protesters were literally trapped inside. No one
had expected that they would either, one, actually take the building that day or two,
remain isolated in the building for another 20 days. For several days no one was
allowed in or out. A local conflict prevention NGO was later allowed to serve as a
liaison and shuttled food and basic supplies through the police line into the building
for the protesters inside. Having interviewed protesters who were inside the building
it was very clear that they had no original intention of staying in the building and
while they had strong support for their candidate they had not anticipated being
trapped in a cold building for several weeks. The statements that the protesters had to
be paid is similar to the government’s statements that everyone in the square was
drunk, it was an attempt to discredit the protests and portray them as incompetent,
drunk, paid for rebels.
261 Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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Political Entrepreneurs
At the end of the 1800’s, Le Bon wrote about the leaders of crowds, “In the
case of human crowds the chief is often nothing more than a ringleader or agitator,
but as such he plays a considerable part.”262 In the events in the Kyrgyz Republic
these “agitators” played the key role in promoting the initial protests. The early
protests were led by aggrieved local leaders who were usually politicians who had
either been deregistered or who had lost their election. There were a few opposition
politicians who won their local elections, but because of pressure from the Akayev
regime or of personal ambition, motivated their supporters to join the protests against
Akayev. I label these political leaders political entrepreneurs because of their
interests in using the protests to advance their personal, political and often business
interests.
The local people came to support their local political entrepreneur who was
able to gather people because of the support that he had provided or could provide in
the region. Even when a few of the protests prior to the elections had grown very
large with thousands of people, such as in Koch-Kor, it was still an isolated protest
about the local politician, not part of a larger network.
The majority of evidence indicates that the protests were organized around a
single local leader and used whatever local means, e.g. blocking strategic roads or
attacking buildings that would be most useful and powerful in their area. As noted
earlier, these actions were the “repertoire” of the protesters. They were using
successful tactics that had been used in former protests in 2000 and 2003. The
262 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd, a Study of the Popular Mind, [12th impression] ed. (London,: T. F.
Unwin, 1920).
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takeover of the government buildings was a new strategy that did not have
widespread use prior to these events. Why this new tactic was used and how it
became so popular is an interesting question for future research.
These political entrepreneurs came from very different backgrounds and had
very little in common other than the pressure applied to them by Akayev’s
government. One of the most important ‘revolutionary’ figures was Beknazarov from
the town of Ak Sai in the south. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Beknazarov had played
a critical role in the events two years before in 2003. Beknazarov in spite of regular
pressure from the White House had still maintained some marginal loyalty to the
regime, but over time through the repeated actions of the government they continued
to push Beknazarov away. One international observer pointed out that it was the
White House that turned Beknazarov into a revolutionary national figure.263
Many of the main opposition leaders had been senior members of the Akayev
government. Kumanbek Bakiev was the Prime Minister until forced to resign in 2003,
while he had opposed the government on different issues, he wasn’t seen as a vocal
radical. K. Bakiev had put in place a very well organized political machine to prepare
for a Presidential run in the fall of 2005. In a lengthy and very open interview with
the current mayor of Jalalabad and a former key party leader for K. Bakiev, he
revealed that he had been working for the past two years at a local level throughout
the south in building up support for K. Bakiev. From local meetings to regional
forum, they were putting into place a solid grassroots operation. This foundation of
263 Interviewee #16. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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contacts and support was used during the revolution, but interviews suggest that it
was actually planned for a legitimate Presidential run.264
In Talas, a province to the west of the capital, the protests gathered in support
of R. Jenbekov, who had formerly been a close member of the President’s inner
circle. He was prevented from running because he had not stepped aside to allow a
relative of the President’s wife to run. He had not been a part of the opposition prior
to these events and never played an active role in working with the opposition until
the very end. Through strong-arm tactics and direct political oppression, the White
House pushed him to become a part of the opposition and for his supporters to
eventually seize the government building in Talas.265 He stated many times that his
only goal was to have the opportunity to run for office and to be a parliamentarian.
He led one of the largest protests in the country and occupied the second government
building after Jalal-Abad, yet he was not closely linked with the main opposition
groups.266
Bayaman Erkinbayev was a parliamentary deputy and a businessman from the
south who controlled a huge share in the largest trading market in the region, the Kara
Soo market. In addition he also was rumored to be involved in the drug trafficking
from the Tadjik border north into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Numerous reports,
including Erkinbayev’s own statements and interviews after the events indicated that
he paid for most of the gas money for buses to transport protesters to Bishkek on the
264 Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
265 Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
266 An interesting question that no one seems to have any answer for is why the Talas government
building was not attacked in the early morning of the 20th, like the government buildings in Osh and
Jalal-Abad.
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21st and 22nd.267 The individual’s who retook the government building in Osh were
almost exclusively his supporters and workers. They used his building as a staging
ground and he paid for supplies for the group.268
There was very little connection among individual protesters between regions.
While local protesters may have encouraged their friends or family members to join
them at the protests, it did not have an important impact on growing the protests
throughout the country. Unlike in Ukraine where different groups of citizen
protesters linked up across the country in solidarity before gathering to stay several
weeks in Kiev, in the Kyrgyz Republic, it appears that groups of protesters remained
within their own groups. For the local protesters, my research shows that there was
very little network interaction beyond the local community. In the south, there are a
few isolated examples prior to the election of some protesters threatening to link up
with other protesters in a neighboring community. When word spread that the crowd
had taken the Oblast building in Jalal-Abad, it became a rallying point and protesters
started to arrive from other cities.269 This is the earliest reference I can find to
protesters from one region traveling to another area in support of a local protest.
The only network dynamic was among the opposition leaders. Many of the
political entrepreneurs were well known politicians so they obviously knew the other
opposition leaders, but only a small number of them were directly working together.
There is an early example of K. Bakiev coming to speak at a rally in Naryn and it is
the earliest example of linkages created from one region to another. It is most likely
267 Interviewee #04 & 07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
268 B. Erkinbayev was assassinated on September 22, 2005.
269 AFP, 03-06, 12:06GMT
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that K. Bakiev went because he was interested in running as a presidential candidate
later that year and wanted to be seen as a national candidate.
The first gathering of opposition leaders was in late February when five or six
candidates running in the south knew they were going to be prevented from running
for office and they started to band together to protest and organize together.270
Jalal-Abad became a rallying point for opposition leaders, and in one of the
earliest examples of opposition leaders joining forces and speaking to supporters from
other regions, national opposition leaders Otunbaeva, Sydykov, and Sadyrbaev spoke
to the crowds in Jalal-Abad on Tuesday the 8th.
The unification of the many parts of the opposition into the Coordination
Council was an important step. Links between some regions increased with the
creation of the Coordinating Council for this was the first time that the opposition was
at all organized and tried to present a united front. While this did bring together
many of the most outspoken opposition leaders, it did not bring together all of the key
leaders involved in the protests. There was some disconnect between the role of the
Coordinating Council and the actual protests. It was formed on top of it, but without
any direct relation or control of the protests. For example, the protests in Talas were
not under the coordination of the Council, the protests in KochKor and Issyk-Kul also
did not have representatives on the Council and a key leader in Osh, B. Erkinbayev
was not a member of the Council and to my knowledge never took part in its decision
making process. The main role of the Council was to provide at least some type of
unified face to the media and the international community. Its role also increased as
the protests elicited more pressure from the government.
270 Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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Reactive Dynamics
How did the protests grow from local protests to widespread protests against
the central government? This section explores in detail the reactive dynamics
between the Akayev government and the opposition that led to the increase in the
protests. Over time there was an important, but subtle shift in the south and
eventually throughout the country in the formation of the protests. The protests
started for the individual candidates, but as the government failed either to listen to
their demands or responded harshly to the actions, the protests began to coalesce
around opposition to the government.
The Akayev government repeatedly showed how little it understood the main
goals and incentives of the protesters by alienating and marginalizing their few
supporters and radicalizing the opposition through the oppressive nature of the
regime. This included deregistering former loyal supporters and pushing away any
support that had existed for the government. This section presents analysis defining
the negative dynamic between the government, the opposition and the general
populace.
This section examines the actions of the Akyev regime that contributed to the
negative feedback loop between the government and the opposition. There are three
key actions that the government took, they 1) alienated political leaders; 2) failed to
communicate; and 3) increased physical pressure on protesters and the opposition.
Alienated political leaders
The protests increased because of sustained pressure from the Akayev regime.
At every opportunity for rapprochement Akayev’s regime pushed local supporters
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towards the opposition because of their harsh response. A common theme from
people interviewed was that it was Akayev’s fault that he was removed from power.
He took more and more actions each day to alienate his few remaining supporters and
to galvanize the opposition. An international observer stated that “Akayev lived in a
Potomkin village. Had the President clearly said that he would not run, it [revolution]
would not have taken place.” Akayev failed to convince the public or the
international organizations that he was serious about reform. The opposition
“managed to surf on a wave of instability” created by Akayev’s actions.271
By the end of the protests, there was no one left to support the government.
For a government that was generally quite benign by regional and international
standards, they went from having a loyal cadre of supporters both within the
government, civil society and the international community to being seen as the
pariahs of a democratic process. When given an opportunity, support withered away
for the main reason that the government pushed them away.
As shown in the timeline, the government led a concerted effort at preventing
opposition candidates from either running for office or implementing their
campaigns. The government believed that they could shut down the opposition and
maintain control of the government. An important event in forming the opposition
leaders’ attitude was the deregistration of Roza Otunbaeva, the former Ambassador to
the UK and the US. The protests by her supporters were rather small and received
little coverage in the national news. It is unlikely that residents throughout the
country were aware of what was happening. Otunbaeva is well known to the
international community from her work as an ambassador and is a capable
271 Interviewee #26. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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spokeswoman for the opposition. However, she is not widely known throughout the
country and has never held an elected office. Her deregistration became a rallying
cry for civil society, the international monitors, and the western embassies, but was
not even mentioned in interviews throughout the country. Her role was to speak to
the international community and provide pressure through the diplomatic channels. It
also gave the appearance of a much greater opposition movement than actually
existed.
If the government had only alienated opposition leaders such as Otunbaeva
who have little local, grassroots support, there would have been few protests. A key
mistake of the government was to incite very popular local leaders. As the previous
section on political entrepreneurs indicated, many of them had been supporters of the
President
As the President threw away his support for previously loyal followers, they
turned against him. They begin to rally their supporters not just to get elected but to
throw out Akayev. It was in response to government intervention, not preplanned for
the protests to increase in the regions and move towards the center.272
Failed to communicate
Another key mistake that only served to alienate the opposition was the
decision not to talk or engage in any dialogue with the opposition. Several
international and local opposition leaders believed that if Akayev had come out in the
first few days when the protests started and made some immediate concessions things
may have turned out differently. As the protests progressed they became more and
272 Interviewee #31. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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more about removing Akayev and he lost all opportunity to intervene. Dialogue is
fundamental to a democracy and people wanted a leader who would talk to them and
be responsive.273
An example of how the protests shifted because of the failure to communicate
is the initial event in Jalalabad. Before the election, the first protest gatherings were
people who supported K. Bakiev. The protesters requested to meet with the Governor
or some government representative to express their concerns, but no one would come
to meet them. Prime Minister Tanev publicly stated that only drunk people were in
the center square in Jalalabad causing problems. The reality was that everyone in the
local area knew that it was actually old people who sat all day in the square. This
inflammatory language from the government only increased the outrage of the
protesters and their supporters. More people started to gather and local supporters
began to provide them with food. A local reporter in Jalal-Abad who witnessed the
daily events said that he saw a significant increase in numbers of protesters after the
government’s negative statements.274 A local Jalal-Abad resident said “more and
more people kept coming, but no one from the Government would come and listen to
our concerns.”275
According to those in the center square in Jalal-Abad on the 4th, a large crowd
had gathered demanding to speak to the governor or a government representative.
One participant stated that there had never been an intention of seizing the building.
They described a situation where as the afternoon wore on and people were tired,
rumors would fly that someone was coming out to speak to them and the crowd
273 Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
274 Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
275 Interviewee #16. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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would start to press towards the gates of the compound. As it got later people were
worried that no one would come out that day and kept moving up to the gates and
eventually moved into the compound and overtook the building.276
If someone had come out to speak to the crowds, would they have dispersed
and had their problems resolved? Not necessarily, but it is highly unlikely that they
would have seized the office of the Oblast Administration, an important tactical and
symbolic victory. The protests may have continued on for even several months as
protests had occurred in prior years, little would have actually been resolved, but
violence may have been avoided.
Increased physical pressure
There are several key examples and actions that almost everyone interviewed
pointed towards as being important examples of increased physical pressure from the
Akayev government that served to galvanize the opposition against Akayev,
specifically the events on the 20th, the 23rd and the 24th. I argue that the use of the
Special Forces on the morning of the 20th to throw the protesters out of the
government buildings in Osh and Jalabad was probably the most important action that
set in place the chain of events leading to the overthrow on the 24th. It is highly
probable that without those events, things may have reached a stalemate or a
negotiated agreement. The harsh reaction by the White House increased the
radicalization of the opposition and removed any remaining support from moderates
that may have existed for the government.277 As discussed above in the timeline,
after the protesters were kicked out of the government building in Jalal-Abad there
276 Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
277 ITAR-TASS, 03-20
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was an immediate and powerful reaction later in the day that swept through the town
and the protests re-took the building in a much more violent manner—in many ways
it presaged the taking of the White House a few days later. The community was
incensed when it heard the rumors of protesters that were killed and the true stories of
the rather violent handling of women and young protesters.
The government argued that it had a right to assert its authority over a
government building and needed to allow the government to operate. This is an
important point and it is to the government’s credit that no small arms or weapons
were used in the re-taking of the building. But the government had lost any fragment
of legitimacy in the south and there was no way that control was going to be restored
without a slow and measured approach. The government’s argument is in the abstract
valid, but is another illustration of how out of touch the administration was with the
reality of the situation. To not anticipate a strong negative reaction by the local
protesters was so naïve as to border on a completely irrational flagrant disregard for
the amount of discontent that was building on the part of the protesters.
On the evening of the 23rd, the administration used excessive and very
aggressive tactics to break up the meeting of the civil society in Bishkek. Several eye
witnesses said that drunken women and agitators were brought in to provoke the
crowd. The irony is that breaking up the meeting on the 23rd had little impact on the
key opposition leaders as they were not in attendance. Those that met on the 23rd
were primarily representatives of the civil society and local NGOs. They had had
very little influence on events up to this time throughout the country and had little
influence in the direction of the protests. According to numerous participants, the
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meeting’s goal was to serve as a forum to inform the media and residents in the north
about the situation in the south. It was heavily attended by representatives of the
international development and diplomatic community. They were eye witnesses to
the aggressive tactics of the government. Up until that point, they had only seen
limited coverage and heard reports of the activities in the south; on the evening of the
23rd it became real for them. This had a significant impact on the events after the fall
of the government and colored much of the early reporting about the influence of the
civil society and NGOs.
If the meeting on the 23rd had progressed without incident, it would have
provided virtually no incentive for the protesters and little if any change to the
government. However, the public hauling away and beating of well respected civil
society leaders in full view of the international representatives and press served to
completely alienate the Akayev regime from any lingering international support that
may have existed.
The events on the 24th are the final and clearest example of the concept of
repression leading to reactive dynamics. It is a reasonable and highly defendable
assertion that Akayev would not have been chased out the back door of the White
House if he had not provoked the crowd. It was another opportunity where the
Akayev regime continued to make the wrong choice at every opportunity offered to
them.
A participant in the events on the 24th believed that “none of the people would
have gone to the White House if rocks had not been thrown.”278 Numerous
interviews with participants in the crowd that afternoon reiterated the point that
278 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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people on the square said that they never would have attacked, if it had not been for
the agitator’s. It was further proof of the failed strategy of Akayev and his staff.279
It is interesting that the leaders in their speeches were not asking for Akayev
to leave. There were numerous banners written with slogans saying for Akayev to
leave and it was the most popular chant of the crowd, but most of the leaders asked
for Akayev to come and listen to their demands. Some of them may have wanted
Akayev to resign immediately, but in interviews with several of the leaders, their goal
was not to overthrow the government through a street protest. They wanted to put
pressure on the government to force the President to acquiesce to their demands and
peacefully transfer power.280
The White House had a clear plan of using sportsmen as agitators to provoke
the crowd into violence. After government supported sportsmen threw rocks and
attacked the crowd, the crowd realized that they now had all the rocks and there were
a lot more of them than the sportsman or militia. It was a back and forth flow of
events where the government was clearly outmanned and had no anticipation of the
power of the potential response.
The poor planning on the part of the White House is rather astounding in
retrospect. Even if they had been successful in provoking the crowd into frenzy, how
would they then control them? The number of security forces arrayed that morning
was quite small. Did they assume that the crowd would not respond and scatter, if so
then why attack them? If they assumed that they would respond and wanted to
provoke more unrest, how did they plan to respond once the crowd was agitated?
279 Interviewee #26. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
280 Interviewee #31. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.
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Few of the militia had any arms and they had been specifically told not to use guns on
the protesters. It was similar to provoking a caged animal and then being shocked by
the violence of its response, the government completely and fatally misunderstood the
ability for their own forces to protect the White House and to withstand any attack.
If my assumption is correct that the protesters had no defined plans to seize
the government building that day and only responded when provoked, then the failure
of the government to understand this premise was a key component to their downfall.
Part of the problem in answering these questions is that it has been very difficult to
gain information from senior government leaders who made decisions at the time. I
had some interviews with lower level government officials, but when I was in the
country no senior official from the former regime was willing to be interviewed.
Former President Akayev has recently given a few interviews in Moscow and these
are the first on-the-record statements that provide a little insight into what the
government believed. In addition, there are secondary sources from the diplomatic
community who met directly with Akayev during this time.
Dynamic Failure
As discussed in Chapter 2, the repression literature indicates that the
relationship between repression and protest is either a negative linear or a curvilinear
relationship, in both situations at the most extreme level of government repression,
the amount and intensity of protests should decrease. In the Kyrgyz Republic case it
appears that it was a positive linear relationship. Khawaja suggests that as repression
increases protests may increase for the individual until a point where the government
overwhelms the protesters. It may be that a graph of the relationship in the Kyrgyz
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Republic would be curvilinear, but events did not go on long enough to see the
strength of the response of the government. For purposes of the repression literature,
the Kyrgyz Republic case is potentially an example where repression increased the
level of protests both at the individual and the collective level. The qualitative story
does suggest that the government used an insufficient level of repression—enough to
provoke, but not enough to control the protests. It appears that the level of repression
increased and the level of protests simultaneously increased in a clear positive linear
relationship.
Is the distinction between successful and unsuccessful protests simply the
level of repression? If the repression is intense enough will the government simply
overwhelm the protesters? These questions can not fully be answered with this data,
but it is suggestive that once a government initiates repression they have to use it
efficiently or they may loose control.
Why did the protests succeeded in overthrowing the government? The final
success of the protests was because of the failures of the Akayev government. As
discussed above, the government ineffectively applied repression to the protests that
resulted in the protests increasing.
The former-Soviet countries have applied two different approaches to local
protests. The first approach is to increase repression and effectively prevent any
opposition leaders from creating protest movements. If citizens do protest, then the
reaction is harsh and severe. The former-Soviet countries have a common
susceptibility to using repression as the immediate response to any problem. In
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countries such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Russia this has proven
effective in the short-run at preventing any large-scale protest movements.
The second approach is a negotiated legal process. These post-Soviet
countries are in the difficult position that they lack the fundamental legal and social
institutional development necessary for negotiated agreements. Ukraine and Georgia
tried to use a negotiated approach through their use of the courts and the legal system
to implement political change. The inconclusive outcome from these countries
demonstrates how difficult this process is to achieve.
The Akayev government attempted a third approach of using some repression
and some legal methods. This middle ground approach used moderate levels of
repression, as discussed above, and tried to use negotiating and legal tactics to
maintain control. It used enough repression to provoke the political entrepreneurs
and to increase the level of protests. It also failed to effectively use a legal process or
negotiated agreement.
Is this a story of an unsuccessful application of repression? That is the lesson
that many of the other countries have taken. In statements by both the President of
Uzbekistan and the President of Russia, both of them implied that the reason for
Akayev’s government collapse was his unwillingness to effectively use force against
the protesters. In the short-term, this analysis may be correct. If the Akayev
government had done more than just antagonize the political entrepreneurs and had
actually physically removed them, the protests would probably have died out in the
short-term. However, the long-term consequences of the increased political
repression may have resulted in more violent protests.
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I argue that an alternative approach for the Akayev government was benign
indifference to the protests. As discussed above, protests have occurred in the
Kyrgyz Republic on a regular basis for the past fifteen years. If my analysis is correct
that the protests grew in size only when the government increased repression, than an
effective response may have been to ignore the small scale protests around the
country and allow them to burn out.
The leverage of the protesters is to create self-defeating reactions by the
government. If the government is capable of resisting the urge to respond harshly,
they may actually be able to dampen the growth of localized protests. When the
government becomes a part of the dynamic interaction process with the protesters,
they have seeded their control to the process. Through resisting direct intervention
and response to the protests, the leverage of the protesters is diminished. Similar to a
terrorist attack, the power of the terrorists is not in the act, but in provoking a
disproportionate response from the government.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
When Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was asked by Henry Kissinger his opinion
of the French Revolution, his response was “it’s too early to tell.”281 Similarly, given
that only two years have passed since streets protests forced President Askar Akayev
to flee the Kyrgyz Republic; it is difficult to identify the long-term ramifications of
this sudden political overthrow. In the short-term, many policy analysts, government
officials, and regional governments have already drawn incorrect and dangerously
misleading conclusions. The leadership of both Uzbekistan and Russia has taken the
lesson that increased repression is necessary to prevent similar crowd protests.282
Understanding the cause and process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic is
important for U.S. policy towards post-Soviet countries and for these countries own
internal political succession dynamic.
This dissertation is one of the first academic research endeavors to examine
why political protests occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic from January to March 2005
and resulted in the collapse of the government. This research provides insight in
three important areas, first, the causes and process of protest in the specific case of
the Kyrgyz Republic, second, the relationships between happiness, satisfaction with
government, and potential to protest, and third, the dynamic of political repression.
This final chapter explores each of these areas and suggests specific contributions and
insights.
281 Tina Rosenberg and Priscilla B. Hayner, "The Unfinished Revolution of 1989," Foreign Policy, no.
115 (1999).
282 Hill and Jones, "Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon."
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There are three main conclusions of this research. One, initial conditions are
poor predictors for the location of political protests. Two, the protests were motivated
by local political entrepreneurs and lacked both external and internal civil society
support. Third, the Kyrgyz government’s use of political repression was the most
important cause for the increase in intensity of the protests and for the collapse of
Akayev’s government.
The key conclusions and contributions are organized by the three dependent
variables or causal outcomes: 1) formation of protests, 2) increase of protests, and 3)
collapse of government.
Formation of protests
The initial causes of these protests are not predicable based on the social,
economic or individual perceptions of the individual protesters. The important
outcome is that the standard predictive models were not useful to determine when or
where protests would occur. The statistical models for individual levels of well-being
and satisfaction presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated a lack of support for the relative
deprivation or individual perception literature. Theories based on cross-country
macro-data fare poorly at predicting either the potential or timing for the political
protests in the Kyrgyz Republic.
The conclusion from the analysis of the statistical models, the macro-
economic conditions and the history is that initial conditions are poor predictors for
the location of political protests. Based on the political protest and civil violence
literature as presented in Chapter 2, there are two types of motivations for political
protests rooted in initial conditions, explanations based on individual indicators and
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societal or collective factors. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, both individual and
collective factors influenced the composition and formation of the protests, but
neither factor fully explains the casual mechanisms for the start and growth of the
protests. There are four important components of this conclusion.
First, the Kyrgyz Republic is not statistically significantly different from
comparators around the world and in the region in terms of perception of individual
happiness. Within the country, small differences were found across oblasts with the
southern respondents having slightly higher levels of individual satisfaction. This
finding challenges policy prescriptions that assume significant cross-country
differences in perception of well-being.
Second, there is not a strong relationship between levels of individual
happiness and regions where protests occurred. While there were clear differences
among some regions, they do not appear to follow the pattern of the protests. As
noted in Chapter 4, it is not possible to conclusively prove the individual level of
happiness of each protester. However, we would expect to find the patterns of
protests corresponding to the levels of happiness if individual levels of happiness
were correlated with protest events.
Third, street protests are not necessarily the product of deep personal
grievances rather they are often the legitimate expression of discontent with the
government. In a more developed democracy, civil society institutions, civic
organizations and town meetings provide forums for public expression. Citizens in
nascent democracies seek any means available to express their political attitudes;
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when the voting box is viewed as corrupt and institutions don’t exist, street protests
often become the legitimate form of expression.
These happy protesters do not have high levels of personal dissatisfaction,
but the exact inverse, they are relatively happy and seek a mechanism to express their
political attitudes.
Fourth, dissatisfaction with government may be a useful cross-country
indicator of potential for conflict. The alternative hypothesis in Chapter 4 showed
that the Kyrgyz Republic is statistically different from other countries in the region in
satisfaction with government, but there is not a correlation between in-country levels
of satisfaction with government and protests. This suggests that protesters were
dissatisfied with the government, but as discussed above, did not have low individual
levels of happiness. Intuitively, an individual may be personally satisfied and happy,
but be highly dissatisfied with the government and show his discontent through street
protests and mass movements. The relatively high level of dissatisfaction made the
Kyrgyz Republic susceptible to protest dynamics—perhaps the equivalent of a weak
unstable system.
Increase in protests
Why did the protests increase? The main conclusion is that the protests were
motivated by local political entrepreneurs and lacked both external and internal civil
society support. There are two analytical components to this conclusion. First, the
actions of political entrepreneurs both motivated the protesters and provided
resources. These political entrepreneurs used the initial public discontent for the
elections and then incorporated it into their own agendas. The initial protests were
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not a referendum on the president, but to show support and loyalty for their local
candidate.
The field interviews indicate that the protesters came because of a
combination of personal grievances with their general socio-economic conditions and
dissatisfaction with the Akayev government. But these grievances had existed for
many years. What changed was the potential to lose benefits accrued through the
actions of their local political entrepreneur. The local people came to support their
local political entrepreneur because of the support that he had provided or could
provide in the region.
Second, the role of international funding, western governments, and local civil
society was minor and unimportant in determining the final outcome of the political
protests. As repeatedly noted in Chapters 5 & 6, the internal civil society was useful
in informing the outside world about the events, but they had no impact on the start of
the protests or the conclusion. International funding, specifically money from the
U.S. government was used to monitor the elections and support local voter awareness
campaigns. While there may have been some marginal increase in awareness of the
process of voting, the timing and causes of the protests indicate that this funding was
not connected to the initiation or to the increase of the protests.
Unfortunately, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other states have
justified the shutting down of international and local NGOs in the belief that the
events in the Kyrgyz Republic were influenced and determined by western
government funding and civil society.
175
Collapse of the government
Why did the government collapse after only a few weeks of protests? The
third conclusion is that the Kyrgyz government’s use of political repression was the
most important cause for the increase in intensity of the protests and for the collapse
of Akayev’s government. The government miscalculated the relative strength of the
protests and their ability to respond to repression. Initial conditions of the quality of
the central government were not the factors in determining the collapse. While the
central government was weak and prone to collapse, if the government had not
responded aggressively to the protests, the president may not have been forced to
leave.
The primary cause for the increase in the political protests was the repressive
action of the government toward the protesters and political entrepreneurs. The
government took three actions that led to an increase in political protests; they
alienated political leaders, failed to communicate, and increased physical pressure on
protesters and the opposition.
The alienation of political leaders pushed the political entrepreneurs against
the government. As discussed in Chapter 6, many of the leading political
entrepreneurs were former government officials and had not been opposition leaders.
The government tried to prevent them from running for office, registering for
campaigns, organizing political activities and even holding local political rallies.
These actions, often towards previously loyal government supporters, pushed away
many key local political leaders who saw their political and economic fortunes
crashing if they were blocked by the Akayev government.
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These local leaders motivated their supporters through appeals to their loyalty
and deep-seated grievances towards the ruling regime. As discussed in Chapter 6,
there is no hard evidence and only limited anecdotal proof that protesters were paid in
cash or bribed to march on the streets. Many of them did receive food and their
transportation was paid when they traveled to Bishkek, but they did not sleep in cold
buildings for weeks or march on the streets in front of armed soldiers because they
were paid.
The government refused to engage in any effective dialogue with the
opposition. A line of communication and negotiation was open at the very end
through intervention of the OSCE, but the president refused to participate directly and
was not a supporter of negotiating with the opposition. It is unlikely that the
president could have remained for another term, but with elections scheduled for
October 2005, it is highly probable that a negotiated agreement could have been
reached that guaranteed the President would step down in a controlled transfer of
power.
The final component was the increase in physical pressure and repression
towards the protesters. As detailed in Chapter 5, the physical attacks in Jalal-Abad
and Osh on the 20th and in Bishkek on the 23rd and 24th resulted in a substantial
increase in the number of protesters and the level of violence. As noted in Chapter 2,
there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the expected response to an
increase in repression. In this case, each time the repression increased, the protests
increased, there appears to be a positive linear relationship. However, as I argued in
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Chapter 6, it is possible that the relationship is curvilinear if the amount of repression
was increased.
The Akayev government was ineffective at both repression and negotiation.
The attempt to find a middle strategy of using both techniques in a limited manner
was completely ineffective. As I presented in Chapter 5, if the government had either
allowed the protests to continue without any intervention or repression, it is
reasonable to conclude that the protests would not have increased and would have
eventually dissipated. Alternatively, if the government had used extreme force, such
as firing on the crowds or killing opposition leaders as has been done in other post-
Soviet states, it is possible that the government would not have collapsed at that time.
This severe repression would have endangered long-term stability and increased the
potential for large scale civil conflict.
A part of the story that has not been fully explored because of lack of data and
information is the motivation for Akayev’s actions. To his credit, he refused to ever
give the command to use deadly force and according to his own statement, as he left
the White House the last order he gave to the police and National Guard was to not
use their weapons.283 Rather than focus on the idiosyncratic actions of a particular
leader, I argue that this dynamic choice of either increased repression or negotiation is
a common theme that many of the rulers in the post-Soviet countries will face.
An important lesson from the Kyrgyz case is that ineffective implementation
of either approach guarantees instability and only results in provoking the opposition.
However, of the two choices, ineffective repression is the worst decision. An
alternative solution to this dilemma may be to a third option of choosing neither
283 Ekho Moskvy (Moscow). March 29, 2005 1318 GMT, in Russian.
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repression nor negotiation, but what I consider benign indifference. Benign
indifference recognizes that protests are occurring, allows them to occur, but doesn’t
try and prevent them or use repressive measures to punish the leaders. As discussed in
Chapter 6, because of the relative weakness of the institutional abilities of the former-
Soviet states, it is also very difficult to focus all of the efforts on legal methods to
negotiate a settlement. Either traditional solution, repression or negotiation, places
undue pressure on a system that it is not capable of withstanding. If the government
allows small-scale protests to occur, they provide a mechanism for frustration to be
released without directly endangering the government. The most difficult part of this
approach is that it is the most demanding personally on a government leader. It takes
great strength of character to allow protests against the government to occur and not
respond. While theoretically useful, this approach may not be practically viable.
Policy Recommendations
The goal of this research has been to understand the dynamics of the political
protests in the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005. These initial conclusions and
contributions are important both for academic scholars of protests and conflict, but
perhaps have more immediate importance and relevance for political analysts and
government officials determining policy in the post-Soviet states. In conclusion, I
offer three policy recommendations based on this research and the conclusions
presented above.
First, the focus for preventing and responding to political protests should be
on developing the institutional capacity within the government to effectively manage
protests. Long-term economic and social development policies are important for the
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general well-being of a country and for decreasing its risk for engaging in political or
civil conflict. Yet as it is impossible to predict where or when a conflict may occur, it
is more important to devote money and resources towards developing countries
ability to respond to political protests.
Second, the international community should decrease its emphasis on
elections as the litmus test for determining the democratic growth of a developing
country. Elections serve a useful process in allowing the local citizens to express
their grievances with the ruling elite. However, they can also serve as flash points for
both the government and the opposition. While the role of the international
community was minor in initiating the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic, they still
played a key role in applying undue pressure to a weak and fragile government. The
international community should decrease their focus on elections and increase
attention and funding for the long-term institutional foundation that is necessary for
sustained democratic development.
Third, countries that engage in severe political repression towards opposition
leaders or protesters should be severely sanctioned and internationally condemned.
One outcome of this research is that ineffective repression can lead to an increase in
protests. This could be interpreted to imply that the solution is to significantly
increase repression. However the humane and democratic interpretation is that any
repression is ultimately unsuccessful in preventing political protests if there are
underlying social and political grievances. The policy concern is that the lesson that
other post-Soviet countries took from the case of the Kyrgyz Republic is that
increased repression is the only solution to political protests. On a global or even
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regional scale of repression, the actions in the Kyrgyz Republic were benign, but
repression has both a relative as well as an absolute measure. Since the events in the
Kyrgyz Republic, repression in other countries has included arresting opposition
leaders, torturing civil society spokesmen, and even shooting into crowds of
protesters. Countries should be strongly encouraged to refrain from political
repression through both positive inducements as well as negative consequences for
repressive behavior.
In conclusion, the political protests in the Kyrgyz Republic have many similar
attributes to contentious political activity over the last few centuries. But the Kyrgyz
Republic case also points towards a process of protests different from the other post-
Soviet countries. The important lessons are the lack of relevance of initial personal
indicators, the relative influence of political entrepreneurs and the significant negative
impact from increased government repression.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Map of the Kyrgyz Republic
Source: Produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Accessed from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kyrgyzstan.html
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Appendix 2: Survey Methodology Report
Regional Perception Survey of Conflict Prevention
and Cooperation in Central Asia
Funded by the World Bank
Implemented by Counterpart International





The project uses public opinion polling to gather and then analyze a sample that
represents the entire population of each of four different countries of Central Asia:
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The samples of 1,500 residents
of each country and the methodology used to obtain these samples differs slightly in
design initially for each country, as discussed below.
Central to a good survey is a strong procedure to select a sample of people to
interview. In more developed countries, surveys can be conducted by phone and
random methods used to selected phone numbers on a nationwide basis to produce a
true random national sample. In less developed countries, with correspondingly weak
telephone penetration, face to face interviews must be conducted, and other sampling
procedures developed to determine who to interview to approximate a random
nationwide sample.
For all four Central Asian countries in this survey, the sampling procedure is a three-
stage stratified clustered one. Census data on the territorial dispersion of the
population is used as the base to start the sampling methodology. The sampling
procedure takes the total population of the country, considers geographic units within
the country as either urban or rural, and then develops random procedures to select
who to survey in three stages: first by randomly selected smaller geographic urban
and units in each province (the primary sampling units or PSUs), second randomly
choosing households within these units, and third, to randomly select which
household member to interview in each household.
The sampling frame used to divide these four countries into smaller geographic units
to randomly sample from differs slightly for each Central Asian country, based on
differences in data availability on the population of the country and its dispersion.
Subsequent sections explain the sampling methodology used and how this sampling
frame differs in each country. Then all four countries have PSUs, random selection
of households, and random sampling of individuals within households using the same
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methods, which are discussed at length only in the first country example –
Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has 14 provinces plus the cities of Almaty and Astana which are
considered separate units. All provinces are divided into districts, of which there are
198 in the country. Districts incorporate towns (with more than 100,000 inhabitants),
small towns (with between 30,000 to 100,000 inhabitants) and villages (less than
30,000 inhabitants). A number of villages, in turn, are incorporated into rural districts
(selskiy okrug). In total, Kazakhstan has cities of Almaty and Astana, 17 towns, 258
small towns, 2,140 rural districts, and 7,986 villages. The population of Kazakhstan
wass 14,953,126 people, of which 8,377,303 (56%) lived in urban areas, and
6,575,823 (44%) lived in rural areas as of January 1, 2004.
In Kazakhstan, since interviewers would not be allowed in electoral districts that use
administrative restrictions to prohibit access of outsiders or that are unsafe for
polling, 395 city electoral districts are excluded from the sampling frame. These
19.6% of the total number of electoral districts in the country are hospitals, prisons
and military zones. The estimate of the population in excluded electoral districts is
not available, because there is no resident population in these areas as defined in the
census.
The sampling frame for Kazakhstan was developed from a list of three types of small
territorial units, which are the primary sampling units (PSUs) used in the survey. The
three are: small settlements of less than 3,000 inhabitants for which each is a distinct
PSU; parts of large settlements divided into populations between 2,500 and 5,000 for
urban settlements and 1,500 to 3,000 for rural settlements each as a separate PSU; and
electoral districts from large settlements each as separate PSU. Such a procedure is
suboptimal, but needed when there is no information on a population in
administrative-territorial units smaller sizes (such as there is by makhallas in
Uzbekistan).
Sampling is through three-stage stratified clustered sampling. First, PSUs are
determined by province stratified by urban and rural population size. This primary
probabiliby sampling (PPS-sampling) of PSUs selects a total of 61 PSUs represent the
urban and rural population of Kazakhstan to generate 1,500 interviews. Second,
sequential random sampling of households is done to select secondary sampling units
(SSUs) in the selected PSUs. Third, a Kish grid is used to ensure random sampling of
respondents within each household.
To generate PSUs, each province is treated as a separate unit for sampling. For each
province, sampling is proportionate to the share of the population of the country that
it comprises, which in turn is divided into the share of the urban and rural population
each province comprises of the entire country. This allocation is done for all 16
provinces. Based on their size relative to the entire urban and rural population of the
country, the proportion of the sample that should be drawn from each urban and rural
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population of each province to represent the nation is determined. For example,
Akmola has 748,930 residents, which is 5.0% of the population of Kazakhstan. Thus
in a sample of 1,500 residents of the country, 5% or 75 people are drawn from
Akmola. The share of urban and rural interviews is determined from the proportion
of the country that the urban and rural population is for the rprovince. Provinces with
larger urban and rural populations will have more people selected for interviews
relative to those with smaller populations. Again, for Akmola, 349,153 people are
urban residents, which is 46.6% of the province. This leads to sampling 35 of these
city dwellers. 399,777 people are rural inhabitants, 53.4% of the population of the
province, which leads to sampling 40 rural residents from Akmola.
The number of PSUs to be sampled to achieve the needed quota for urban and rural
residents in each province depends on a minimum number of interviews to be
achieved per PSU, the costs of data collection, supervision, control and follow-up, as
well as minimum effective number to conduct the survey in a PSU. The number of
people surveyed varies in Kazakhstan in the 61 PSUs surveyed from a low of 8 to a
high of 30 people. An approximately equal number of interviews are allocated
respectively for each selected urban and rural PSU.
Then the actual geographic units (PSUs) in each province to be polled are determined
by a random process. A list of all urban and rural PSUs is composed for each
province. The probability a PSU is selected for the survey depends on the size of
either the urban or rural population within it. The PPS-sampling is carried out by
sorted these units by size and randomly chosing which PSUs to survey over and over
until the required number of urban and rural units is reached. To stick with the
Akmola example, the quota of 35 urban residents can be reasonably reached by
surveying 2 urban PSUs, and querying 18 people in one and 17 in another. For the
quota of 40 rural respondents, again 2 PSUs are selected randomly and 20
respondents will be selected in each. Thus interviewers will visit 4 different
randomly selected PSUs in the province to find these 35 urban and 40 rural
Kazakhstanis.
Sequential random sampling of households is done by supervisors and interviewers
during the fieldwork through a special form with random numbers that is used to
draw a sample of households. Ideally, when interviewers brief local authorities that
they will be conducting a survey in the district, they obtain a list of households from
the authorities. However, in many cases the lists of households were made by
interviewers without participation of local authorities because the administration was
either not willing to provide assistance or was located far away from the district.
Sequential random sampling is done by random numbers associated with serial
numbers of households in the list. Once a household has been selected, it cannot be
selected again. Any household where the interview fails, from not finding the
household or respondent refusal, is replaced with the next one randomly selected,
according to the order of the random numbers. Selection is repeated until a required
number of interviews is reached in each PSU.
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A kish grid is used to randomly sample respondents within households. To selecting
a single adult in each selected household, 8 types of Kish grids each with different
selection of respondents are combined together under strict proportions to ensure
almost equal overall probability for any eligible household member to be chosen to
participate in the survey. All household members eligible for the survey are sorted by
gender, the primary sorting, and then by age, the secondary sorting. Each is assigned
a serial number and a respondent is determined according to the type of Kish grid.
Kish grids were assigned to each sample address randomly and in advance to avoid
the tendency for interviewers' to interview a “convenient” rather than random
household member.
As the table below indicates, the achieved sample differs somewhat from the
characteristics of the population found in the prior census. Surveys in Central Asia
typically have these issues: an underrepresentation of men and youth, who are
difficult to find due to their higher geographic mobility. Weighting is used to
somewhat reduce these disproportions statistically.
Table 1: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN KAZAKHSTAN
Sample
Variable Census
Pure Diff. Weighted Diff.
Sex (2004)
Male 48.1% 43.5% -4.6% 45.4% -2.7%
Female 51.9% 56.5% 4.6% 54.6% 2.7%
Age (2004)
18-19 6.1% 3.5% -2.6% 4.5% -1.6%
20-29 24.5% 18.7% -5.9% 20.4% -4.2%
30-39 21.2% 23.5% 2.3% 21.9% 0.7%
40-49 20.4% 22.7% 2.2% 22.2% 1.8%
50-59 12.0% 12.5% 0.4% 13.8% 1.7%
60 and older 15.7% 19.2% 3.5% 17.2% 1.6%
Nationality (1999)
Kazakh 53.4% 54.5% 1.1% 55.9% 2.5%
Russian 30.0% 30.3% 0.4% 28.1% -1.9%
Other 16.6% 15.2% -1.4% 16.0% -0.6%
Education (1999)
Primary education and lower 20.9% 17.1% -3.8% 15.6% -5.3%
Secondary specialized 27.8% 32.7% 4.8% 31.7% 3.8%
Completed secondary 36.4% 29.5% -6.9% 30.4% -6.0%
Non-completed higher 1.8% 4.6% 2.8% 5.1% 3.3%
Higher education 13.1% 16.1% 3.0% 17.2% 4.1%
In fieldwork, 181 potential respondents refused to participate, and thus are non-
respondents. The average response rate is thus 89% (1,500 of 1,681 cases). Non-
response is registered if a completed interview is not achieved after three interviewer
callbacks. High numbers of non-response were noted in Akmola, where the response
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rate was 65.8%; elsewhere response rates were always above 80%. Non-response
was more common in urban than rural areas, with the response rate for urban
respondents 86.1% compared to 93.7% for rural residents. Rural residents are more
willing to cooperate, less mobile, and are typically listed in more accurate population
registers than those in urban areas. Most non-responses are from respondents
emphatically refusing to participate (47.5% of all non-responses), with an additional
18.8% of nonrespondents a result of family members refusing to call the selected
family member in for an interview. Finally, 15.5% of non-responses are the result of
the designed respondent not being home for any of the three call-backs.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has of 7 provinces, with Bishkek city is considered as an eighth province
for the survey. Each province is divided into several districts (rural areas) and city
councils (“gorodskoy kenesh”). Overall Kyrgyzstan has 56 units (44 districts and 14
city councils). Districts incorporates villages, city councils incorporates cities (one for
each city council) and villages (although these are not in all city councils). Villages
are incorporated into rural districts (“ailny okmot”). Kyrgyzstan has 14 cities, 431
rural districts and 1,815 villages. The population of Kyrghyzstan was to 4,641,237
people, the urban population was 1,520,487 (33%), and the rural population
3,120,750 (67%) as of January, 1, 1998.
Several remote or inaccessible districts are excluded from the sampling frame. This
category includes one district each in Naryn, Batken, Osh, Issyk-Kul, and three in
Djalal-Abad. One larger district, Uzgen in Osh oblast, was excluded due to
complicated interethnic and interreligious attitudes (147,183 inhabitants). In all,
14.99% of the rural population of the country was unfortunately left out of the sample
frame, (467,853 people). This is 10.08% of the total population of Kyrgyzstan.
The sampling frame for Kyrgyzstan is constructed from a list of small territorial units
that are the primary sampling units which are of two types: villages – rural
settlements that are subordinated to rural councils (“ailny okmot”) and is used as a
unit for the sampling; and parts of large urban settlements – each city is divided into
parts with populations between 3,991 and 5,364 inhabitants. As in Kazakhstan, such
configuration of the sampling frame is required when there is only census data
available for the population in urban settlements and there is no information available
on the population in administrative-territorial urban units of smaller sizes (such as
makhallas in Uzbekistan).
As in Kazakhstan, the sampling scheme for Kyrgyzstan has:
proportionate stratification by population of provinces;
for all provinces:
proportionate stratification by urban/rural population within provinces;
PPS-sampling of PSUs within urban/rural strata
sequential random sampling of households (Secondary Sampling Units - SSUs) in
selected PSUs;
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Kish grid based sampling of respondents within households.
Thus, the sampling is three-stage stratified clustered sampling, with all three stages
conducted identically to the Kazakhstan example above. 58 PSUs in Kyrgyzstan are
selected from the sampling frames, with the number of interviews varying between 11
and 30 people per PSU.
The sample distribution of main demographic characteristics can be compared with
census data from 1999 (with 2000 data used for education section).
Table 2: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN KYRGYZSTAN
Sample
Variable Census
Pure Diff. Weighted Diff.
Sex (1999)
Male 49.4% 48.80% -0.56% 49.92% 0.56%
Female 50.6% 51.20% 0.56% 50.08% -0.56%
Age (1999)
18-20 10.02% 9.93% -2.10% 11.67% 1.66%
21-30 28.77% 27.93% -4.90% 29.45% 0.68%
31-40 24.64% 23.07% 1.20% 19.09% -5.55%
41-50 15.87% 20.53% 2.10% 21.05% 5.18%
51-60 7.84% 9.07% 0.40% 10.10% 2.26%
61 and older 12.87% 9.47% 3.40% 8.63% -4.23%
Nationality (1999)
Kyrghyz 64.86% 65.53% 0.67% 65.34% 0.48%
Russian 12.51% 10.40% -2.11% 9.44% -3.07%
Ukrainian 1.05% 0.47% -0.58% 0.31% -0.74%
Uzbek 13.79% 16.80% 3.01% 17.50% 3.71%
Kazakh 0.88% 0.87% -0.02% 0.80% -0.09%
Tadjik 0.88% 0.40% -0.48% 0.54% -0.34%
Tartar 0.94% 0.67% -0.28% 0.46% -0.48%
Dungan 1.07% 0.20% -0.87% 0.26% -0.81%
Corean 0.41% 0.87% 0.46% 1.06% 0.65%
German 0.45% 0.47% 0.02% 0.46% 0.02%
Uigur 0.97% 0.27% -0.70% 0.35% -0.62%
Other 2.19% 3.07% 0.87% 3.49% 1.30%
Education (2000)
No education 2.45% 0.00% -2.45% 0.00% -2.45%
Incomplete secondary 21.37% 8.13% -13.23% 7.94% -13.42%
Full secondary or incomplete higher 52.68% 53.00% 0.32% 53.27% 0.58%
Academic liceum, technical school, college 11.86% 20.67% 8.81% 20.66% 8.81%
Completed higher 11.64% 18.13% 6.49% 18.07% 6.43%
282 cases of nonresponse were observed. The average response rate is about 84%
(282 of 1782 cases. 210 of these cases were in urban areas, leaving a 70.0% response
rate for cities, while 72 cases were rural, for a 93.3% response rate in rural
Kyrgyzstan. Respose rates were over 92% for all but Osh (89.6%) and Bishkek,
where 177 people refused to participate, leaving a response rate of 58.2%. Most
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urban nonrespondents emphatically refused to participate (176 people or 83.8% of all
urban residents that were non-responsive).
Tajikistan
Tajikistan has 4 provinces, with the city of Dushanbe then considered a separate fifth
province. These provinces have 58 districts, with 17 cities and 7 settlements
(“posyolok”) of provincal submission. Districts incorporate rural settlements or
villages, which are incorporated into rural districts (“djamoat dekhot” and
“poselkovyi djamoat”). In total there are 23 cities (17 cities of provincal submission
and 6 cities of district submission), 47 settlements (7 settlements of provincal
submission and 40 settlements of district submission), 356 djamoat and 3,803
villages. The population of Tajikistan was 6,187,561 people, of whom 1,686,095
(27%) were urban, and 4,501,466 (73%) were rural as of January 20, 2000.
Several remote or inaccessible districts were excluded from the sample from since
they are practically impossible to get to due to their remote location or absence of
transportation. These are three districts in Sogd province, that have a population of
248,290 people, which is 0.1% o f the urban population of the country and 5.5% of
the rural population – a total of 4.01% percent of the country.
The sampling frame for Tajikistan is based on the list of small territorial units
(primary sampling units - PSUs) of three types:
Villages – rural settlements subordinate to djamoats, each is a separate PSU.
Parts of large rural settlements, divided into populations of between 2,504 and 4,835
inhabitants as separate PSUs.
Parts of large urban settlements, divided into populations of between 2,450 and 4,903
inhabitants as separate PSUs.
Like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the sampling is three-stage stratified clustered
sampling for Tajikistan. First, proportionate stratification is done by the population
of provinces, with proportionate stratification by urban/rural population within
provinces (except the city of Dushanbe which is all urban) and then a PPS-sampling
of PSUs within these urban and rural strata. Second, sequential random sampling of
households (Secondary Sampling Units - SSUs) is done in selected PSUs. Third,
Kish grids are used to sample respondents within households.
For Tajikistan, 56 PSUs are randomly selected from the sampling frame, and between
7 people (for urban areas in Gorno-Badakhshan, which is a tiny proportion of the
urban population of the country) and 29 respondent interviewed in each.
The sample distribution of the main demographic characteristics can be compared
with census data from 1989 (with data from 2000 used instead in the nationality
section). These data have changed substantially over fifteen years and the dramatic
change in the economy, society, and polity with the civil war and other changes that
have accompanied independence. The data are weighted, which somewhat reduces
the typical disproportionate probability of selection of men and youth.
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Table 3: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN TAJIKISTAN
Sample
Variable Census
Pure Diff. Weighted Diff.
Sex (1989)
Male 49.7% 45.9% -3.8% 47.9% -1.8%
Female 50.3% 54.1% 3.8% 52.1% 1.8%
Age (1989)
18-19 8.1% 5.6% -2.5% 6.6% -1.5%
20-29 35.0% 25.7% -9.2% 30.8% -4.2%
30-39 21.8% 28.7% 6.8% 23.4% 1.6%
40-49 11.2% 21.2% 10.0% 19.5% 8.3%
50-59 11.9% 8.3% -3.5% 9.8% -2.0%
60 and older 12.0% 10.5% -1.6% 9.9% -2.1%
Nationality (2000)
Tadjik 79.9% 74.2% -5.7% 75.7% -4.3%
Uzbek 15.3% 21.1% 5.8% 20.8% 5.6%
Russian 15.3% 2.7% -12.6% 2.1% -13.2%
Other 3.7% 2.0% -1.7% 2.6% -1.1%
Education (1989, age 15
and older)
Incomplete secondary 25.2% 22.3% -2.9% 22.9% -2.3%
Full secondary or
incomplete higher
52.7% 49.1% -3.6% 49.7% -2.9%
Academic liceum,
technical school, college
13.1% 15.0% 1.8% 14.2% 1.0%
Completed higher 9.0% 13.7% 4.7% 13.2% 4.2%
In comparison with the 2000 census nationality data, the number of Uzbeks has
grown and the number of people of other nationalities (especially Russians) has
appreciably diminished. This is due to high levels of unemployment and increased
migration of Tajik men to Russia for work and, on the contrary, the settled way of life
of many Uzbeks who have remained in agriculture. Second, census data
overestimates the proportion of the titular nationality since belonging to this nation
provides advantages in employment, careers, and education. In opinion polls, when
no supporting documentation is required, respondents preferred to name their
ethnicity as that which they actually identify themselves.
During the fieldwork, 88 cases of nonresponse were observed. The average response
rate is about 94% (1,500 of 1,588 cases - due to using the sequential sampling of
households the nonresponse had no effect on the final sample size). Generally,
nonresponse was registered if a completed interview had not taken place, and an
interviewer had made up to 3 callbacks. The response rate was 84.4% in urban areas
and 98.9% in rural ones. In Dushanbe the response rate was 73.3%. Two-thirds
(67.1%) of urban non-responses came from respondents not being at home; few emphatic
refusals to participate were noted in Tajikistan.
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Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan has 12 provinces, the Republic of Karakalpakstan, and the city of
Tashkent. Each province has several districts for a total of 168 districts in the country.
Each district has a number of cities, small towns and villages. Of the 233 cities and
small towns in Uzbekistan, 76 cities are subordinated directly to provinces due to
their importance. The population of Uzbekistan was 25,523,000 people, of which
9,410,700 (37%) were urban residents, and the 16,112,300 (63%) were rural residents
as of May 2002. Several districts, practically inaccessible from an absence of
transportation or remote location, are excluded from the sampling frame. These two
cities, one small town, and one district in Navoi have a population of 95,300, 0.9% of
the urban population and 0.1% of the rural population of the country – a total of
0.4% of the population of Uzbekistan is excluded from the sampling frame.
.
The sampling frame for Uzbekistan has primary sampling units (PSUs) of two types:
MK (“Mahallinskiy Komitet”) - town makhalla committee. Makhallas are the
traditional neighborhood committees which have been revived (and in some urban
areas artificially created) by the Uzbek government;
SSG (“Selskiy Skhod Grazhdan”) - village council. This type has been used for rural
areas in all recent surveys.
The sampling scheme then has the following three standard stages:
proportionate stratification by population of provinces;
for all provinces (include Tashkent city as urban stratum):
proportionate stratification by urban/rural population within provinces;
PPS-sampling of PSUs within urban/rural strata;
sequential random sampling of households (Secondary Sampling Units - SSUs) in
selected PSUs;
Kish grid based sampling of respondents.
Thus, the sampling is three-stage stratified clustered sampling.
There are 63 PSUs are selected from the sampling frames, with the number of
respondents to be interviewed in each varying between 17 and 29 in different PSUs.
The sample distribution by the main demographic characteristics can be compared
with data of Statistical Department of Republic of Uzbekistan from January 1, 2002.
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Table 4: COMPARION OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN UZBEKISTAN
Sample (18 years and older, 2004)
Variable Census
Pure Difference Weighted Difference
Sex
Male 49.0% 41.3% -7.7% 44.1% -4.9%
Female 51.0% 58.7% 7.7% 55.9% 4.9%
Age
15-19 7.5% 5.2% -2.3% 6.4% -1.1%
20-29 30.8% 22.3% -8.5% 27.1% -3.7%
30-39 24.2% 27.5% 3.2% 21.4% -2.8%
40-49 18.2% 21.8% 3.6% 21.1% 2.9%
50-59 7.9% 10.1% 2.2% 11.3% 3.4%
60 and older 11.4% 13.2% 1.8% 12.8% 1.3%
No comparisons are made on nationality, education and marital status of population
because data from the last census data for these categories is not available.
During the fieldwork, 766 cases of non-response were registered (non-eligible units
are excluded from this count). The average response rate is about 66% (1,500 of
2,266 attempts). Generally, the non-response case was registered if an interviewer had
made up to two failed callbacks. Below is listed the response rate by residence:
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Table 5. Response rate by urban/rural and provinces
No Residence Response Non-response Response rate
Urban 553 432 56.1%
Rural 947 334 73.9%
1 Karakalpakstan 91 20 82.0%
2 Andijan 134 41 76.6%
3 Buhara 87 20 81.3%
4 Jizzakh 61 11 84.7%
5 Kashkadarya 135 56 70.7%
6 Navoi 47 24 66.2%
7 Namangan 119 50 70.4%
8 Samarkand 164 110 59.9%
9 Surhandarya 108 28 79.4%
10 Syrdarya 39 11 78.0%
11 Tashkent 143 79 64.4%
12 Fergana 163 66 71.2%
13 Horezm 82 40 67.2%
14 Tashkent city 127 210 37.7%
TOTAL in Uzbekistan 1 500 766 66.2%
As one can see, the response rate in rural areas is higher than in urban areas. In
Tashkent city very much high level of refusals is observed (response rate barely about
38%). This is caused mainly by the following factors:
rural residents are more willing to cooperate;
they are less active in sense of movement, therefore more reachable;
the theme of interview sets people on the alert;
population registration and register maintenance in cities are generally worse which
leads to poor quality sampling frames.
The influence of first two factors is aligned lately because of a falling of a scale of
living of people.
The table below showing the structure of non-response proves these assumptions.
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Table 6. Non-response structure by causes
Urban Rural TOTAL
No Cause of non-response
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
3 Nobody at home 39 8.2% 20 5.1% 59 6.8%
4
Respondent was not at home by that
time
11 2.3% 14 3.6% 25 2.9%




191 40.0% 122 31.2% 313 36.1%
8 Respondent was drunk 1 0.3% 1 0.1%
9
Respondent could not talk (sick,
abnormal, very old, etc.)
7 1.5% 17 4.3% 24 2.8%
10
Not at home for a long time (long
absence)
175 36.7% 151 38.6% 326 37.6%
11
Address was not found, does not
exist
23 4.8% 25 6.4% 48 5.5%
12 Address is not residential 20 4.2% 11 2.8% 31 3.6%
13
Repeat address or out of range of
actual count of households in the
PSU (sampling technical causes –
see 0)
2 0.4% 21 5.4% 23 2.6%
TOTAL 477 100.0% 391 100.0% 868 100.0%
In this table are included the causes of non-response owing to a non-eligible units
(causes 11,12) and technique of sampling of households (cause 13, see also 0).
Thus, 40% of all the causes in the urban areas is the “household members refused
contacting respondent” (cause 7), as compared with the corresponding 31.2% in the
rural areas. This cause has the most spread for urban people and the second at the
prevalence for rural areas (about 31% of all causes of non-response), because the
theme of interview (the internal politic, interethnic problem etc.) makes people
mistrustful and situation with the criminality (especially in the cities) is very
complicated.
Otherwise, cause 10 (“not at home for a long time”) is second at the prevalence for
urban areas (about 37%) and first for rural areas (about 39% of all non-response
causes). This cause is spread for urban and rural people because they migrate in
searches of earnings.
The similar reasons called cause 3 “nobody at home” and 4 “respondent was not at
home by that time” (8.2% and 2,3% for urban and 5.1% and 3.6% for rural areas
accordingly). Besides for these causes there is one more explanation – employment of
urban population and “cotton campaign” for rural population.
The causes 6, 8, and 9 met not frequently. Therefore we may not make any
conclusions.
The sampling frame quality is revealed by comparing the share of cause 11 “address
was not found, does not exist”– 4.8% in the urban areas versus 6.4% in the rural. In
the urban areas 2.8% of the non-response are “Address is not residential” (cause 12).
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In the rural areas this cause makes 4.2% of all causes of non-response. In most cases
it originates from that a household, in order to get an additional land plot from a
makhalla committee for running subsidiary economy, declares itself to be actually
consisting of two households – parents’ and a new, young one. Then the makhalla
committee registers a new household and allocates a plot. However, this “household”
continues living with the parents, making the new address not residential. Most urban
cases are connected with fitting apartments for small offices, cafes, renting to
foreigners, etc. More apartments in the cities are thrown (owners have left in
searching of earnings).
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Appendix 3: Don’t Know and No Response Regressions
Three models of DKNR responses for the Kyrgyz Republic.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
KYR Conflict Likely= Yes,




age 0.026 -0.011 0.002 0.019 -0.017 -0.005 -0.028 -0.04 -0.027
[0.81] [0.44] [0.06] [0.57] [0.62] [0.19] [0.67] [0.98] [0.74]
age2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.81] [0.36] [0.14] [0.53] [0.47] [0.07] [0.68] [0.84] [0.68]
urban 1.114 0.707 0.089 1.23 0.808 0.183 0.678 0.426 0.478
[6.94]** [5.13]** [0.65] [7.52]** [5.65]** [1.28] [2.95]** [1.96]* [2.44]*
male 0.259 0.157 0.346 0.209 0.155 0.223 -0.389 -0.135 -0.731
[1.73] [1.28] [2.91]** [1.37] [1.22] [1.80] [1.78] [0.68] [3.89]**
married -0.126 0.04 0.064 -0.158 0.049 0.127 -0.214 0.145 0.232
[0.69] [0.26] [0.43] [0.84] [0.31] [0.83] [0.85] [0.60] [1.06]
pp_hard 0.128 -0.199 -0.252 0.082 -0.266 -0.327 -0.373 -0.347 -0.387
[0.64] [1.18] [1.55] [0.40] [1.53] [1.94] [1.24] [1.23] [1.53]
pp_required -0.043 0.019 -0.077 -0.08 0.024 -0.1 -0.057 0.099 -0.064
[0.24] [0.13] [0.54] [0.44] [0.15] [0.66] [0.22] [0.42] [0.30]
ed_sec_inco -0.915 -0.337 -0.712 -0.896 -0.186 -0.674 0.949 0.979 0.453
[2.08]* [1.05] [2.28]* [1.97]* [0.55] [2.07]* [1.91] [2.04]* [1.05]
ed_sec_tech -0.215 -0.043 -0.285 -0.166 -0.019 -0.33 0.448 0.285 -0.157
[0.95] [0.22] [1.49] [0.72] [0.09] [1.65] [1.31] [0.85] [0.55]
ed_sec_reg -0.233 -0.131 -0.205 -0.21 -0.061 -0.227 0.292 0.609 0.065
[1.10] [0.72] [1.16] [0.97] [0.32] [1.21] [0.86] [1.92] [0.24]
ed_high_inco -0.293 -0.244 -0.108 -0.325 -0.221 -0.099 0.317 0.421 0.101
[1.11] [1.07] [0.49] [1.20] [0.94] [0.43] [0.81] [1.13] [0.32]
employed 0.04 0.134 -0.337 0.083 0.21 -0.285 0.62 0.527 0.428
[0.25] [1.00] [2.59]** [0.50] [1.52] [2.10]* [2.54]* [2.38]* [2.12]*
muslim -0.633 -0.472 -0.608 -0.695 -0.67 -0.827 -0.551 -0.921 -0.726
[2.74]** [2.38]* [3.17]** [2.95]** [3.18]** [4.01]** [1.84] [3.34]** [2.80]**
eth_min_kg -0.958 -0.807 -0.461 -0.966 -0.812 -0.491 0.005 0.091 -0.076
[4.82]** [5.21]** [3.22]** [4.81]** [5.13]** [3.33]** [0.02] [0.40] [0.35]
Constant -1.424 -0.076 0.286 -1.145 0.281 0.844 -2.01 -1.594 -1.032
[2.17]* [0.14] [0.55] [1.71] [0.50] [1.56] [2.26]* [1.91] [1.36]
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1218 1200 1170 1318 1318 1318
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Appendix 4: Survey Control Models
Comparison of models using survey controls for cluster and stratification.
DV: Well-










male 0.236 0.173 0.064 0.046 -0.148 -0.1 -0.145 -0.069
[0.128] [0.115] [0.131] [0.111] [0.130] [0.112] [0.124] [0.108]
age -0.048 -0.056 -0.039 -0.029 -0.049 -0.049 -0.101 -0.1
[0.030] [0.025]* [0.029] [0.021] [0.031] [0.022]* [0.028]** [0.022]**
age2 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000]**
ed_sec_tech 0.313 0.326 0.159 0.144 0.227 0.282 -0.483 -0.47
[0.272] [0.263] [0.248] [0.180] [0.247] [0.190] [0.207]* [0.169]**
ed_sec_reg 0.547 0.577 0.305 0.301 -0.074 -0.159 -0.331 -0.343
[0.242]* [0.252]* [0.265] [0.181] [0.189] [0.139] [0.172] [0.160]*
ed_high_inco 0.616 0.66 0.904 0.786 1.137 1.03 -0.67 -0.363
[0.290]* [0.292]* [0.423]* [0.294]** [0.311]** [0.241]** [0.783] [0.446]
ed_high_com 0.698 0.742 0.379 0.387 0.801 0.797 -0.433 -0.53
[0.265]* [0.278]** [0.251] [0.206] [0.208]** [0.200]** [0.267] [0.218]*
employed 0.042 0.138 0.25 0.3 -0.015 -0.069 0.221 0.22
[0.130] [0.123] [0.150] [0.125]* [0.165] [0.110] [0.126] [0.111]*
single 0.426 0.599 0.01 0.226 0.437 0.527 0.623 0.769
[0.314] [0.305]* [0.284] [0.240] [0.404] [0.309] [0.419] [0.304]*
married 0.395 0.699 0.225 0.309 0.81 0.9 1.152 1.353
[0.245] [0.257]** [0.200] [0.175] [0.338]* [0.257]** [0.297]** [0.238]**
widow 0.116 0.522 -0.087 0.007 0.703 0.584 0.07 0.408
[0.419] [0.355] [0.285] [0.238] [0.367] [0.314] [0.346] [0.297]
ses_ml_low -2.448 -2.421 -2.615 -2.357 -1.442 -1.575 -1.297 -1.464
[0.267]** [0.192]** [0.247]** [0.178]** [0.280]** [0.172]** [0.282]** [0.170]**
ses_mod -1.312 -1.173 -1.062 -0.934 -0.485 -0.527 -0.56 -0.732
[0.218]** [0.165]** [0.184]** [0.158]** [0.200]* [0.155]** [0.214]* [0.161]**
Observations 1327 1327 1474 1474 1483 1483 1487 1487
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire (English)
FINAL
August 30, 2004









H. Respondent's first name
I. Interviewer #
J. Gender of interviewer
K. Date
L. Time started




What language would you prefer to use in our survey today: Uzbek, Russian, Kazak,
Tajik, Kyrgyz, or Karakalpak?”









(Read) My name is _____________________, and I am working with Expert Fikri, a
sociological research center. Our Center regularly conducts opinion surveys to study
people's opinions on various questions. As you probably know, study of people's
opinions is important for understanding how people live, what their concerns and
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aspirations are, and what they would like to change in their society. In this survey, in
every oblast of the country, we are studying people's perceptions and opinions of
social conditions, individual and family economic well-being, the current state of the
economy, and regional links and cooperation in Central Asia.
You were selected by chance and no one else can be interviewed instead of you. All
information you provide will only be used in an aggregate form, along with the
answers of thousands of other people. Your name, address and your personal opinion
will not be released to any government department or other organization. This
interview will take about 40 minutes.
In the course of the interview, if you don’t know the answer or don’t have an opinion,
feel free to say so. If I go too fast or too slow, or if you don’t understand the question,
let me know.
Now, before we begin, do you have any questions of me?
DEMOGRAPHICS
How old are you?
____________
What is your main ethnic heritage?
[RECORD VERBATIM] __________
What is your marital status?
[CARD]
Married
Married by religious ceremony nikoh
Married, but my spouse lives elsewhere because of work
Live with somebody but not registered (grazhdanski brak)




What is the highest level of education you have received?
Incomplete secondary school (8-9 years) or less
Specialized secondary school (technical or vocational school)
Complete secondary school (10-11 years)
Incomplete higher education or bachelor's degree
Complete higher education, master's degree or greater
DK/NR
199
What is the highest educational level achieved by a member of your household other
than yourself?
Elementary and incomplete secondary school (8-9 years) or less
Specialized secondary school (technical or vocational school)
Complete secondary school (10-11 years)
Incomplete higher education or bachelor's degree
Complete higher education, master's degree, or greater
DK/NR
LANGUAGE
What language do you think in?
___________
What other languages do you speak?









SATISFACTION AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life – very satisfied, fairly






How would you describe your household’s current economic situation - is it very







How would you rate the economic situation in your household a few years ago – was







Imagine a 10-step ladder where the poorest people are standing on the first, or lowest,
step, stand the and the richest people are standing on the tenth, or highest, step On
what step would you place yourself today?
[RECORD THE NUMBER]
How long do you think it will take for you to reach a satisfactory standard of living?
[SHOW CARD]





It will take at least 50 years
Never
Other (specify)DK/NR
CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL COHESION
I am going to read you a list of various activities. I would like you to tell me, if over
the last few years you have been involved in any of the following activities in the past
three years
[READ ONE BY ONE AND MARK THE RESPONSE]
Yes No DK/NR
1. Write a letter of complaint to local or national
authorities
2. Sign a petition to local or national authorities
3. Ask your local council to resolve the issue
(use appropriate name, e.g. mahalla committee)
4. Organize people in your mahalla/village to
address the issue
5. Contact the press/media
6. Take part in an authorized protest, such as
meeting, strike, picket, etc.
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In the past 12 months, have you heard of any instances were people in your village or
city have joined together to bring their grievances to local government (hokimiat,




Are there grievances that you together with the representatives of your community






COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COOPERATION
Has the frequency of interaction with your relatives decreased or increased over the
last few years?
Increased (SKIP TO Q-19)
Stayed the same (SKIP TO Q-19)
Decreased
DK/NR (SKIP TO Q-19)
If DECREASED, why do you think the frequency of interaction has decreased?
[RECORD VERBATIM]
Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?
People can be trusted
You can’t be too careful
DK/NR
In the past 12 months did you participate in any unpaid communal activities (such as
beautification of the neighborhood), in which people came together to do some work
for the benefit of all?
Yes
No (SKIP TO Q-22)
DK/NR (SKIP TO Q-22)
If YES, what exactly did you do in these communal activities?
[RECORD VERBATIM]
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SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY
In your opinion, what are the three most critical issues that people in your village/city
faces today?
[OPEN ENDED, RECORD VERBATIM UP TO THREE]
Compared to few years ago, do you feel less safe or more safe when you go walking
about alone when it is dark - is it much more safe, somewhat more safe, about the





INTEREST OF GOVERNMENT IN YOUR LIFE
Do the local authorities (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village council) take
















Are unofficial leaders, people who do not work for hokimiat or mahalla committee,





Do you or anyone in your immediate family receive any kind of subsidy from the





Now let's talk about disputes and conflicts that sometimes happen between different
groups or people in the society.
Where do people usually go to attempt to resolve disputes and conflicts:
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Are there organizations, movements, or groups in society causing problems in your
COUNTRY?
Yes
No (SKIP TO Q-31)
DK/NR (SKIP TO Q-31)
[If YES] what groups or organizations do you have in mind?
[RECORD VERBATIM. DO NOT USE ACRONYMS OR ABBREVIATIONS FOR
NAMES OF ORGANIZATIONS.]
How likely is conflict within COUNTRY over the next few years– highly likely,




Not likely at all (SKIP TO Q-35)
NR/DK (SKIP TO Q-35)
Conflict over what? Name up to three reasons.
[RECORD VERBATIM]
What kinds of groups might be in conflict? Name up to three groups.
[RECORD VERBATIM, DO NOT USE ACRONYMS OR ABBREVIATIONS.]








How likely is conflict on the local level, in your village/city, over the next few years –




Not likely at all (SKIP TO Q-38)
NR/DK (SKIP TO Q-38)
Conflict over what? Name up to three reasons.
[RECORD VERBATIM]
How intense might this conflict be?
Armed conflict
Mass disorder




How likely is conflict between COUNTRY and other countries in Central Asia –
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan - over the next few years - is it




Not likely at all (GO TO Q-41)
NR/DK (GO TO Q-41)
Conflict with which country and over what?
[READ COUNTRY NAME AND RECORD VERBATIM REASONS OF
CONFLICT IN THE TABLE BELOW]
How intense might this conflict be for each country named?




























RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS
Which is of more importance to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?




DO NOT CARE ABOUT EITHER
DK/NR
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How would you describe current relations among ethnic groups in COUNTRY – are





DK/NR (SKIP TO Q-44)
Why do you think so?
[OPEN ENDED, LIST ALL THAT RESPONDENTS NOTE]
Generally, how much do you feel in common with members of these different groups
– do you have much in common, little in common, nothing at all in common with:
Much Little Nothing DK/NR
Majority nationality
Russians
Other largest ethnic group
[Nationalities specific to the country surveyed]
In your opinion, will current relations among ethnic groups in COUNTRY change for
the better, stay the same, or change for the worse over the following periods of time?
Change for the
better










How do you rate COUNTRY’s policy towards the following groups in the
COUNTRY – is it very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, very unfair?




[Nationalities specific to the country surveyed, e.g., Uzbeks in KG, Uzbeks in TJ,
Tajiks in UZ.]
In the last several years, have you experienced instances of discrimination because of
your ethnicity in COUNTRY?
Yes
No (GO TO Q-49)
DK/NR (GO TO Q-49)
What have your experiences been like?
[RECORD VERBATIM]
ATTITUDES TOWARDS NEWCOMERS
Have new people moved to your village or city in the last few years?
Yes
Yes, my family and I moved here (GO TO Q-51)
No (GO TO Q-53)
DK/NR (GO TO Q-53)
Where are these people from?
RECORD COUNTRY NAME _______________________
Other Oblast of COUNTRY________________ 98
DK/NR ____________________________ 99
ATTENTION: INTERVIEWER, GO TO Q-52
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Where did you and/or your family move from?
RECORD COUNTRY NAME ________________
OTHER OBLAST OF COUNTRY 98
DK/NR 99
In your opinion, are there any tensions between newcomers and local people? If yes,




I want to remind you that if you don’t know the answer or don’t understand the
question, please feel free to say so.
BORDERS
Now I’d like to ask you several questions about borders between COUNTRY
and other Central Asian countries.
What impact have borders between COUNTRY and other Central Asian countries
had in the following areas – is it very positive, positive, no impact, negative, or very
negative?








a. trade, transport, transit across new
borders
b. access to water
c. access to energy (electricity, fuel,
etc.)
d. ability to make financial transactions
for business
e. access to family, friends, or business
associates
f. conflict, insecurity and crime
g. drug traffic and use
h. ability to communicate in one
common language
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How do you rate border relations between COUNTRY and its Central Asian
neighbors over the last few years?
[SHOW CARD]
[DO NOT ASK ABOUT THE COUNTRY THAT YOU ARE IN]






If you have traveled to any other Central Asian countries since 2000, what was the
purpose of your travel? Select all that apply.
[SHOW CARD, ASK FOR THE FOUR COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE ONE
YOU ARE IN]
No travel [ONLY VOLUNTARY ANSWER]
To find work
Business or trade
For my current work





Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan
To find work 1 1 1 1
Business or
trade
2 2 2 2
For my current
work




4 4 4 4
For vacation 5 5 5 5





98 98 98 98
DK/NR 99 99 99 99
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[IF TRAVELED] Have you encountered any of the following problems when
traveling to any of the Central Asian countries?
[SHOW CARD, CHECK ALL THAT APPLY}
Time-consuming visa processing
Expensive visa
Mistreatment at the embassy
Mistreatment at the border control
Mistreatment at customs control
Difficulty with registration in the country of visit
Denial in registration in the country of visit
Expensive or unavailable air-tickets
Crossing the border took an inordinate amount of time
Mistreatment in a country of travel a result of national or ethnic identity
Bribes to immigration and customs officers at the border.
Other (Specify)
DK/NR
LABOR AND TRADE MIGRATION
How many children do you have?
RECORD
NO CHILDREN 99
Did you or anyone in your household leave your village or city to work or engage in
trade between 2004 and the present? It can be any kind of a trip, except for
“komandirovka”.
Yes
No (GO TO Q-75)
DK/NR (GO TO Q-75)









ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! QUESTION 60 IS ONLY FOR THOSE WHO
HAVE TRAVELED WITHIN COUNTRY IN Q-59. FOR OTHERS, GO TO Q-61
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Which oblasts of COUNTRY did you go to?
List of oblasts with codes goes here
Traveled within my Oblast 98
DK/NR 99
Did you go to a city or village?
City
Village
Both city and village
NR
What type of work or trade did you primarily engage in the other village or city?
[SHOW CARD]
Agriculture sector
Construction and house renovation






ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! Q-63 IS ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DID TRADE
If trade, what goods did you primarily trade?
Agricultural produce
Food products
Goods produced in the country where you traded
Goods not produced in the country where traded
Gasoline/oil/diesel fuel
Agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds, etc.)
Other
DK/NR
ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! Q-64 IS ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DIDN’T DO
TRADE IN Q-62.
What exactly did you do?
RECORD VERBATIM. DO NOT ACCEPT ANSWERS LIKE “ENGINEER” OR
“WORKER”




3-4 times a week
3-4 times a month
3-4 times a year
Other (specify)______
DK/NR








How many trips did you make during 2004?
_______________.
What year did you first go to work outside your place of residence?
_______
DK/NR
What did you do before leaving?
[SHOW CARD]
Independent entrepreneur
Head/manager of company or organization
Farmer
Specialist with higher education




Retired and don’t work









What is the primary reason you went to work or trade outside your place of
residence?
[SHOW CARD]
No work in our village/city
Better opportunities elsewhere
Earn money for special events (wedding and the like)
Other (Specify)__________________
DK/NR
Has the household’s financial situation changed as a result of your working or trading








What percentage of your total household income in 2004 constitutes income from
your trips?
RECORD ___%
What were two major difficulties if any, that you had when traveling and staying
outside your village or city for work or trade?
[RECORD VERBATIM UP TO TWO]
Now I will ask you a few questions about security in COUNTRY and its
cooperation with other countries.
SENSE OF SECURITY AND PERCEPTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES
In your opinion, where does the greatest threat to the security of COUNTRY come
from, Choose up to two.
[SHOW CARD]
From another former Soviet republic
From some other foreign country
From religious organizations
From organized crime (SKIP TO Q-77)
Feel no particular threat at all (SKIP TO Q-77)
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Other (specify) (SKIP TO Q-77)
DK/NR (SKIP TO Q-77)




Which country in Central Asia do you regard as the most important partner for
COUNTRY?






6. NONE OF THESE (voluntary)
9. DK/NR
Which countries outside of Central Asia do you regard as the most important partners






How do you assess the economic cooperation in Central Asia over the last 2 to 3







What are the two most important issues for cooperation between COUNTRY and
other Central Asian countries?
[SHOW CARD, ACCEPT UP TO TWO ANSWERS]
Trade, transport, transit of goods across new borders
Regional security
Migration, movement of people across borders for work
Water management
Environmental issues
Financial services, such as financial transactions, money transfers and convertibility
Drug trafficking and use
Human trafficking, especially women and children
Social security and welfare
Other (specify)
DK/NR
SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY
Regarding the overall situation in COUNTRY today - are you generally satisfied or







What are the three most important problems in COUNTRY today?
[RECORD VERBATIM UP TO THREE.]
How would you describe the current economic situation in COUNTRY -- is it very







When do you think people in COUNTRY will live better?
[SHOW CARD]





It will take at least 50 years
Other (specify)
DK/NR
Please look at the following list of governmental functions. Please rate the quality of
these functions provided by the state as very poor, poor, fair, good, or very good:
[SHOW CARD. READ CATEGORIES AND MARK RESPONSES ONE BY ONE]
V
Poor






e. programs for youth ( solving problems of
youth)
f. social assistance programs
g. protecting the rights of ethnic minorities
h. maintaining good relations with other
Central Asian countries
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a. security in the
country

















When you think about how fairly people are treated in society, how would you say
that people like yourself are treated by the following institutions? Would you say that
you are treated: always fairly, mostly fairly, sometimes fairly and sometimes not,




















d. collective farm –
selsovet (use the
appropriate name) [DO





h. clergy (of mosques
and churches)
CORRUPTION
Now two questions about corruption. In your opinion, how serious is the level of





Not a problem at all
DK/NR
As I mention various organizations, please tell me how much corruption you think
there is among people in each of them – A great deal, a fair amount, not very much,
none?
[SHOW CARD. READ CATEGORIES AND MARK RESPONSES ONE BY ONE.]












Passport and Registration Offices
RELIGION
What role do you think Islam plays in the political life of COUNTRY – a very
important role, a somewhat important role, a small role, no role at all?
An extremely important role
A somewhat important role
A small role
No role at all
DK/NR
What role do you think Islam should play in the political life of COUNTRY – a very
important role, a somewhat important role, a small role, no role at all?
A very important role
A somewhat important role
A small role
No role at all
DK/NR
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Atheist/no religion (GO TO Q-96)
DK/NR
How many times a day do you pray?
RECORD
LESS THAN 1time/DAY (DURING HOLIDAYS OR DURING RAMAZAN) 8
DK/NR 9
ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! QUESTIONS 94 AND 95 ARE FOR MUSLIMS
ONLY. FOR OTHERS MOVE TO QUESTION 96.
Do you know what jihad means in Islam?
Yes
No (GO TO Q-96)
DK/NR (GO TO Q-96)
Some people say that jihad is a fight of a Muslim with the devil inside oneself, others
say that it is a fight of a Muslim with non-Muslims. Which point of you do you share?
Jihad is a fight of a Muslim with the devil inside oneself
Jihad is a fight of a Muslim with non-Muslims





We are coming to the end of the interview. The last questions are about you and
your household.
Are you currently employed?
Yes (GO TO Q-98)
No
If unemployed, what is your current status?
[SHOW CARD]
Student
Retired or disabled, do not work
Housewife, or currently on child care leave
Temporarily unemployed and looking for a job
Temporarily unemployed and not looking for a job
Other (specify)
DK/NR
INTERVIEWER, GO TO Q-99!
Please tell, which category on this card describes your position on your current job?
[SHOW CARD]
Independent entrepreneur
Head/manager of company or organization
Farmer
Specialist with higher education






Please look at this card. Which one statement best characterizes the situation in your
household?
[SHOW CARD]
Difficult to provide the family with basic food
Manage to provide basic food but find it difficult to pay utility bills and buy clothes
Can afford required foods, clothes and pay utility bills, but cannot afford such goods
as TV, refrigerator, etc.
We can afford to buy a TV or refrigerator, but cannot afford a car, a new house or
travel to another country.
Can buy a car, a new house or travel to another country, etc.
Don’t know/ No Response
What are three main sources of income for your household?
[SHOW CARD]
Salary, wages
Cash or in-kind rent/lease payments received (for land, equipment, machinery,
housing or other premises)






Money or in-kind assistance from relatives in the country










Appendix 6: Survey Questions
Survey of Conflict Prevention and Cooperation, 2004
Description of labels and values of database variables
Q1 What language do you prefer to use during our conversation?
Q2_DECADEAge of respondent (by decade)
Q3 Nationality of respondent
Q4 Marital status of respondent
Q5 Highest level of education of respondent
Q6 Is there anybody in your household who has a higher educational level
than yours? If yes, what is that level?
Q7 What language do you think?
Q8 What other languages do you speak fluently?
Q9 Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life
Q10 How do you estimate current economic situation of your household?
Q11 How would you rate the economic situation in your household a few
years ago in comparison with current situation?
Q12 Imagine a 10-step ladder where the poorest people are standing on the
first, or lowest, step, and the richest people are standing on the tenth,
or highest, step. On what step would you place yourself today?
Q13 How long do you think it will take for you to reach a satisfactory
standard of living?
Q14A Did you write a letter of complaint to the national or local authorities
in the past three years?
Q14B Did you sign any collective petition to the national or local authorities
in the past three years?
Q14C Did you ask your mahalla committee to resolve any issue in the past
three years?
Q14D Did you organize people in your mahalla/village to resolve any issue
in the past three years?
Q14E Did you contact the press/media with any problem in the past three
years?
Q14F Did you take part in an authorized protest (meetings, strikes, pickets)
in the past three years?
Q14G Did you take part in an unauthorized protest (meetings, strikes,
pickets) in the past three years?
Q15 In the past 12 months, have you heard of any instances were people in
your village or city have joined together to bring their grievances to
local government (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village council)?
Q16 Are there grievances that you together with the representatives of your
community would like to discuss with authorities?
Q16C Comments of respondent to question 16
Q17 Has the frequency of interaction with your relatives decreased or
increased over the last few years?
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Q18 Why do you think the frequency of interaction has decreased?
Q19 Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted, or
that you should be too careful in dealing with people?
Q20 In the past 12 months did you participate in any unpaid communal
activities (such as beautification of the neighborhood)?
Q21 What exactly did you do in these communal activities?
Q22 In your opinion, what are the three most critical issues that people in
your village/city faces today?
Q23 Compared to few years ago, do you feel less safe or more safe when
you go walking about alone when it is dark?
Q24 Do the local authorities (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village
council) take interest in and responds to the needs of people in your
city/village?
Q25 Does the national government take interest in and responds to the
needs of people in your city/village?
Q26 Are unofficial leaders, people who do not work for hokimiat or
mahalla committee, more active in your city or village than hokimiat
or mahalla?
Q27 Do you or anyone in your immediate family receive any kind of
subsidy from the state during the last 12 months excepting pension?
Q28A Who usually resolves disputes and conflicts within the family?
Q28B Who usually resolves disputes and conflicts between families and
neighbors?
Q28C Who usually resolves disputes and conflicts between people living in
the border rayons of neighboring countries?
Q29 Are there organizations, movements, or groups in our society causing
problems?
Q30 What organisations or groups do you have in mind, when you talk
about organisation or groups causing problems in our society?
Q31 How likely is conflict within our country over the next few years?
Q32 What can be possible reasons for such conflict in our country over the
next few years?
Q33 What groups or individuals can take part in this conflict in our country
over the next few years?
Q34 In which form can the conflict be in our country over the next few
years?
Q35 How likely is conflict on the local level, in your village/city, over the
next few years?
Q36 What can be possible reasons for such conflict in your city/village
over the next few years?
Q37 In which form can the conflict be in your city/village over the next
few years?
Q38 How likely is conflict between (country) and other countries in
Central Asia?
Q39A1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Kazakhstan?
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Q39A2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and
Kazakhstan?
Q40A In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Kazakhstan?
Q39B1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Kyrghyzstan?
Q39B2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and
Kyrghyzstan?
Q40B In which form can the conflict be between (country) and
Kyrghyzstan?
Q39C1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Tadjikistan?
Q39C2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and
Tadjikistan?
Q40C In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Tadjikistan?
Q39D1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Turkmenistan?
Q39D2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and
Turkmenistan?
Q40D In which form can the conflict be between (country) and
Turkmenistan?
Q39E1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Uzbekistan?
Q39E2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and
Uzbekistan?
Q40E In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Uzbekistan?
Q41 Which is more important to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?
Q42 How would you estimate current relations among people of different
ethnic groups in (country)?
Q431 Why do you estimate current relations among people of different
ethnic groups in (country) as good relations?
Q432 Why do you estimate current relations among people of different
ethnic groups in (country) as bad relations?
Q44A How much do you feel in common with Kazakhs?
Q44B How much do you feel in common with Kyrgyz?
Q44C How much do you feel in common with Tajiks?
Q44D How much do you feel in common with Uzbeks?
Q44E How much do you feel in common with Russians?
Q45A How will change the current relations between people of different
nationalities in (country) over the next year?
Q45B How will change the current relations between people of different
nationalities in (country) over the next five years?
Q45C How will change the current relations between people of different
nationalities in (country) over the next decade?
Q46A How do you rate policy of our government towards Russians living in
(country)?
Q46B How do you rate policy of our government towards Tajiks living in
(country)?
Q46C How do you rate policy of our government towards Uzbeks living in
(country)?
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Q47 In the last several years, have you experienced instances of
discrimination because of your ethnicity in (country)?
Q48 In what form was expressed discimination of your rights in (country)
because of your nationality?
Q49 Have new people moved to your village or city for work or for living
in the last few years?
Q50 Where are people have coming for work or for living come from?
Q51 Where did you and your family move from?
Q52 Are there any tensions between newcomers and local people?
Q521 What conflicts between newcomers and local people are there?
Q53A What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in trade, transport, transit across new borders?
Q53B What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in access to water?
Q53C What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in access to energy (electricity, fuel etc.)?
Q53D What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in ability to make financial transactions for business?
Q53E What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had for access to family, friends, or business associates?
Q53F What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in conflict, insecurity and crime?
Q53G What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in use and traffic of drugs?
Q53H What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian
countries had in ability to communicate in one common language?
Q54A How do you rate border relations between (country) and Kazakhstan
over the last few years?
Q54B How do you rate border relations between (country) and Kyrgyzstan
over the last few years?
Q54C How do you rate border relations between (country) and Tajikistan
over the last few years?
Q54D How do you rate border relations between (country) and
Turkmenistan over the last few years?
Q54E How do you rate border relations between (country) and Uzbekistan
over the last few years?
Q551 If you have traveled to Kazakhstan since 2000, what was the purpose
of your travel?
Q552 If you have traveled to Kyrgyzstan since 2000, what was the purpose
of your travel?
Q553 If you have traveled to Tajikistan since 2000, what was the purpose of
your travel?
Q554 If you have traveled to Turkmenistan since 2000, what was the
purpose of your travel?
Q555 If you have traveled to Uzbekistan since 2000, what was the purpose
of your travel?
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Q56 Have you encountered any of the following problems when traveling
to any of the Central Asian countries?
Q57 How many children do you have?
Q57_REC How many children do you have?
Q58 Did you leave your village/city in 2004 for work or trade, irrespective
of trip duration?
Q59 What country did you primarly go to for work or trade?
Q60 Which oblasts of (country) did you go to for work or trade?
Q61 Did you go to a city or village for work or trade?
Q62 In which sphere of business you were mainly engaged in the place
where you went for work or trade?
Q63 What goods did you primarily trade or trade?
Q64 What exactly did you do during your trips for work or trade?
Q65 How often do you go to work or trade outside your village/city?
Q66 How long do you usually remain away for work or trade?
Q67 How many trips for work or trade did you make during 2004?
Q68 What year did you first go to work or trade outside your place of
residence?
Q69 What did you do before your first leaving for work or trade?
Q70 Did you have friends or relatives living there when you first traveled
there?
Q71 What is the primary reason you went to work or trade outside your
place of residence?
Q72 How much has the financial situation of household changed in result
of your working or trading outside of your village/city?
Q73 What percentage of your total household income in 2004 constitutes
income from your trips for work or trade?
Q74 Name please two major difficulties, that you had when traveling and
staying outside your village or city for work or trade?
Q75 In your opinion, where does the greatest threat to the security of
(country) come from or there is not such threat at all?
Q76 Which one (republic, country, organization) poses the biggest threat?
Q77 Which country in Central Asia do you regard as the most important
partner for (country)?
Q78 Which countries outside of Central Asia do you regard as the most
important partners for (country)?
Q79 How do you assess the economic cooperation in Central Asia over the
last 2 to 3 years?
Q80 Name please the two most important issues for cooperation between
(country) and other Central Asian countries?
Q81 Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in
(country) today?
Q82 In your opinion, what are the three most important problems in
(country) today?
Q83 How would you describe the current economic situation in (country)?
Q84 When do you think people in (country) will live better?
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Q85A Please rate the quality of healthcare services provided by government
of (country)?
Q85B Please rate the quality of secondary education provided by
government of (country)?
Q85C Please rate the quality of higher education provided by government of
(country)?
Q85D Please rate the quality of pensions provided by government of
(country)?
Q85E Please rate the quality of solving problems of youth provided by
government of (country)?
Q85F Please rate the quality of social assistance and programs provided by
government of (country)?
Q85G Please rate the quality of protecting the rights of ethnic minorities
provided by government of (country)?
Q85H Please rate the quality of maintaining good relations with other
Central Asian countries provided by government of (country)?
Q86A How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with security in the country?
Q86B How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with respect of rights of citizens
by authorities?
Q86C How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with customs services?
Q86D How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with border guards?
Q86E How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with law enforcement officials
(police, persecutor, courts)?
Q86F How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with opportunity of citizens to
influence the State power?
Q86G How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with level of political freedoms?
Q86H How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with level of independence of the
mass media?
Q87A How fairly does khokimiat treat you and people like you?
Q87B How fairly does national goverment treat you and people like you?
Q87C How fairly does president administration treat you and people like
you?
Q87D How fairly does mahalla committe treat you and people like you?
Q87E How fairly do heads of rural community treat you and people like
you?
Q87F How fairly does militsia staff treat you and people like you?
Q87G How fairly do courts treat you and people like you?
Q87H How fairly do tax authorities treat you and people like you?
Q87I How fairly do clergy (of mosques and churches) treat you and people
like you?
Q88 In your opinion, how serious is the level of corruption in (country)?
Q89A How much corruption you think there is among staff of the courts?
Q89B How much corruption you think there is among staff of the militsia?
Q89C How much corruption you think there is among clergy of mosques
and churches?
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Q89D How much corruption you think there is among staff of healthcare
institutions?
Q89E How much corruption you think there is among staff of universities
and other institutions of higher education?
Q89F How much corruption you think there is among staff of secondary
schools?
Q89G How much corruption you think there is among staff of local
government?
Q89H How much corruption you think there is among staff of national
government?
Q89I How much corruption you think there is among staff of mahalla
committee?
Q89J How much corruption you think there is among staff of passport and
registration offices?
Q90 What role do you think Islam plays in the political life of (country)?
Q91 What role do you think Islam should play in the political life of
(country)?
Q92 What is your religion?
Q93 How many times a day do you pray?
Q94 Do you know what jihad means in Islam?
Q95 Some people say that jihad is a fight of a Muslim with the devil inside
oneself, others say that it is a fight of a Muslim with non-Muslims.
Which point of you do you share?
Q96 Are you currently employed?
Q97 If unemployed, what is your current status?
Q98 Which category on this card describes your position on your main
job?
Q99 Which one statement best characterizes the situation in your
household?
Q100 Name please three main sources of income for your household.
Q101_GROUPS How many members are there of your household?
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